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Plans do not serve the particular circumstances of a given situation, but rather serve as abstract 
descriptions of some future activities. The relationship between plans, which are abstract, and actions, 
which are concrete, is referred to as the relationship between plans and situated actions. This 
relationship can be formulated in the following questions: 1) How do individuals conceive of future 
activities? 2) How does an individual who is acting upon a plan adjust when facing contingencies? 
The relationship between plans and situated actions has remained a source of intense academic 
discussions (e.g., Bardram, 1997; Bardram & Hensen, 2010; Leudar & Costall, 1996; Ng, 2002; 
Schmidt, 1997; Suchman, 1987). Despite the ample research on the relationship between plans and 
situated actions, a review of the literature indicates that the problem has not been adequately 
addressed (Randall et al., 2007; Suchman 2003), which has compelled this researcher to create a 
theoretical model that integrates the disparate nature of plans and line of actions.  
Drawing on research on cognition and categorization theory, this thesis proposes a theoretical 
framework that conceptualizes the relationship between plans and situated actions in terms of activity 
categories. Specifically, the theoretical framework draws on the prototype and basic-level category 
theories of categorization, both of which were developed primarily by Rosch (1978), as well as the 
field theory developed by Lewin (1936). Categorization theories are used to address plans’ 
abstractness as they capture typifications of human experience. Field theory is used to address the 
concreteness of action as it captures dynamic properties of the situation in the here and now. The 
basic premise of the theoretical framework is that individuals conceive (have a knowledge) of plans 
and their attributes as future activity categories with a range of possibilities. These possibilities are 
structurally graded, ranging from highly typical to atypical. Plans are believed to be formed based on 
what is typical for the activity. The theoretical framework argues that an association exists between 
an individual’s knowledge of typical adjustment relevant to the activity and actual adjustment the 
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individual makes while performing the activity. With this in mind, the theoretical framework 
considers the actor’s perspective to be central to the investigation. Based on the theoretical 
framework, several hypotheses are formularized and tested.  
An in-depth case study conducted in a ready-mix concrete company was used to examine aspects 
of the theoretical framework empirically. The results of the case study provide a wide range of 
independent evidence supporting the framework. In addition, an experimental methodology was 
developed for quantitative testing in the laboratory aspects of the theoretical framework not attainable 
in the case study. Theoretical and practical implications of the proposed framework and empirical 
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Plans, like any models of reality, cannot be as exact as the reality itself (Ashby, 1970). Although they 
serve as abstract descriptions of some future activities, plans do not in fact reflect the particular 
circumstances of a given situation. The disparate nature between plans, which are abstract, and lines of 
action, which are concrete, poses a challenge in how they are related. In the literature, this problem—a 
fundamental problem in information systems—is referred to as the relationship between plans and 
situated actions (Suchman, 2007). 
Ample research exists on the plan–action relationship1 (e.g., Bardram, 1997; Bardram & Hensen, 2010; 
Leudar & Costall, 1996; Ng, 2002; Schmidt, 1997; Suchman, 2007). The literature review herein 
concludes that six paramount issues exist in the plan–action relationship: 1) whether goals precede or 
follow actions; 2) whether actions are produced partly by goals or completely by local contingencies; 3) 
whether actions are planned or are fundamentally improvised and ad hoc; 4) whether plans adequately 
describe actions; 5) whether plans control actions; and 6) whether hierarchical levels or a single level 
exists in which the plan–action relationship works. However, methodologically, a number of 
disagreements have arisen in the literature, including 1) the appropriate unit of analysis (mechanisms and 
constraints of human cognition versus individuals acting in a setting); 2) the appropriate method for 
studying human action (laboratory experiments versus observations in natural settings); and 3) the role of 
human perception (is it fundamental to studying behaviors and experiences or a superfluous psychological 
apparatus?). Given that such themes are the foundation of the plan–action relationship debate, it is 
essential to discuss these themes in detail, which the current study will do in the literature review. 
Despite the ample research on the plan–action relationship, there is a lack of a theoretical framework on 
how plans and actions are related (Suchman, 2003). The lack of a theoretical framework serves as the 
                                                   
1 In this thesis the choice of writing “plan–action” with an en-dash, rather than “plans and situated actions,” stems from the fact 
that plans and situated actions are not contrast categories, although any act of planning would have to be situated as well. 
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impetus for the current inquiry. In particular, the aims of this research are to investigate 1) how 
individuals conceive (have knowledge and awareness) of plans and 2) how an individual who is acting 
upon a plan adjusts when facing contingencies. The resulting theoretical framework must combine the 
abstractness of the plan with the concreteness of the action.  
To this end, the current study encompasses two primary objectives. First, it presents a theoretical 
framework that combines plans as an abstract concept and the line of actions as a concrete concept. The 
theoretical framework draws on the prototype and basic-level category theories of categorization, both of 
which were developed primarily by Rosch (1978), as well as the field theory developed by Lewin (1936). 
Categorization theories are used to address plans’ abstractness, as they capture typifications of human 
experience. Field theory is used to address the concreteness of an action as it captures dynamic properties 
of the situation in the here and now. Second, the proposed theoretical framework is examined 
quantitatively and qualitatively through two studies: a case study and a laboratory experiment. The case 
study was conducted at a ready-mix concrete plant and was followed by a laboratory experiment based on 
the French card game La Belote. The laboratory experiment addressed the aspects of the plan–action 
relationship that were not testable through the case study.  
This work will, therefore, contribute to the information systems literature by addressing in detail the 
key themes of the plan–action relationship. In addition, through its theoretical framework, this work will 
provide a better understanding of how plans are related to the actions to which they refer. This work will 
also consider some of the implications for human categorization processes and information systems 
literature.  
This dissertation consists of two major areas of work: theoretical and empirical. The theoretical element 
includes the literature review and theoretical framework. Specifically, Chapter 2 reviews and assesses the 
literature related to the plan–action relationship to examine the underlying assumptions of prior research; 
the chapter further reviews and contrasts the major theoretical approaches, the psychological theory of 
planning, and the situated action perspective of plans. Chapter 3 draws from the literature review to 
present a theoretical framework that combines plans and actions utilizing field theory (Lewin, 1936) and 
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categorization theories (Rosch, 1978). The model, which draws on both Lewin’s theory (1936) and 
Rosch’s theories (1978), is then formalized and the hypotheses presented. 
The empirical element of the dissertation, which includes case study and laboratory experiments, is 
structured as follows: Chapter 4 reviews the case study background, method, and the reliability and 
validity of the case study. Chapter 5 then presents the results and analysis of the case study. Also, the 
chapter offers a discussion of the case study limitations. Chapter 6 discusses the laboratory experiment, 
reviewing experimental tasks used to investigate plans; it further presents the results and the analysis of 
the conducted laboratory experiment. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the laboratory 




Theoretical Part: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
 
One might ask where these theorists [Hobbes, Rousseau, Adam Smith and Marx] 
found governing conceptions about mankind in the absence of a science of 
psychology. The answer is that they found them in their own observations and 







Planning is a fundamental ability for humans and an essential part of everyday life (Dreher & Oerter, 
1987). For example, people plan their diet to lose weight or stay healthy, couples plan their wedding 
party, and families plan where and how to spend a long-deserved vacation. Organizations also plan as 
companies announce plans to reduce costs and introduce new products. Governments release plans to 
reduce taxes and provide better services to citizens. Even on a worldwide scale, nations are collectively 
planning how to overcome the global recession. Given the pervasiveness of planning in contemporary 
society, what do the sciences have to say about plans? Scientists in fields such as organizational theory, 
operations research, information systems and psychology, to name a few, have positioned planning as 
central to their various enquiries (Das, Kar, & Parrila, 1996; Friedman, Scholnick, & Cocking, 1987; 
Thompson, 1967; Wezel, Meystel, & Jorna, 2006). One of the fundamental issues in planning—and an 
active area of debate—is how plans (which are abstract) and lines of action (which are concrete) are 
related (Bardram, 1997; Leudar & Costall, 1996; Ng, 2002; Schmidt, 1997; Suchman, 1987).  
In the context of planning, two extreme positions have emerged: the psychological theory of planning 
(i.e., the “classical view”), which argues that plans are central to understanding human behavior (Miller, 
Galanter, & Pribram, 1960), and the situated action perspective of plans, which claims that improvisations 
rather than plans are the central phenomena for understanding human behavior (Suchman, 1987).2 The 
psychological theory of planning posits that actions are goal directed, consequential, and connected to 
knowledge about the goal. Once the hierarchical structure of plans is formed and executed, desired goals 
can be reached. In this process, feedback loops play an essential role in responding to environmental 
disturbances. According to this view, the process of attaining goals by forming and executing the 
hierarchical structure of plans with the aid of feedback loops demonstrates the control property of plans. 
                                                   
2 I do not describe situated actions as a theory, but as perspective, as some proponents of situated actions (e.g., Suchman, 2007) 
take a position against theoretical abstractions, preferring instead detailed descriptions of situations as a method of conducting 
research (Kushmerick, 1996; Loren, Dietrich, Morrison, & Beskin, 1998).     
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In their discussion of plans, Miller et al. (1960) suggested that plans for individuals are analogous to 
computer programs for machines.   
Meanwhile, the situated action perspective presumes that actions are not goal-directed; rather, goals are 
constructed within the activity and through after-the-fact rationalizations about actions (Lave, 1988). 
According to this view, plans cannot describe, predict, or specify actions on a moment-by-moment level, 
indicating that plans do not control actions with certainty. Indeed, plans are a weak resource that orients 
individuals toward their actions. They provide contexts for reasoning about actions prior to or (less often) 
during the activity. Rationalizing and interpreting actions primarily occur after the fact.  
As previously indicated, these two views—classical planning and situated action—are the extremes; 
other models and theories can be classified in connection to either of these or can take a more moderate 
position. Researchers in various fields have adopted such views to examine planning. For example, one 
approach to planning that is closer to the classical view comes from operations research, which is based 
on mathematical models built on previously known objectives or goals designed to achieve optimal 
solutions by satisfying a set of constraints (i.e., forces that define the problem space or the set of options; 
Ackoff, 1970; Starr, 1966). Yet operations research has been criticized as being more concerned with the 
mathematics than with investigating real-world problems and the actualities of production management 
(Ackoff, 1979; Crawford & Wiers, 2001; McKay, 2001; McKay, Safayeni, & Buzacott, 1988; McKay, 
Safayeni, & Buzacott, 1995; McKay & Wiers, 2006). For example, McKay et al. (1995) identified formal 
scheduling processes that contrast how schedulers actually accomplish their activities. When McKay et al. 
(1995) investigated different input information, heuristics, and skills in relation to scheduling practices, 
they discovered that different sorts of plans exist, such as “political plans” for formal communication and 
“private plans” that reflect what is actually happening.  
Another approach to planning that is closer to situated action perspective has been put forward by 
several organizational theorists, who suggested that a plan’s role is to refer to what happened in the past, 
not what is expected to happen in the future (March, 1974; Weick, 1969). Weick (1969) asserted that 
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“[p]lans seem to exist in a context of justification more than in a context of anticipation. They refer more 
to what has been accomplished than to what is yet to be accomplished” (p. 102).  
Meanwhile, a more moderate position is evident in the cultural and historical school of psychology. 
Bardram (1997) presented a model based on activity theory that presumes that activities are goal or 
motive directed, with goals differentiating one activity from another. Plans can be purely intangible (e.g., 
residing in the head) or material artifacts (e.g., a checklist or flight schedule) that are culturally and 
historically developed. In addition, plans are not always completely developed before actions occur, but 
continue to develop within the ongoing activity in which plans are implemented via the hierarchical 
structure of the activity and feedback mechanisms. Plans also control human activities, transforming a 
motive or goal into outcomes (Bardram, 1997).  
In the context of strategic planning, Mintzberg and Waters (1985) posed a more moderate position by 
differentiating two types of plans. Deliberate plans are based on established goals that control subsequent 
actions whereas emergent plans are based on realizing goals after the fact (hence, the control property is 
relaxed). The authors suggested that the process of “strategy formation walks on two feet, one deliberate, 
and the other emergent” (p. 271). They further asserted that individuals acting in organizations have their 
own intentions and goals. Thus, in emergent plans or strategies, acting in accordance with plans indicates 
that the plan has provided a vision for the actors, which might change through frequent feedback from the 
surrounding environment. Indeed, if this is the case, earlier vision does not control actors’ actions.  
In the organizational context, Ackoff (1970) used the word “adaptivizing” to suggest that planning aims 
to control the future. Specifically he proposed that plans motivate individuals to behave in a way that is 
consistent with their goals. He classified the future into three categories: 1) highly predictable (e.g., time 
required to ship a product); 2) uncertain, but with high probabilities (e.g., alternative fuel, cleaner car 
engines); and 3) unknown, with unpredictable probabilities or even possibilities (e.g., technological 
breakthroughs).  
These various planning approaches demonstrate how the key themes of the plan–action relationship are 
addressed, highlighting key similarities and differences. Previous analyses of the literature and 
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researchers’ recommendations (e.g., Kushmerick, 1996; Wilson & Myers, 2000) reveal that the two 
extreme views of planning—namely, the classical psychological theory and the situated action view—
comprehensively address the dominant properties of the planning phenomenon and elucidate the 
underlying assumptions of different theoretical approaches and models. Therefore, the remainder of this 
literature review will describe the psychological planning and situated action view of plans to specify and 
explicate the underlying assumptions of the plan–action relationship. Each description is followed by a 
critical assessment.  
2.1 Psychological Theory of Planning   
The psychological theory of planning was primarily and most comprehensively articulated by Miller et al. 
(1960) in their book Plans and the Structure of Behavior. The aim of the psychological theory of planning 
is to describe the relationship between cognition and actions by introducing the concept of plans.  
2.1.1 The View of Action and Plan  
According to Miller et al. (1960), actions are not only goal-directed, but also preceded by plans. The 
argument that all actions are planned suggests that, in order to conduct everyday life activities, individuals 
create and deploy plans. Miller et al. (1960) defined plans as “any hierarchical process in the organism 
that can control the order in which a sequence of operations is to be performed” (p. 16; emphasis in 
original). 
2.1.2 Propositions of the Plan–action Relationship  
Based on Miller et al.’s (1960) definition of planning, the plan–action relationship includes two 
propositions: a hierarchical structure and a control mechanism. Miller et al. (1960) argued that plans are 
composed of sub-plans, with both plans and sub-plans having a hierarchical structure. They further 
proposed using a feedback loop in their model, which they called the Test-Operate-Test-Exit (TOTE) 
unit. The authors asserted that plans are composed of multiple sub-plans, each of which has associated 
TOTE units. When a plan or sub-plan is executed, the TOTE unit first tests the result of execution (i.e., its 
current state) by comparing it with the goal (i.e., its desired state). If no incongruity exists between the 
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current state and the desired state when an individual performs the TOTE unit, he or she exits the 
feedback loop; otherwise, he or she continues to operate, which means that another action is carried out 
according to the plan, followed by another test. These steps are repeated until no incongruity exists 
between the current state and the desired state. In the process of attaining goals by moving between 
different hierarchical structure levels, feedback loops play an essential role in responding to 
environmental disturbances.3 Miller et al. (1960) referred to the example of hammering a nail: An 
individual operates by striking the nail. The individual tests the present state with the desired state 
through a feedback loop. When incongruity exists, the feedback loop (i.e., TOTE units) continues to work 
after each operation (i.e., hammer strike) until the nail is flush with the wood, at which point the 
individual exits the TOTE unit. 
The second proposition of the plan–action relationship is the control property. Miller et al. (1960) 
defined a plan as a controlling mechanism, using the following example:  
[I]magine that you wanted to look at a particular topic in a certain book in order to see 
what the author had to say about it. You would open the book to the index and find the 
topic. Following the entry is a string of numbers. As you look up each page reference in 
turn, your behavior can be described as under the control of that list of numbers, and 
control is transferred from one number to the next as you proceed through the list (p. 28).  
 
According to Miller et al. (1960), a plan for an individual is similar to a software program for a 
machine: “[A] plan is, for an organism, essentially the same as a program for a computer” (p. 16). 
However, it is naïve to claim that an exact correspondence exists between a machine and the human brain. 
Thus, further research is necessary to investigate under what conditions machine instructions are similar 
to or differ from individuals’ plans. 
Schank and Abelson (1977) developed an extension of Miller et al.’s (1960) original work by 
introducing the notion of script, which they defined as “a structure that describes appropriate sequences of 
events in a particular context” (p. 41). A script is a predictable pattern that both determines and controls 
                                                   
3 Due to the limitations of humans’ information-processing capacity, the possibility of having an infinite number of nested loops 
within the plans and sub-plans should not be considered. 
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actions in familiar situations. For example, an individual entering a fast-food restaurant is expected to find 
a seat by him- or herself; however, in more formal restaurants, patrons are expected to be seated by a host 
or hostess. The concept of scripts addresses situations in which an individual follows well-developed, 
typical, and familiar sequences of actions. Recent studies have implemented scripts to investigate 
everyday or routine activities, such as coffee making, using different simulation models. In such a model, 
the task of coffee making is divided into subtasks, such as adding milk to the coffee and putting sugar in 
the coffee (Botvinick, 2008).              
2.1.3 Unit of Analysis  
Defining the unit of analysis is important for differentiating between the psychological theory of planning 
and the situated action perspective of plans. In the psychological theory of planning, an individual’s mind 
is considered to be the unit of analysis, with the focus being on the mechanisms and constraints of human 
cognition (e.g., long-term and short-term memory) (Anderson, Reder, & Simon, 1997; Greeno, 1997; 
Leudar & Costall, 1996). Psychological studies of planning tend to be conducted in laboratories under 
controlled conditions (Das et al., 1996; Friedman & Scholnick, 1997). However, Miller et al. (1960) 
suggested that external support (e.g., a timetable) plays an important role during planning because the 
human capacity to process information is limited. Thus, at least theoretically, the psychological theory of 
planning suggests a connection between the role of the external support and the role of the individual’s 
mind.  
2.1.4 Assessment  
Many researchers have criticized Miller et al.’s (1960) assertion that all actions are planned—whether 
fully planned before actions occur or planned at the moment immediately prior to an action (Agre & 
Chapman, 1989; Das et al., 1996; Hendriks-Jansen, 1996; Suchman, 1988). Several researchers have 
argued that Miller et al.’s (1960) theory does not take into account the fact that individuals often take 
advantage of opportunities encountered when executing plans (Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1979). In 
 
 11 
addition, Das et al. (1996) raised questions about whether infants (i.e., babies) have plans—sequences of 
operations—as Miller et al.’s (1960) theory implies. 
Another critique addressed how Miller et al. (1960) equated plans for individuals with programs for 
machines, implying that an individual acts according to a plan in the same manner in which a machine 
operates based on an algorithm, which suggests that plans specify every level of detail (Agre, 1991; 
Chapman, 1989a; Leudar & Costall, 1996; Suchman, 2003). Critics have concluded that Miller et al. 
(1960) equated plans with human knowledge, meaning plans can be followed literally (Leudar & Costall, 
1996; Suchman, 1988). However, Leudar and Costall (1996) disagreed, concluding that Miller et al. 
(1960) did not equate plans with human knowledge—a claim supported by Miller et al.’s (1960) aircraft 
example: Memorizing a description of the actions necessary to land an aircraft does not mean an 
individual will be able to actually land an aircraft. Similarly, Miller et al. (1960) pointed out that 
instruction manuals do not specify every minute detail (e.g., muscle movements) of a task to be 
performed.  
In the context of the current research, Miller et al.’s (1960) theory does not appear to be applicable as it 
does not adequately distinguish between plans and algorithmic program. In addition, the theory assumes 
that all actions are preceded by a plan, which is not the case.  
2.2 Situated Action Perspective of Plans 
During the last two decades, journals such as Cognitive Science, Cognitive Systems Research, Ecological 
Psychology, Educational Researcher, and Learning Sciences have published special issues and hosted 
intense discussions on situated action-related issues. Coupled with numerous related conferences, the 
journal issues provide a dedicated forum in which to discuss theoretical arguments relating to the situated 
action perspective of planning, which suggests that these arguments are important to scientific 
communities (Halverson, 2002). Despite such debates, no unified position or clear definition of situated 
action has emerged (Anderson et al., 1997; Ciborra, 2006; Kushmerick, 1996; Lave, 1991; Patel, 
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Kaufman, & Arocha, 1995; Suchman, 1993; Vera & Simon, 1993b; Wilson & Myers, 2000; Ziemke & 
Sun, 2002).  
The situated action perspective of plans can be traced to Suchman’s (1987) study, which reported 
empirical data based on an uncontrolled experiment that investigated how completely novice participants 
used sophisticated photocopy machines. Participants in Suchman’s study were tasked with making 
double-sided copies; no detailed instructions were provided. To accomplish the task, participants used an 
expert system built into the photocopy machine to answer a series of questions about their task. The 
expert system subsequently invoked step-like instructions, which Suchman (1987) referred to as a plan, 
suggesting that Suchman equated instructions with plans. The expert system had to recognize 
participants’ actions in order to invoke the next step. The machine was built based on the assumption that, 
if instructions were followed in a step-by-step manner, the task would be accomplished.  
Participants in Suchman’s (1987) experiment worked in pairs and were told to read the instructions 
aloud as the machine presented them. The resulting discussion was recorded on videotape and provided a 
major source of data for analysis. Methodologically, Suchman and Jordan (1997) argued that videotaping 
activity provides a “microscopic” view of a situation, capturing participants’ detailed behavior in 
moment-to-moment interactions, largely independent of the analysts’ intervention (Suchman, 1987; 
Suchman, 1990). However, Suchman (1995) subsequently concluded that the objectivity afforded by 
videotapes does not offer independence from interference as the analysts must still decide where to place 
the camera, what to record, what to present, and so on.  
During the analysis, Suchman (1987) created a table to indicate participants’ actions that might be 
captured by the machine (e.g., pressing a button) and actions of the machine that might be recognized by 
participants (e.g., delivering paper). The data from the videotapes and transcripts demonstrated that many 
problems arose when participants had to make sense of the photocopier’s malfunctions (e.g., when 
pressing a button did not have the anticipated result) (Suchman, 1987). The central conclusion of the 
study was that actions are situated since participants needed to interpret every single instruction on a 
moment-to-moment basis (Agre, 1990; Ciborra, 2006; Suchman, 1990).  
 
 13 
2.2.1 The View of Action and Plan 
A situated action refers to an activity that takes place in a particular place, at a particular time, and in 
relation to particular social and material local circumstances (Agre, 1997; Clancey, 1997; Greeno & 
Moore, 1993; Lave, 1991; Suchman & Trigg, 1991). Situated action researchers (e.g., Lave, 1988; 
Suchman 1987) have identified three characteristics governing actions within the situated action 
perspective—namely, 1) actions are not goal-directed but goals are constructed as after-the-fact 
rationalizations, 2) improvisations rather than plans are the central phenomenon for understanding human 
behavior, and 3) actions are entirely a product of moment-to-moment interaction.  
Situated action researchers assert that the first characteristic of actions is that “action is not ‘goal 
directed,’ nor are goals a condition for action” (Lave, 1988, p. 183)—an understanding that contrasts 
Miller et al.’s (1960) conclusions. To support the claim that actions are not goal directed, Lave (1988) 
referred to an episode of how a shopper decides to buy a certain number of apples. The shopper’s 
narrative is as follows:  
[T]here are only about three or four [apples] at home, and I have four kids, so you figure 
at least two apiece in the next three days. These are the kind of things I have to resupply. 
I only have a certain amount of storage space in the refrigerator, so I can’t load it up 
totally…Now that I’m home in the summertime, this is a good snack food. And I like an 
apple sometimes at lunchtime when I come home (Murtaugh, 1985, p. 188, cited in Lave, 
1988, p. 2).  
 
According to Lave (1988), this episode demonstrates that no specific goal exists (e.g., purchasing an 
exact number of apples); as a result, actions are not directed toward specific goals. Lave’s assertion raises 
an important question: What is the role of goals if not to direct and motivate actions? Situated action 
researchers have concluded that goals are constructed during actions (e.g., buying apples) and serve as 




The second characteristic of plans, according to situated action researchers, is that plans are not central 
phenomena in relation to actions; instead, improvisations are central (Agre, 1997; Chapman & Agre, 
1987; Suchman, 2007). Unlike Miller et al. (1960), the situated action perspective deems that all actions 
are at some level improvisations4—what to do here and now—rather than planned actions (Agre & 
Horswill, 1992; Clancey, 1997; Suchman, 2002). Based on this understanding, Deutsch (1968) and Ross 
and Nisbett (1991) underscored the role of actors’ subjective perceptions of their situations when studying 
human behavior as such perceptions emphasize the actors’ experience of their situation that can only 
define and describe whether a situation is improvised or planned. The role of perception in human actions 
will be thoroughly discussed in the assessment subsection (see section 2.2.4).    
The third characteristic of actions in the situated action perspective is that actions are essentially and 
exclusively a product of the “moment-to-moment” interaction (Agre, 1997; Clancey, 1997; Dourish, 
2001; Suchman, 1987; Suchman, 2002; Suchman & Wynn, 1984), which has led some researchers (e.g., 
Suchman, 2007) to conclude that every situation is unique. Based on this conclusion, these researchers 
have adopted an anti-theory position (Kaptelinin & Nardi, 2006; Rogers, 2004) that describes theory 
building as an erroneous activity (Suchman, 2007). Dourish (2006), Goodwin, (1997), and Nardi (2002) 
argued that theoretical progression beyond the particular circumstances of a given situation is an essential 
activity. Thus, Goodwin (1997) concluded that “[t]he issue, therefore, is not particularism but rather 
access to a range of basic cognitive processes that require for their analysis detailed study of actual work 
in endogenous settings” (p. 135).  
Situated action researchers (e.g., Suchman, 1994) define plans as imaginative acts that project some 
future actions manifested in artifacts. In this context, the term artifact refers to tool and technology (Ehn, 
1989; Randall, Harper, & Rouncefield, 2007; Trigg, Blomberg, & Suchman, 1999).  
                                                   
4 Other expressions have been used in the literature to refer to improvisations, such as ad hoc (Agre, 1997; Chapman, 1991; 
Suchman, 2007) and problem solving (Suchman & Wynn, 1984). 
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2.2.2 Propositions of the Plan–action Relationship  
Situated action researchers have offered several propositions that relate to plans and their relationship to 
the actions to which they refer—namely, 1) plans do not describe actions adequately; 2) plans do not 
control actions; 3) plans are best characterized as a resource among other resources; and 4) plans consist 
of reasoning about actions. The first and second propositions stem from situated action researchers’ (e.g., 
Suchman, 1987) criticisms of Miller et al.’s (1960) theory of psychological planning. These researchers 
argued that, if Miller et al.’s (1960) theory of planning were correct, plans ought to describe and predict 
action at every level of detail. Yet they challenged this view by arguing that plans are not adequate for 
describing actions and do not control actions; thus, the plan–action relationship is problematic (Suchman, 
2003). As a result, the third and fourth propositions were put forth as alternative explanations of the plan–
action relationship. This section discusses these four propositions in greater detail.     
In the first proposition, situated action researchers argue that plans are incomplete, inadequate 
descriptions of actions (Chapman, 1989a; Suchman, 1982; Suchman & Trigg, 1991; Suchman, 2007). For 
example, Suchman (1987) claimed that “the production and use of instructions have concentrated on the 
irremediable incompleteness of instructions” (p. 101). Similarly, Fikes and Henderson (1980) stated that 
“a procedure which implements a task is necessarily an inadequate description of all the actions which 
must be done to achieve the task’s goals in all the various situations that can (and inevitably will) occur” 
(p. 203; emphasis in original). Different expressions have been used in the situated actions literature to 
refer to the argument that plans are inadequate for describing the actions to which they refer, such as 
plans are not generative mechanisms for actions (Button & Dourish, 1996; Crabtree, 2003) and plans are 
neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for actions (Sharrock & Button, 2003; Streibel, 1995).  
Empirically, studies of situated actions have focused on the particular circumstances of a given 
situation to demonstrate how plans fail to specify or predict these circumstances. For example, Garfinkel 
(1996) studied a group of individuals who were asked to use instructions to code clinical files. The 
researcher concluded that, at some level, coders had to use their own judgment to employ the instructions 
in actual situations. In another study, Suchman (1983) examined two accountants who recorded payments 
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for purchased supplies. According to the procedures, all items had to be received and paid for in order to 
file payments; otherwise, the information was to be kept in a temporary file. The study reported a case in 
which a purchase order was lost, although official documents showed that all items had been received. 
Interestingly, the company’s record indicated that only two out of eight items had been paid for, while the 
supplier claimed that six items had been paid for and two outstanding items remained. As the solution of 
the case was not in the official procedures and required informal arrangements, Suchman concluded that 
procedures cannot specify or predict all possible situations. Similar patterns of focusing on the particulars 
of situations when procedures do not go according to plan have been reported in many other studies (e.g., 
Beck, 1995; Wynn, 1979). 
The second proposition, which is the crux of situated action researchers’ argument, is that plans do not 
determine or control the progress and sequence of actions (Agre, 1988; Chapman & Agre, 1987; Clancey, 
1997; Dourish & Button, 1998; Suchman, 1987). For example, Suchman (1988) asserted that “in no 
case—and this is the crucial point—do such plans control action in any strict sense of the word ‘control’” 
(p. 314). She used the analogy of how maps do not control travelers’ actions to illustrate how plans do not 
control actions: “Just as it would seem absurd to claim that a map in some strong sense controlled the 
traveler’s movements through the world, it is wrong to imagine plans as controlling actions” (p. 189). 
However, the analogy seems to be problematic because a plan is an intentional act (i.e., to have a plan is 
to have the intent to act upon the plan), whereas simply possessing a map does not require intent.  
Some researchers have argued that these first two propositions, which—as previously stated—serve as 
criticisms of Miller et al.’s (1960) theory, apply only to the fields of cognitive science and artificial 
intelligence, as these fields adopt Miller et al.’s (1906) argument that plans precede actions and are 
defined as a sequence of operations to be carried out to control actions (Button, 2008; Randall et al., 
2007; Rouncefield, 2002; Sharrock & Button, 2003; Slezak, 1999). These researchers further argued that 
the critics of the situated action perspective of plans (e.g., Schmidt, 1997; Vera & Simon, 1993a) fail to 
understand this point. Yet Suchman (2003), as well as other researchers (e.g., Bardram, 1997; 
Koschmann, 2003; Leudar & Costall, 1996; Schmidt & Simone, 1996; Woolgar, 1989), asserted that the 
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situated action perspective of plans can and should be extended beyond cognitive science and artificial 
intelligence to include plans in everyday life.  
In order to explain the plan–action relationship, situated action researchers presented an alternative 
view to Miller et al.’s (1960) theory—namely, the third proposition. This proposition asserts that a plan is 
a resource used among other resources (e.g., equipment and papers) to determine what to do here and 
now, during the course of actions (Agre & Chapman, 1989; Suchman, 1987). Although the idea of plans 
as resources for situated actions is a fundamental principle in human-computer interaction, computer-
supported cooperative work, and other fields (Schmidt & Simone, 1996), it seems that this principle is 
frequently used without a clear definition. The current researcher traced the use of this term throughout 
the literature in an effort to establish a definition. Table 2.1 lists the term resource as it is used across 
various studies, which suggest that resource refers to tangible items such as project files as well as 
intangible items such as experience. According to Spagnolli, Varotto, and Mantovani (2003), resource 
appears to be a broad category equivalent to the category of “thing.” Several other studies have argued 
that plans are strong resources for coordinating human activities (Bardram, 1997; Chapman, 1989b; 
Leudar & Costall, 1996; Rosebery, 2005; Schmidt, 1997), without providing criteria by which a plan can 
be judged to be a weak, strong, or neutral resource. 
Table  2.1: Sample List of Appearances of the Term Resource in the Situated Action Perspective Literature 
Resources  Reference 
Plans Agre & Chapman (1989); Suchman (1987) 
Project files Suchman, Blomberg, Orr, & Trigg (1999); Suchman, Trigg,  & 
Blomberg (2002); Trigg et al. (1999) 
Whiteboards Trigg, Suchman, & Halasz (1986) 
Experience, embodied skill, material evidence, 
communicative competence, and members’ knowledge 
Suchman (1988) 
Attorneys and attorneys’ form files Blomberg, Suchman, & Trigg (1996) 
Systems designed to track plans Suchman (1995) 




The fourth proposition of the plan–action relationship according to the situated action perspective is 
that a plan is a way of reasoning about actions (Suchman, 1987). More specifically, plans serve as a way 
to think and talk about actions both before (i.e., prospective) and after (i.e., retrospection) they occur 
(Agre, 1997; Chapman, 1991; Suchman, 1987; Suchman, 1988). Suchman (2007) extended the claim that 
plans involve reasoning about action to include the reasoning about action within an activity. Reasoning 
about action beforehand is performed to orient individuals to accomplish their activities (Suchman, 1987). 
For example, according to Suchman (1987), “[t]he function of abstract representation is…to orient or 
position us in a way that will allow us, through local interactions, to exploit some contingencies of our 
environment and to avoid others” (p. 188). The notion of an after-the-fact reference to plans emerges in 
the context of justification (Leudar & Costall, 1996; Mantovani, 1996; Suchman, 1987). Suchman (1987) 
explicitly stated that “it is only when we are pressed to account for the rationality of our actions, given the 
biases of European culture, that we invoke the guidance of a plan” (p. ix). Nonetheless, both theoretically 
and empirically, the result is an inadequate description of how this reasoning works.  
2.2.3 Unit of Analysis  
The unit of analysis in the situated action perspective is social interactions—namely, two or more 
individuals acting in a setting (Button, 2008; Cole, 1991; Pea, 1993; Vera & Simon, 1993a). Unlike 
psychological theorists, situated action researchers argue that actions are social phenomena in which the 
individual interprets others’ actions in an interactional context. As a result, individual cognition is both 
theoretically and empirically irrelevant to situated action studies (Salomon, 1993).  
With respect to the level of analysis, situated action researchers have conflicting views (Agre, 1997; 
Greiffenhagen & Sharrock, 2008; Suchman, 1987; Wilson & Myers, 2000; Ziemke & Sun, 2002). 
Suchman (1987) argued that the level of analysis occurs at the moment-to-moment level; other situated 
action researchers (e.g., Lave, 1988, 1991) have asserted that various levels of analysis exist for studying 
human behavior. For example, Lave (1988) suggested microscopic, intermediate, and organizational 
interaction levels.  
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Methodologically, situated action researchers observe individuals in their natural settings. These 
researchers do not consider other methodologies, such as laboratory experiments, to be valid for studying 
human behavior (Lave, Murtaugh, & de la Rocha, 1984; Suchman, 1987).  
2.2.4 Assessment  
This section assesses Suchman’s (1987) photocopy machine study, which so significantly influenced 
subsequent studies that embraced a similar methodological approach and provided a basis for various 
theoretical propositions put forward by situated action researchers. It then evaluates different theoretical 
issues of the plan–action relationship, elaborating upon propositions suggesting that plans are inadequate 
descriptions of actions and do not control actions as well as the role of actors’ direct perception in situated 
action studies.  
To Suchman’s (1987) credit, the photocopy machine study is one of the earliest studies that carefully 
examined how technology is used in a natural environment (Carroll, 2003; Hert, 1997; Wells, 2003). 
According to Ciborra (2006), the strength of Suchman’s study is that its theoretical analysis goes hand in 
hand with its empirical analysis. Theoretically, one of the study’s important insights is the assertion that 
actions that include creating and executing plans are situated in a particular time and place in relation to 
the social and material world (Leudar & Costall, 1996; Räsänen & Nyce, 2006). Empirically, Suchman 
(1987) introduced conversational analysis and videotape recording technology to study the situated 
property of actions in technological settings (Carroll, 2003; Pea, 1993; Wells, 2003).  
In her study, Suchman (1987) aimed to investigate the plan–action relationship; however, compared to 
the actions side, which was well demonstrated (Räsänen & Nyce, 2006), the plan side of the study was 
not adequately addressed—if at all (Vera, 2003). Indeed, several concerns have emerged about the plan 
side of the study. First, the study equates the step-like instructions, provided to users by the machine’s 
expert system, with the actor’s plans (Suchman, 1987), which raises the question of whether plans and 
instructions are similar enough to use interchangeably in the study. Second, in the study, the notion of 
plans is restricted to the machine’s instructions as programmed by the machine designer. However, 
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participants may have had their own plans that did not necessarily correspond to the designer’s plans. 
Carroll (2003) explained that “[f]requently, people are not even trying to follow instructions in such 
episodes, rather they are trying to achieve their own task-oriented goals” (p. 275). Suchman (1987) failed 
to consider the possibility that participants may not have been following instructions, but rather 
maintaining their own plans.  
Third, participants had to follow a predefined, fixed sequence of actions to act in accordance with the 
plans. In other words, unlike plans in everyday life, highly structured tasks (e.g., making a double-sided 
photocopy) do not allow for flexibility (Agre & Chapman, 1989). Clancey (2006) argued that, because the 
plan in Suchman’s (1987) study was a fixed, predefined task, it resembled a puzzle rather than a real-
world plan. In fact, assuming that acting in accordance with the plan means following a specific path may 
have limited the generalizability of the study as it focused on a very specific type of plan—namely, a 
predefined, fixed sequence of actions.  
Finally, the photocopy machine study used only novice participants who had never used the machine 
before, thereby amplifying the results by producing more heterogeneous actions than if participants had 
been a mixture of novice and expert users or if similar participants had been observed over a period of 
time (Wells, 2003). Ultimately, the photocopy machine study did not empirically demonstrate the 
alternative view of situated actions toward the plan–action relationship—namely, that a plan could 
involve reasoning about actions and post-hoc rationalization.           
2.2.4.1 The Role of Plans in Describing and Controlling Action   
One of the central arguments in the situated action literature is that plans do not control actions (Suchman, 
1987). According to Randall et al. (2007), much of the confusion surrounding the notion of control can be 
attributed to the assumption that the meaning of control in planning is exactly analogous to a computer 
program that controls machines. If plans are like computer programs, they must be implemented literally 
and run by themselves, implying that plans predict all possible situations.  
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Organizational theorists such as Thompson (1967), Blau and Scott (1963), and others have asserted that 
plans do not describe concrete actions in full detail. For example, Selznick (1948) stressed that:  
The formal administrative design can never adequately or fully reflect the concrete 
organization to which it refers, for the obvious reason that no abstract plan or pattern 
can—or may, if it is to be useful—exhaustively describe an empirical totality. At the 
same time, that which is not included in the abstract design…is vitally relevant to the 
maintenance and development of the formal system itself (p. 215).  
 
If plans ought not to describe concrete actions and at the same time control actions to which they refer, 
then the question becomes what does ‘control’ mean?  
It seems that control is not binary and that a degree of control may exist, as implicitly indicated by 
several situated action researchers (e.g., Agre, 1997; Suchman, 1987; Suchman, 1988) who associated the 
idea that plans do not control actions with qualifiers such as “in any strict sense,” “in any strong sense,” 
and “mechanically determined actions.” Some researchers further argued that the source of the degree of 
control is the structure of the task (Mintzberg, 1983; Schmidt & Simone, 1996; Schmidt, 1997). Schmidt 
and Simone (1996) empirically demonstrated that, in highly structured situations, such as a Kanban 
system (a system for moving parts in the production line from one station to another using cards and 
boxes), workers are not expected to search for and negotiate why they do what they are doing; rather, they 
act according to the system’s set of available acceptable choices.  
Another possible explanation of control is evident when the distribution of the outcomes correlates with 
the plans. A thought experiment may help illustrate this point. If a class has been instructed to write their 
first names, control exists if the students follow the instructions. Otherwise, we might find date of birth, 
shopping lists, or anything else—or even nothing at all—written down. However, the instruction “write 
your first name” does not specify whether or not the name should be capitalized; thus, the control remains 
at the level of the instructions specified.  
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2.2.4.2 The Role of Perception in Understanding Individuals’ Action  
The role of human perception of situations also seems problematic in situated action studies. Situated 
action researchers treat individuals’ accounts of their actions (e.g., what they say about themselves) as 
always unreliable because individuals’ accounts of their actions are post-hoc (i.e., after-the-fact) 
rationalizations (Nardi, 1996). The key issue here stems from how the experience of actions should be 
described (Clancey, 1997; Schön, 1983).  
Suchman’s (1996) study, entitled “Constituting Shared Workspaces,” examined what the researcher 
called a “trouble situation”; the study illustrated how the situated action perspective treats individuals’ 
accounts of their actions as unreliable. The trouble situation started when a flight having arrived at the 
airport, but the ladder used to unload passengers from the airplane did not work. Suchman described the 
situation on a moment-to-moment basis: 
The unremarkable status of the incident was indicated to us, for example, by the 
observation that a coworker coming in from the ramp shortly after the trouble’s 
resolution, who inquired of one of the operations room workers present to the event, 
“What’s happening,” received the reply, “Oh, nothing much” (p. 59, note 14; emphasis 
added).  
 
Although Suchman labeled this situation as trouble, the individual who experienced the situation 
claimed that it was not trouble but was, in fact, “nothing much.” Both Suchman (1996) and the actor are 
correct in their description of the situation. On the one hand, Suchman (1996) refers to trouble in relation 
to some sort of objective measurement, which involves moment-to-moment interactions as recorded on 
videotapes. On the other hand, the actor refers to his or her subjective experience from a direct perception. 
Suchman (1996) successfully distinguished between the two kinds of experience, but she did not analyze 
the difference. In fact, she labeled the event as a trouble situation, favoring the researcher’s judgment 
rather than the actor’s description of his/her situation.  
Although social desirability may occur in which actors’ descriptions may be tailored to what they think 
makes them look good (Babbie, 1992), favoring an analyst’s account of the actions and disregarding 
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individuals’ accounts of their actions may not be a justifiable approach because the analyst is at risk of 
making arbitrary choices. It seems that other situated action perspective arguments, such as the notion that 
all actions are improvisations, problem solving, or ad hoc, are made by favoring the analyst’s account of 
the situation. Indeed, stating that all actions are improvisations—regardless of the actor’s experience—
relates to some sort of objective measurement that, according to Clancey (1997), is made “at some level.”  
Thus, when analyzing human behavior, a distinction may exist between the analyst’s descriptions of 
any situation and the actor’s perception of the situation. Indeed, many researchers (e.g., Deutsch, 1968; 
Ross & Nisbett, 1991) stress the importance of studying how individuals experience situations based on 
their perceptions—an idea central to this study framework.  
2.3 Summary  
As evident from the literature review thus far, the plan–action relationship is an active area of debate. The 
lack of agreed-upon definitions of fundamental constructs (i.e., actions and plans) creates major 
challenges; however, some attempts have been made to address the plan–action relationship (e.g., Miller 
et al., 1960; Suchman, 1987). Although the psychological theory of planning does not adequately address 
the plan–action relationship (Agre & Chapman, 1989; Suchman, 1987), the situated action perspective 
also fails to provide a satisfactory explanation of the plan–action relationship (Vera, 2003). Such a lack of 
an adequate explanation provides support for the significance of the current study. 
Additional major findings from the literature review can be summarized as follows: 
1. Situated action researchers have argued that Miller et al.’s (1960) psychological theory of 
planning implies that plans ought to describe and specify actions; however, neither Miller and his 
colleagues nor situated action proponents claim that plans ought to describe and specify actions at 
every level of detail. 
2. Many situated action researchers have proposed that only one level of analysis exists when 
analyzing actions—namely, the moment-to-moment level. Other researchers (e.g., Bardram, 
1997) have suggested that plans are formed at one level and implemented at another level. 
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3. Feedback loops play an essential role in executing plans and responding to environmental 
uncertainty (Bardram, 1997; Clancey, 1997; Miller et al., 1960). 
4. Researchers who support the situated action view treat individuals’ accounts of their actions as 
unreliable (Suchman, 1996) despite the fact that such accounts are central to understanding a 
situation (Deutsch, 1968; Ross & Nisbett, 1991) as individual actors are the principle executors of 
the plan. 
Table 2.2 summarizes the different views related to the major issues in the plan–action relationship, 
indicating disparate arguments.  
Table  2.2: Different Views of Major Issues in the Plan–action Relationship 
 Psychological Theory of Planning Situated Action Perspective of Plans 
Position of the Planning 
Phenomenon 
 Central to understanding human 
behavior 
 Planning is peripheral to understanding 
human behavior 
 Improvisation is central to understanding 
human behavior 
Goals  Precede actions  Post-hoc (i.e., after-the-fact) rationalizations 
Structure of the Actions  Shaped and controlled by goals  Entirely a product of moment-to-moment interactions 
Plans as a Control 
Mechanism  Control actions  Do not control actions 
Level of Analysis  Multiple hierarchical levels  Mostly single level (moment to moment) 
Unit of Analysis  Cognitive mechanisms of 
information processing 
 Two or more individuals acting in a setting 
(i.e., social interactions) 
Preferred Empirical 
Method 
 Mostly controlled laboratory 
experiments 







This chapter addresses the question of how the plan–action relationship works. The current study’s model 
draws on field theory developed by Kurt Lewin (1936), which relates to action in the here and now. The 
model also draws on basic-level categories and prototype theories of categorization, both of which were 
developed primarily by Eleanor Rosch (1978). Lewin’s (1936) field theory is used to analyze the dynamic 
process of the plan–action relationship as the actor perceives it whereas Rosch’s (1978) theories are 
utilized to analyze the actor’s knowledge of his/her future situation.   
This chapter is organized as follows. The first section explains field theory, followed by a discussion of 
the notion of plans in field theory. Next, theories of the perceived internal structure of categories (i.e., 
prototype and basic-level category theory) are presented. Finally, the combination of field theory and 
categorization theories into a model of plan–action relationship is explained according to a number of 
hypotheses.   
3.1 Field Theory: Dynamic Properties of the Situations 
Lewin exerted considerable influence in the field of psychology, particularly in studying the 
interrelationship between individuals and their environment. He influenced such work as behavioral 
settings theory, ecological psychology (Heft, 2001), and the activity theory developed in Russian 
psychology (Stadler, 1988). His field theory, from which the current study’s model draws, is a theory of 
action situated in the here-and-now.  
The fundamental notion behind field theory is that behavior is a function of a total situation that 
consists of an individual and his or her psychological environment. Lewin (1936) described behavior (B) 
as a function of both person (P) and environment (E) in the formula B = F (P, E). Thus, field theory is 
concerned with how individuals and their environments are interrelated or interdependent (Lewin, 1936). 
Field theory stresses the importance of the actors’ view of their experiences and how the individuals 
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interpret their situations. Indeed, field theory uses individuals’ interpretations of their situations to gain an 
understanding of their behavior (Derbentseva, 2007; Deutsch, 1968; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). In this 
context, according to Deutsch (1968), field theory uses phrases such as “at a certain moment,” “at a given 
time,” “the time just past,” and “here and now” to refer to a psychological unit that is meaningful from the 
actor’s perspective. 
A central concept in field theory is life space. The terms life space, psychological field, and total 
situation all refer to the psychological environment that exists in an individual’s subjective experience 
(Deutsch, 1968). Life space represents all activities that can possibly occur. Within life space, an 
individual is positioned within a region of activity that corresponds to his or her immediate situation. 
Regions of activity are psychological units representing spaces in which the individual exists, moves, and 
perceives other events in the life space (Lewin, 1936). For example, a high school student is in a given 
place at a given time (i.e., immediate psychological situation), considering four options for how to spend 
her day: studying for an exam, taking a driving lesson, going to a movie, or working at a part-time job to 
earn some money. These possibilities are regions of activity that currently exist in the student’s life space 
(Deutsch, 1968). Any single region of activity can be further differentiated into a number of parts or sub-
regions. For example, when the student moves into the “taking a driving lesson” region of activity, the 
lesson may be about how to drive a manual transmission, for which the student must focus on each and 
every movement (e.g., shifting gears and depressing the clutch). Such movements are examples of sub-
regions, or parts, of the driving activity. On the other hand, expert drivers do not think about shifting 
gears when changing lanes or passing cars; for them, these sub-regions have disappeared into a single 
region of activity. 
Another central concept related to an individual’s movement in the life space is locomotion. As 
previously discussed, at any given time an individual is positioned psychologically in a region of activity. 
This position is dynamic and constantly changing; hence, the individual is always moving through 
different regions or sub-regions of activity in his or her life space. Such movement is referred to as 
locomotion. Locomotion constantly changes one’s life space and its characteristics. Movement among 
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regions and sub-regions of an activity can be either possible or impossible as a result of the perceived 
boundaries between these regions or sub-regions (Derbentseva, 2007). 
Meanwhile, boundaries refers to separating different regions of activities, whether physically (e.g., the 
walls of a prison or the edges of a bathtub) or psychologically (e.g., perceived threat). The separation 
refers to a continuum that ranges from completely allowing free movement among regions or sub-regions 
to completely prohibiting such movement. If one is unable to move freely in the life space, this restriction 
is called a barrier—namely, “boundaries (boundary zone) which offer resistance to psychological 
locomotion” (Lewin, 1936, p. 108). Different barriers create different degrees of resistance. Returning to 
the example of the student who is considering how to spend her day, suppose that the student decides to 
go to a movie. Such a decision might require passing through two regions of activity: first, “taking a bus,” 
and second, “buying a ticket.” If the student does not have enough money to buy a ticket, a barrier to 
“watching the movie” arises. Missing the bus would also create a barrier as the student would no longer 
be able to get to the theatre in time to watch the movie. However, if the student has other transportation 
options (e.g., taking a taxi, walking, or going with a friend), new paths become available, enabling her to 
reach the “watching the movie” region.  
Another concept associated with regions of activity is valence. Lewin defines valence as “a certain 
object or event, which is experienced as an attraction (or repulsion)” (1935, p. 51). Both negative and 
positive valences exist (Lewin, 1936), and each region of activity within a life space may possess a 
valence that is either positive (e.g., liked by the individual) or negative (e.g., disliked by the individual). 
The psychological forces created by positive valences will attract an individual to the region, whereas 
forces created by negative valences will repel the individual. Valences are not static, but rather dynamic 
as they depend on the needs and motives of the actor in each situation.  
A goal state in a goal-directed activity is a region of activity possessing a positive valence 
(attractiveness), creating forces that push the individual toward the goal state. Barriers that prevent the 
individual from reaching the goal state correspond to forces with a negative valence for the actor. 
Consequently, if an individual initially perceives a path toward a goal state but then finds it blocked by a 
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barrier, the need arises for the individual to work around the barrier; this is accomplished by taking a 
detour to reach the goal state via an alternative path consisting of a sub-region that bypasses the barrier. 
Thus, goals are dynamic, meaning that they can be modified during the course of an action (Derbentseva, 
2007).     
With respect to plans, field theory introduces the concept of irreality—or unreality—to explain how 
individuals experience the psychological future (e.g., plans, wishes, fears, daydreams), which refers to 
expectations or thoughts (Barker, Dembo & Lewin, 1941; Deutsch, 1968). According to Barker et al. 
(1941), movement is more fluid at the level of irreality than at the level of reality (life space), making 
goal attainment seem more probable/easier to an individual. In this context, to have a plan is to construct 
as-yet undetailed regions for future activity. For example, a student who earns an undergraduate degree 
may begin to envision getting a certain job. At this point, the student is at the level of irreality (i.e., before 
the job is actually attained) and goes through several undetailed regions to arrive at the goal region; the 
student may also bypass (i.e., ignore) some negative regions along the way (Deutsch, 1968). 
In summary, Lewin’s (1936) theory addresses an individual’s immediate psychological situation, which 
determines behavior. To reiterate and summarize the terminology used, the psychological situation 
represents the interdependence between an individual and his or her perceived environment. The 
immediate situation is the life space, consisting of different regions of activity. At any given time, an 
individual is always located in one region of activity, which may be divided into sub-regions or collapsed 
into greater regions—all of which are perceived as meaningful psychological units of action. Locomotion 
refers to the movement among different regions of activity or their sub-regions; such movement is 
influenced by positive (attractive) or negative (repulsive) valences inherent to every region of activity. 
Although individuals generally seek to satisfy goals, a barrier—whether psychological or physical—may 
require the individual to find ways to work around it by taking a detour. In Lewin's theory, the concept of 




In the current research context, although field theory addresses actions in the here and now (i.e., 
situated actions), it lacks detailed explanation of plans. To overcome this shortcoming, categorization 
theories are introduced.  
3.2 Categorization Theories: Typifications of Experience 
Human experience relies on categorizing, which treats different things in a similar manner according to 
given names (Chrysikou, 2006; Lakoff, 1990; Quinlan & Dyson, 2008; Rosch, 1978). For example, the 
category of “birds” includes robins, owls, and penguins whereas the category “black things” includes 
black hair and black tea. Categories can be formed based on perceptual similarities between different 
objects (Markman, 2005). Lakoff (1990) asserted that:  
Every time we see something as a kind of thing, for example, a tree, we are categorizing. 
Whenever we reason about kinds of things—chairs, nations, illnesses, emotions, any kind 
of thing at all—we are employing categories. Whenever we intentionally perform any 
kind of action, say something as mundane as writing with a pencil, hammering with a 
hammer, or ironing clothes, we are using categories. The particular action we perform on 
that occasion is a kind of motor activity (e.g., writing, hammering, ironing), that is, it is in 
a particular category of motor actions. They are never done exactly in the same way, yet 
despite the difference in particular movements, they are all movements of a kind, and we 
know how to make movements of that kind (pp. 5-6; emphasis in original).  
 
As such, categorization is central to understanding how individuals think, perceive, and act (Lakoff, 
1990; Murphy, 2004). Indeed, the purpose of categories is to help individuals make sense of and manage 
rich information in their surrounding environments (Quinlan & Dyson, 2008).  
Classical views of categorization have asserted that, for an object to enter a category, the object has to 
satisfy certain features considered to be necessary and sufficient conditions. Although this view remains 
true for some formally defined categories (e.g., odd numbers), how people experience categories 
psychologically differs substantially from this view. Evidence suggests that individuals think about 
categories in terms of best examples, frequent features, and central tendencies, implying that categories 
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do not consist of equal status examples, but rather involve a structure in which individuals organize and 
process them (Lakoff, 1990; Rosch, 1974; Tversky, Zacks & Hard, 2008). 
According to Rosch (1978), a category’s structure has both hierarchical and horizontal elements. For 
example, in the category “birds,” robins, owls, and penguins are horizontal elements (see Figure 3.1) 
whereas the category “animals” includes the subcategory “birds,” which in turn comprises the various 










Figure  3.1: Example of hierarchical and horizontal elements 
 
Rosch (1978) proposed the prototype theory to explain the horizontal structure of a category. A 
category prototype is defined as “the collection of properties most likely to be true of members of a 
category” (Smith & Kosslyn, 2007, p. 540). For example, features of the category “birds” include flies, 
sings, and lives in trees. For most North Americans, a robin is the best real-world exemplar and therefore 
prototypical of the “birds” category as it possesses most of the category’s features (Barsalou, 1991; 
Lakoff, 1990).  
The argument that some objects of a given category best represent the category suggests that not all 
objects exhibit equal status within a category. For example, chair, radio, and refrigerator do not have 
equal status in representing “furniture” because a chair is more typical of the “furniture” category than a 
radio or refrigerator. This inequality of objects’ status within a category can be called a graded structure 
Animals 
Birds 
Owls Robins Penguins 
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(Barsalou, 1991; Gabora, Rosch & Aerts, 2008; Quinlan & Dyson, 2008), which according to Kim and 
Murphy (2011) “has been found in virtually all categories that have been tested” (p. 1092). Barsalou 
(1983) defined graded structure as “a continuum of category membership, ranging from prototypical 
members through unclear cases to prototypical nonmembers” (pp. 211-212). Prototypes, or best examples, 
can be formed based on individuals’ experiences and goals as well as the frequency with which 
individuals encounter or use the prototypes (Gabora et al., 2008). Prototypes also exhibit a high degree of 
typicality; as such, they can be called “most typical” (Rosch, 1978, 1999). The degree of typicality is 
defined as “how well a particular item fits [the subject’s] idea or image of the category to which the item 
belongs” (Rosch, 1999, p. 65). For example, although a chair is a prototype or best example of 
“furniture,” it may be unclear as to whether or not a radio even belongs in the category. Given the 
difficulty associated with determining category boundaries, Rosch (1978) asserted that a better way to 
identify whether an object belongs to a category is by determining its resemblance or similarity to clear 
cases.    
To address such categorization issues, Rosch (1978) developed the basic-level category theory, which 
proposes that “categories that are cognitively basic are ‘in the middle’ of a general-to-specific hierarchy” 
(Lakoff, 1990, p. 13). From the perspective of a hierarchical structure, categories can be described at 
different levels of abstraction—from the most general to the most specific. For example, the “furniture” 
category includes table and chair subcategories, while chair has even further subcategories: kitchen chair, 
office chair, and garden chair. Within each level of the hierarchical structure, a prototype exists. For 
example, while the category “furniture” can have prototypes such as chair and table, the prototype that 
best represents the “chair” category might be desk chair rather than barber chair or electric chair (Quinlan 
& Dyson, 2008). In this example, “chair” is the basic level as defined by Rosch’s (1978) theory, while the 
category “furniture” indicates a superordinate level. Meanwhile, kitchen chair, office chair, and garden 
chair occupy the subordinate level.  
Several factors determine which category level is basic for a given individual. First, the features of the 
objects in a category are primarily stored in the memory at the basic level; that is, when an individual is 
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asked to list the features of a given category, most features will be listed at the basic level (e.g., chair) 
rather than at the superordinate level (e.g., “furniture”). At the subordinate level (e.g., kitchen chair, office 
chair, and garden chair), knowledge about features does not increase as much as at the basic level (Lakoff, 
1990). Second, the basic level is most commonly used in communication. For example, in a neutral 
context, when an individual is asked to describe an animal in front of a house, he/she may say “there’s a 
dog on the porch”; it would be unusual for that person to say “there’s a mammal on the porch” or “there’s 
a wire-haired terrier on the porch” (Lakoff, 1990). Third, aspects of information processing, such as 
remembering and recognizing, tend to be processed at the basic level. Finally, motor interactions are 
associated with objects at the basic level. For example, a chair affords a motor action for sitting; however, 
it seems difficult to apply a specific motor action to a superordinate category such as “furniture” (Lakoff, 
1990). Similarly, it is difficult to differentiate motor actions for subordinate categories like desk chair and 
kitchen chair.  
Although it would be expected that a single basic level exists for each category, according to Smith and 
Kosslyn (2007), the basic-level category is dynamic and changes based on the context. In fact, the 
dynamic of category structure can be seen from both hierarchical and horizontal elements. From 
hierarchical elements, in the aforementioned examples of basic-level category theory, a dog is the basic 
level in a neutral context; however, when transporting a dog into the United Kingdom, one encounters a 
law that states that all mammals are subject to quarantine for six months. This law is not specified at the 
basic level (e.g., dog or cat) but at the superordinate level (i.e., mammals) to ensure that the law applies to 
all different kinds of pets.  
Rosch’s (1978) theories of prototypes and basic-level categories were developed based on common 
taxonomies (e.g., the category of “animals”), in which categories serve as the basis for many 
developments and extensions within studies of categorization (Lakoff, 1990). The current research is 
primarily concerned with the categorical knowledge of plans (e.g., “taking a trip to Toronto next 
Saturday”). In turn, three lines of research emerge that further develop theories of prototypes and basic-
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level categories relevant to the categorical knowledge of plans: the goal-derived category (Barsalou, 
1991), the event category (Zacks, Tversky & Iyer, 2001), and the action category (Hemeren, 2008). 
In contrast to common taxonomies, goal-derived categories are not fixed, but are instead “made up on 
the fly for some immediate purpose” (Lakoff, 1990, p. 45). Examples of goal-derived categories include 
“what to do for entertainment on a weekend,” “things to take from one’s home during a fire,” and “things 
to take on a camping trip” (Barsalou, 1983; Barsalou, 2010; Chrysikou, 2006; Lakoff, 1990). Goal-
derived categories are determined by goals reflected in the formation of these categories. Meanwhile, 
common taxonomies are mostly based on the perceptual similarity of relevant attributes. For example, 
members in the “birds” grouping, such as robins, owls, and penguins, are mostly grouped based on shared 
relevant attributes, such as flies, sings, and lives in trees (Barsalou, 2010; Lakoff, 1990; Murphy, 2004). 
In the goal-derived category (e.g., “things to take from one’s home during a fire”), the structure of the 
category would reflect goals (e.g., taking valuable objects) while considering specific attributes (e.g., the 
weight of the objects and time needed to escape) (Barsalou, 2010).  
Similar to common taxonomies, goal-derived categories exhibit typicality or a graded structure in 
which some members of a category are more typical than others (Barsalou, 1991; Barsalou, 1983; Lakoff, 
1990). For example, the category of “things to take from one’s home during a fire” includes things that an 
individual would be more typically inclined to take, such as photos, documents, and money. Goal-derived 
categories can be further divided into two types based on familiar and novel goals (Chrysikou, 2006). For 
example, the category of “things to pack in a suitcase” can be considered to be a category based on a 
novel goal, but only if the individual is invoking that category for the first time since the category has not 
been established in memory. If this category has already been invoked many times, the category is 
established in memory and can be considered to be based on familiar goals. 
The second type of category relevant to this research is the event category (Zacks et al., 2001), which 
Zacks and Tversky (2001) defined as “a segment of time at a given location that is conceived by an 
observer to have a beginning and an end” (p. 17). Three broad types of event categories have been 
proposed: 1) goal-directed events; 2) non-goal-directed events; and 3) events that are independent of 
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humans. A goal-directed activity such as “making a bed” is an event that has dimensions of both time 
(i.e., beginning and end) and space (i.e., location) (Tversky et al., 2008). Although some events are not 
goal-directed (e.g., falling from a ladder) and some events are independent of humans (e.g., a tsunami) 
(Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007; Zacks & Tversky, 2001), goal-directed events seem 
to be the most relevant type of events for studying categorical knowledge of plans. 
Both common taxonomies and events have a hierarchical structure; however, common taxonomies are 
hierarchically based on a kind of relationship (e.g., bird is a kind of “animal”) whereas goal-directed 
event categories tend to be hierarchically based on a part–whole relationship (e.g., spreading the sheet is 
part of “making a bed”) (Zacks & Tversky, 2001). Still, some event categories can be viewed as having a 
“kind of” relationship, indicating that basic, subordinate, and superordinate levels exist. For example, in 
an experimental setting, participants performed a category verification task, in which a brief story (e.g., 
screaming during the scary parts of a movie) from an event (e.g., watching a movie) was presented. 
Participants were then asked to verify the label of that story at one of the three levels: the subordinate 
level (e.g., horror movie), the basic level (e.g., movie), or the superordinate level (e.g., entertainment). It 
was predicted that it would take less time to verify the label of the scene as basic level than as subordinate 
or superordinate. The results indicated that participants were faster (i.e., requiring less time) in verifying 
the label of the scene at the basic level (Morris & Murphy, 1990).  
The third type of categories relevant to this research is the action category. For instance, the action 
category “body movements” includes members such as walking, running, and waving. Studies of action 
categories usually employ a visual medium to present certain actions to experimental subjects, such as 
video clips and pitch-light displays (i.e., body-motion visual display based on light associated with body 
joints). Research has demonstrated that running is the prototype of the action category of body 
movements—that is, it is the central member around which other category members are organized 
(Hemeren, 2008). However, the researched action categories have not considered activities that involve 
more than one body movement action, such as driving, where planning and implementing a plan require a 
set of related actions. Within the context of actions category is the findings of Graesser, Gordon, and 
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Sawyer (1979) that scripted activities such as going to a restaurant are structurally graded. It is worth 
noting, however, that plans may have other components related to preparing for the plans that are not 
necessarily part of the script (Hudson, Sosa, & Shapiro, 1997). 
To address the research questions, both field theory and categorization theories are combined. Field 
theory is used to represent the dynamics of the situations while categorization theories are used to model 
human experience.  
3.3 Plan–action Relationship: Combining Field Theory and Categorization 
Theories 
From a field theory perspective, according to Barker, Dembo, & Lewin (1941) and Deutsch (1968), plans, 
strategies, and schedules refer to future regions of activity. This is because these activities are intended 
but have not yet been performed. Field theory suggests that future regions of activity consist of 
subregions, which can be further differentiated into more detailed subregions. For instance, ‘taking my 
wife from Waterloo to Toronto Pearson International Airport next Saturday’ is a future region of activity 
which may include subregions such as ‘driving on Highway 401 E,’ ‘taking Dixon exit,’ and ‘following 
airport signs to get to the airport.’  
From a categorization perspective (e.g., Rosch, 1978), this research argues that individuals conceive 
(i.e. have knowledge) of plans as future activity categories with a range of possibilities. Further, the 
internal structure of a future activity category can have both hierarchical and horizontal elements. 
Hierarchically, the future activity category may be divided into subcategories and more detailed 
subcategories. For instance, the future activity category of ‘taking my wife from Waterloo to Toronto 
Pearson International Airport next Saturday’ includes subcategories such as ‘driving on Highway 401 E.’  
Horizontally, the future activity category can have a range of possibilities that describe different ways 
of doing the activity. Some of these possibilities are more likely to happen (i.e., more typical) than others.  
For example, the future activity category of ‘driving on Highway 401 E’ can have a range of possibilities 
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such as different ways of driving including aggressive driving, moderate driving, and cautious driving; in 
this case, moderate driving may be most typical of the category.  
Additionally, the future activity category can have attributes that describe characteristics of the 
situation in which the activity takes place. Each of these attributes has a range of possibilities, some of 
which are more typical than others. For example, the future activity category of ‘driving on Highway 401 
E’ can have attributes such as ‘traffic’ and ‘weather.’ In the range of possibilities for the attribute ‘traffic,’ 
the most typical possibility on Saturdays is light traffic. However, while the ‘traffic’ on Saturdays is less 
likely to be heavy or extremely heavy, it is still possible. The ‘weather’ attribute also has a range of 
possibilities, such as clear, sunny, snowing, and windy. In the winter, the most typical possibility for the 
attribute ‘weather’ might be snowing; it is less likely, but still possible, for it to be clear or sunny.  
As the above examples illustrate variability within the future activity category is due to both variability 
in how the activity is performed and variability in the situation in which the activity takes place. For the 
future activity category and its attributes, the possibilities range from more typical to less typical and 
atypical. According to Rosch (1973), this range of possibilities represents a graded structure in which 
some possibilities are more likely to happen than others. Thus, the following hypotheses can be stated: 
 
H1.  Individuals tend to conceive of plans as future activity categories with a range of possible 
attributes. 
 
H2. Future activity categories tend to exhibit a graded structure. 
 
Within the context of the plan-action relationship, categorization theories can be related to field theory. 
Individuals’ conception of a future activity as an activity category that has attributes in categorization 
theory is related to future regions of activity in field theory. Specifically, the typical possibilities of the 
future activity category correspond with the future regions of activity about which individuals form plans.  
During the execution of the activity category, according to Lewin’s (1936) theory, the individuals’ 
locomotion between regions of activity in the life space might not be possible due to a barrier (i.e., 
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situational contingencies). To overcome such a barrier, an adjustment is required. The adjustment is an 
alternative path or detour taken toward the goal region. 
 The researcher argues that there is a range of barriers that could arise. For a given barrier, there is a 
range of possible ways to adjust. Thus, for an activity category, it seems that a range of possibilities can 
occur for 1) the barriers and 2) the adjustments for a given barrier. These possibilities can range from 
more typical to typical and atypical. That is, not all barriers are new, but some of these barriers are more 
typical and therefore more, expected than others. Also, adjustments that an individual may take in 
response to a barrier are for the most part not constantly new, but can be reasonably expected based on an 
amalgamation of past experience. In the Toronto airport trip example, if ‘bad’ weather is quite typical in 
the winter, leaving home earlier with my wife to get to the airport on time may be a more typical 
adjustment than speeding on the highway.  
Furthermore, the required adjustment is based on the extent to which a barrier can affect the activity. 
That is, some barriers prevent the individual from executing the activity entirely, while other barriers 
require an adjustment that does not prevent them from executing the activity. For example, heavy ‘traffic’ 
may slow down the ‘driving on Highway 401 E,’ but does not prevent executing the activity “taking my 
wife from Waterloo to Toronto Pearson International Airport next Saturday.” However, if the ‘traffic’ 
shuts down the highway, then the trip will need to be rescheduled.   
It can be argued that the decision of the actual adjustment taken by an individual is related to the 
individuals’ knowledge and awareness of the range of possible adjustments and their typicality (graded 
structure). In the previous example, it can be said that the actual adjustment taken by leaving home earlier 
is influenced by my knowledge and awareness of the range of possible adjustments in the bad ‘weather’ 
condition, such as leaving home earlier and speeding on the highway. On the other hand, in the previous 
example my categorical knowledge of how trips to airport vary and how to adjust in response to 
variability is based on experience of behaving similar situations in the past. The general case is 




H3. There is an association between an individual’s knowledge of typical adjustments relevant to the 
activity category and the individual’s actual adjustment in the activity category.  
 
3.4 Summary 
As can be seen from the discussion of the theoretical framework in this chapter, 
 Plans as future activities have a categorical relationship with the future actions to which they 
refer;  
 Future activity categories have internal structures that are both hierarchical and horizontal;  
 The horizontal structure of the future activity category exhibits a graded structure, meaning 
that there are possibilities that are more likely to happen than others; and  
 In the case that an adjustment is required due to a presented barrier, there is an association 
between individuals’ knowledge of the future activity and the actual adjustment they make 




Empirical Part: Case Study and Laboratory Experiment  
“A psychological construct, if it is to prove valid and adequate, must be as valid 
and adequate in handling the stuff of ordinary human affairs as in handling the 
controlled variables of the laboratory experiment.” (p.12, Sharif and Cantril, 
1947)  




The Case Study: Setting the Stage 
An in-depth field study was conducted at Ready-Mix Company (RMC) to examine the proposed research 
hypotheses. The decision to conduct a field study was based on the desire to observe both planning 
activities and categorization in a natural setting, as many researchers have recommended (e.g., Agre & 
Chapman, 1989; Murphy, 2005). The choice of RMC is conducive to this specific research because 
observing and drawing conclusions about jobs are easier tasks when the jobs involve physical work than 
when they do not (Scribner, 1984).  
This chapter begins with an overview of the case context. Then, the case study’s two-phase method is 
presented. Thereafter, a discussion of the validity and reliability of the collected data is described. The 
results of the researcher’s observations, document analysis, and interviews are presented in Chapter 5.  
4.1  Study Background 
The study was conducted at RMC, which produces and delivers ready-mix concrete. RMC is located in 
the Middle East and occupies two physical locations: the head office and the batching plant. The head 
office is responsible for management activities, including developing and securing new contracts, 
managing current customers’ accounts, and preparing the daily schedule. The batching plant is 
operational and technical in nature; the plant’s employees are responsible for production, delivery, quality 
service, inventory control, and laboratory scale samples.    
RMC manufactures and delivers various ready-mix concretes, including 3,000 pounds per square inch 
(PSI) and 7,500 PSI formulas. These mixes consist of cement, water, sand, admixture, and aggregate. An 
interesting property of the ready-mix concrete industry is that its products are highly perishable and must 
be batched upon request and according to the customer’s specifications, which results in a complex 
logistical problem (Naso, Surico, Turchiano, & Kaymak, 2007). Typically, scheduling in such an industry 
is handled by experts (Lu & Lam, 2005; Naso et al., 2007); RMC is no exception. Expert schedulers offer 
 
 41 
the opportunity to study the plan–action relationship because, unlike automated scheduling software, they 
provide primary access to individuals who conceive of schedules and how an activity is described. Human 
beings can also evaluate if such activities progressed according to the plan. The remainder of this section 
is based on an interview conducted with RMC’s schedulers about their main job responsibilities.   
Scheduling is a resource allocation process (McKay et al., 1995). At RMC, scheduling starts by signing 
a contract between the project owner/contractor and RMC. The contract specifies the approximate total of 
required volume and specifications, project description, project duration, site location, and cost. Over the 
course of the project, orders are typically placed three to four days in advance, with an order confirmation 
being submitted the day before the order delivers. The three- or four-day lead time is mainly used to order 
raw materials, plan for truck mixers, and manage batching plant capacity. Late orders that are placed on 
the day of the delivery cannot be guaranteed. The scheduler receives orders and codes the following 
information for each order:  
 Date of concrete pouring: In some cases, customers are placed on a waiting list if they are 
willing to receive their order based on availability.  
 Preferred time of concrete pouring: The customer chooses one of three time slots—morning, 
afternoon, or evening—based on a first-come, first-served basis. It is worth noting that the 
first-come, first-served basis is not followed strictly; contractors who need a continuous daily 
supply of concrete for their large projects are given priority over other customers. 
 Requested volume: The customer specifies the required volume as precisely as possible.   
 Concrete specifications: The customer chooses from among a selection of predefined mixes 
at RMC.  
 Site location: Sites in restricted areas (e.g., airbases, jails) require advance permission for 
specific trucks, pumps, and drivers to enter the area. Local municipalities in which RMC 
operates also impose regulations on the downtown area, restricting concrete pouring to a 
limited number of hours approved by the traffic department. 
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 Type of pouring: The customer specifies the type of pouring, such as column, slab, or 
foundation.  
 Concrete discharge method: If the order requires a pump, the customer must ask for a pump 
to discharge the concrete from the truck mixers to the construction sites. For example, 
pouring a slab on the sixth floor of a structure requires a pump.  
Based on this information and plant available capacity, the scheduler decides either to accept the order 
or delay the order to a later date. One day before the delivery, the scheduler confirms the order’s 
requirements with the customer and ensures that the site is ready for delivery. In this way, the scheduler 
can prepare the next day’s schedule. If an order is not confirmed, the order is cancelled (except for small 
orders of one truckload5). As a result, other customers might be contacted and shifted one or two days 
earlier to replace the cancelled orders. If an order is cancelled by RMC on the day of the delivery, the 
scheduler may negotiate delaying the delivery date and time with other customers to accommodate 
cancelled orders. Usually, the schedule is released and sent to the plant the evening before the delivery. 
Appendix A includes an example of the daily schedule at RMC.  
For the purpose of the present study, according to corporate records of daily schedules, the major 
activity category that organizes scheduling is “delivering orders,” which varies based on 1) volume of 
concrete, 2) PSI grades, 3) concrete pumps, 4) site locations, and 5) delivery time (see Figure 4.1). These 
attributes are defined formally in the daily schedule and reporting system at RMC. The present study 
individually analyzes each of the attributes on the occasions of delivering orders (hereafter, occasions of 
shipment), with the exception of the delivery time attribute as RMC does not record actual delivery time.  
                                                   




Figure  4.1: Attributes of the “delivering orders” activity category 
4.2  Methods 
The data collection for this study, which involved two phases—the preliminary and main phases—took 
place between June and September 2009. The first phase, preliminary collection, was exploratory in 
nature, with a goal of gaining a general understanding of ready-mix concrete. The second phase, main 
collection, consisted of participant-observation and semi-structured interviews to explore the nature of the 
“delivering orders” activity category and test the proposed research hypotheses. The second phase was 
followed up by additional communication to collect further data to clarify the data and assist with 
analysis. In the following subsections, each phase is discussed in detail, including the goal of the phase 
and the instruments used to collect data. 
4.2.1  Preliminary Phase  
The goal of the preliminary phase was to identify RMC’s general background and the structure of the 
company’s planning and scheduling systems. This phase involved establishing an appropriate level of 
trust and social rapport for the study, preparing an atmosphere in which staff members could express their 
opinions openly and establish contact with key staff members. During this stage, the following items were 
examined: the length of the scheduling cycle (i.e., scheduling horizon), how schedules were created, how 
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related parties (e.g., customers). Furthermore, key actors and entities involved in planning and scheduling 
were examined, including individuals (e.g., schedulers and dispatchers), groups (e.g., customers), and 
artifacts (e.g., scheduling software).  
RMC’s general manager was contacted by phone in March 2009 to request approval to study the 
company’s planning and scheduling activities. The focus of the study was defined broadly in the area of 
planning and logistics operations, particularly with regard to how people develop and use operational 
plans and how these plans affect the way in which operational activities actually unfold in practice. The 
researcher informed the general manager that he was most interested in meeting with staff members in 
operational and planning roles, including those engaged in converting raw materials into finished goods, 
maintaining industrial machinery, and using information systems to support planning and operations. 
After obtaining the general manager’s approval, to begin the preliminary phase, the researcher met with 
the general manager, who introduced the researcher to the key staff members at the head office, including 
the deputy general manager, sales manager, financial manager, and schedulers. The researcher also 
accompanied the general manager during a visit to the plant. At the plant, the general manager 
coordinated a meeting to introduce the researcher to the plant’s key staff members, including the plant 
manager, assistant manager, quality control supervisor, and maintenance supervisor. In mid-June 2009, 
the researcher spent a week at RMC observing the planning and scheduling activities and informally 
interviewing several individuals. In addition, various documents and records related to daily production 
schedules were reviewed and evaluated. 
In setting up this study, it was challenging to determine the optimum place in which to observe the 
scheduling activities as they unfolded as these activities were distributed geographically among the 
construction sites, the head office, and the plant. After several visits to different locations where 
scheduling activities took place, it seemed that the dispatch office would be the best place to observe 
operations and collect data on scheduling activities. This conclusion corresponded with the plant 
manager’s recommendation to situate the study in the dispatcher office. In addition, the researcher also 
frequently visited construction sites and the head office.  
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4.2.2  Main Phase 
The purposes of the main phase were to understand the “delivering orders” activity category and examine 
how staff members experience their job tasks as they unfold. With respect to the “delivering orders” 
activity category, information was obtained during interviews by identifying sets of job tasks and subtasks 
that a staff member performed in relation to developing and executing daily schedules. For example, the 
dispatcher might describe his or her task as “delivering an order,” with a subtask such as “giving 
directions to the site.” Interviewees were also asked to provide specific examples of typical and atypical 
instances of job tasks and subtasks to identify the range of possibilities.  
The interview questions were constructed based on the “echo method” originally developed by Bavelas 
(1942). This method can be used to analyze the interactions, communications, and interdependency of 
roles relative to a particular task structure (Barthol & Bridge, 1968; Poile, 2008). The echo method has 
been applied to various settings, including manufacturing (Scala, Purdy, & Safayeni, 2006), 
organizational communications (Duimering, 1997), project management (Alojairi & Safayeni, 2012) and 
education (Schaefer, Bavelas, & Bavelas, 1980). Interviews involved questioning staff members about 
their experiences and tasks in their current and previous positions. Interviewees were asked to provide 
examples of what they considered to be helpful and unhelpful behaviors exhibited by both themselves and 
others in assisting other staff members or units in accomplishing their job tasks. (See Appendix B for the 
interview questions used in the present study.) 
Nine interviews were conducted and recorded (with permission); lasting for an average of an hour and 
15 minutes each. Interviews were conducted with schedulers, dispatchers, the plant assistant manager, the 
quality control supervisor, a quality control technician, site inspectors, and the sales manager. 
Interviewees had between 2 and 15 years of experience at RMC, with an average of 9.8. Blue-collar 
workers, such as truck drivers and pump operators, were excluded because most of these workers were 
not fluent in either of the languages the researcher speaks, which would have resulted in communication 
and interpretation barriers, thereby limiting the number of potential interviewees. According to Syverson 
(2008), blue-collar workers at ready-mix concrete plants typically account for more than 75% of the plant 
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staff; RMC was no exception. As the percentage of these workers is so high and the researcher was not 
able to interview them, the study focused on other sources of data. 
The other primary source of data from the main phase was collected via participant observation. In the 
interest of maintaining consistency in collecting the data over the course of the study, both a systematic 
data collection process and a data collection template were developed (see Appendix C for the details of 
the process used to develop these tools and Appendix D for the data collection template). Although 
recorded information was collected, validated, and cross-checked with the staff members after the 
observations, this information was not formally analyzed. Instead, these data formed the basis for the field 
notes that the researcher drew upon in analyzing anecdotes presented in the case study. In addition, over 
the course of the study -from June to September 2009- 35 hours of audio and video recordings were made 
of the daily activities at different locations (e.g., head office and construction sites), including 18.5 hours 
recorded in the dispatcher office. These recordings were used in conjunction with the field notes. 
Although the recordings were made with management’s permission, in some cases the researcher was 
instructed to stop recording due to the sensitivity of these cases.  
The data collected were mainly in Arabic, which is the official language of the country in which the 
company is located (and thus the language in which the study was conducted). To ensure a high-quality 
translation from Arabic to English, an iterative translation method was employed. Translation is not 
purely a linguistic task; rather, it requires many skills beyond language fluency, such as familiarity with 
the content of the material being translated (Green & White, 1976; Milliman & Glinow, 1998). In the 
present study, three bilingual graduate students, including the researcher, conducted the process of 
iterative translation. Each person completed the translation individually; the translators then compared 
their work. Discrepancies were noted and discussed until consensus was reached. 
A follow-up study was carried out primarily to further clarify aspects of the case study. For example, 
additional data related to the procedures used at RMC to test the quality of delivered concrete were 
collected. These follow-up data were mainly collected through email correspondence between the 
researcher and general manager and quality control supervisor from April to May 2011. 
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During the data analysis stage, the interviews, field notes, and recordings were coded for analysis. The 
coding process involved identifying categories and their specific examples by segmenting, sorting, and 
then summarizing the data. The analysis focused on the patterns in the various data collected and the 
emergent themes as evidence to test the hypotheses (Charmaz, 2006; Maxwell, 2005; Strauss, 1987). In 
addition, various documents and records were collected, providing a quantitative basis for testing the 
research hypotheses.  
4.2.2.1  Measuring the Graded Structure   
One of the hypotheses in the present study is that individuals tend to conceive (have knowledge and 
awareness) of plans as future activity categories that are structurally graded. Over the last four decades, 
extensive research of human categorization processes has examined the prevalence of graded structure; 
this research has produced robust empirical results in which no single study failed to report a graded 
structure (Kim & Murphy, 2011; Murphy, 2004). A graded structure is typically examined quantitatively 
by typicality ratings, whereby survey instruments are used in experimental settings to measure how well a 
member of a given category fits the subjects’ understanding of the category. Specifically, graded structure 
suggests that some members belonging to a given category are a better fit to the category than other 
members. For example, when asked to rate on a 9-point Likert scale how well different members fit the 
category of “furniture,” if subjects judge that “sofa” is a better example (i.e., member) than “television,” 
then the “furniture” category can be said to exhibit a graded structure (Barsalou, 1985; Murphy, 2004; 
Rosch, 1973, 1999). Graded structure studies have also found that members within a category that are 
judged to be different in their fitness with the category (e.g., degree of typicality) are correlated with 
different behavior measurements in psychological research. For example, when subjects were asked to 
press a button as quickly as possible, also called reaction time, to indicate that an object appearing on a 
screen belonged to a given category, researchers found that objects that better fit a given category were 
associated with faster responses than objects that fit the category poorly (Barsalou, 1985; Lakoff, 1990; 
Rosch, 1999).   
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However, within the context of RMC, obtaining reliable typicality ratings was difficult because the 
number of subjects who could perform any given task was small. Thus, an alternative approach was 
developed, suggesting that different behaviors that occur during different occasions of shipment are 
associated with different degrees of typicality of these occasions. For example, atypical occasions of 
shipment were associated with harsh language and cursing. Whereas typical occasions of shipment were 
associated with phrases such as “usually” and “always happens.” The dataset used in this approach 
consisted of a set of anecdotes based on the transcript of the 18.5 hours of data recorded in the 
dispatcher’s office. The study sought evidence to indicate whether RMC staff members can discriminate 
between different degrees of typicality for different occasions of shipments. (section 5.1.1.1 discusses the 
details of the dataset used and the coding procedures). To validate the developed qualitative approach, the 
evidence found in the qualitative data was correlated with corporate records, as described in section 
5.1.1.2.  
4.2.2.2  Unit of Analysis 
In the present study, observational data are based on the perception of key staff members within RMC 
who had sufficient knowledge of the company and its operations. The analysis represents a collective 
perception of these key staff members of RMC, which suggests that the unit of analysis takes place at the 
plant/organizational level rather than the individual (staff member) level. Furthermore, official scheduling 
records used in the present study represent corporate data at the plant/organizational level, which is also 
not necessarily related to particular individuals.     
4.2.2.3  Assumptions of the Case Study 
This study, like many other studies investigating plan–action relationships (e.g., Suchman 1987), assumes 
that people are following plans. However, according to Carroll (2003), this assumption might not always 
be valid. Assessing this assumption at RMC is difficult as producing and delivering concrete are complex 
tasks that require multiple people to work simultaneously at different geographical locations.  
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In addition, following previous studies of plan–action relationships (e.g., Suchman & Trigg, 1991), this 
study uses schedules instead of plans to investigate the relationship. Thus, plans and schedules are 
assumed to be equivalent within the context of the plan–action relationship. Although in this case study 
both plans and schedules data were available for analysis, the decision was made to study schedules 
because, at RMC, the raw material availability and the reliable suppliers almost guarantee a continuous 
supply that keeps the amount of planning at RMC at a minimum. Furthermore, a larger sample size was 
obtained by focusing on schedules due to scheduling cycles (i.e., the process by which schedules are 
created and executed) being shorter than planning cycles.  
4.3  Reliability and Validity of the Case Study  
This section seeks to answer several questions—namely: Is RMC’s scheduling performance comparable 
to that of the ready-mix concrete industry? Are different sources of collected data reliable? What 
problems are associated with these sources of data?  
Few studies have focused on performance measures in the ready-mix concrete industry (Wang & 
Anson, 2000), and some researchers (e.g., Wang & Anson, 2000; Wang, Ofori, & Teo, 2001) have argued 
that the ready-mix concrete industry does not possess accepted performance measures that can be used for 
benchmarking. Wang and Anson (2000) suggested comparing different measures reported in the literature 
to assess the performance of ready-mix concrete plants. Therefore, various measures of scheduling 
performance at RMC, such as the mean difference between scheduled volume and actual volume 
delivered, are computed and compared with findings in the existing literature.  
In the present study, the first scheduling performance measurement used to assess RMC is the mean of 
difference between scheduled volume and actual volume delivered (Anson, Tang, & Ying, 2002). 
According to data reported in Anson et al. (2002), the mean of the difference between scheduled volume 
and actual volume delivered is 24.2%, with a standard deviation of 7.4%. At RMC, the mean difference 
between these two measures is 9.8%, with a standard deviation of 7.8%. Thus, it appears that RMC has 
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higher performance based on the mean of difference between scheduled volume and actual volume 
delivered than the performance found by Anson et al. (2002).  
The second performance measure reported in the literature to measure ready-mix concrete plant 
performance is the difference between the initial number of orders per day and the actual number of 
orders delivered. For example, Anson et al. (2002) found that the mean of difference between the number 
of orders initially placed and the number of orders actually delivered per day was 62.9%, with a 21.1% 
standard deviation. At RMC, the mean of difference between the number of initial orders and the actual 
orders delivered is 20.9%, with a standard deviation of 7.4%. Thus, it appears that RMC demonstrates 
much higher in consistency between the number of orders initially placed and the number of orders 
actually delivered per day.  
The third performance measure is the average volume per order (Anson et al., 2002; Anson et al., 
1996). Anson et al. (2002) reported an average of 30.48 m3 per order, whereas Anson et al. (1996) 
reported an average of 32.5 m3 per order. These two figures are close to the 29.7 m3 recorded average 
volume per order at RMC. Overall, as shown in Table 4.1, data on the performance measures of 
scheduling suggest that RMC has higher performance than reported studies. 
Table  4.1: Performance Measures of Scheduling at RMC Compared with Reported Studies  
No. Performance Measures Anson et al. (2002) 
Anson et al. 
(1996) RMC 
1 % of the difference between scheduled volume and actual 
volume delivered per day 
M = 24.2% 
SD = 7.4% 
 
Not reported  
M = 9.8% 
SD = 7.8% 
2 
 
% of the difference between initial number of orders and 
actual number of orders delivered per day 
M = 62.9% 








Average volume per order 30.48 m3 
 
32.5 m3 29.7 m3 
 
With respect to the validity and reliability of the collected data, the present study uses methodological 
triangulation in which multiple sources of evidence—namely, formal interviews, scheduling reports, and 
participant observation—are used to establish a chain of evidence to examine the proposed theoretical 
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framework and enhance the study’s validity (Yin, 2003). The first set of data was obtained from formal 
interviews with a standard set of questions, which were helpful in capturing the real task situation and 
understanding the “delivering orders” category. Two issues must be noted regarding the formal 
interviews. First, the number of interviewees available was limited by communication barriers with the 
blue-collar staff, as previously discussed. Second, interviews are considered second-hand information, 
requiring interviewees to reconstruct real-life events (Duimering, 1997). To overcome these issues, direct 
observation of the events was used because observational data might be more reliable for capturing events 
as they unfold rather than reconstructing these events after the fact. 
The second set of data is the observational data, such as audio and video recordings. This very rich data 
represents the work at RMC as it is unfolding. Observational data also provide opportunities to draw 
comparisons between different events and examine emergent patterns. One of the issues with 
observational data is that human perception is a highly selective process. According to Sacks (1984), 
“The question is why did you choose the particular data? Is it some problem in your mind that caused you 
to pick up this data?” (p. 26). To overcome the selectivity of human perception, the observational data 
were gathered in two forms: 1) structured field notes and 2) audio or video recordings. Together, these 
two formats offer a structured and more comprehensive dataset than using a single form. The other issue 
associated with recordings is that, in a few sensitive situations at RMC, recording was not possible. 
The third set of data is corporate records, including scheduling and quality control reports, which allow 
comparisons to be drawn between scheduled and actual production. These reports are limited by the fact 
that they do not give the reasons for the changes in the daily schedules (e.g., replacing scheduled pumps 
with other pumps or changing the volume of concrete).                                                                                                       
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Chapter 5                                                                                                        
Case Study: Results and Analysis  
This chapter synthesizes the qualitative and quantitative data, creating triangulation to sensibly interpret 
the actual situations observed and documents analyzed to extract a coherent meaning. In addition, the 
examined attributes of the daily schedule (volume, PSI grades, pumps, and site locations) offer 
independent lines of evidence to test the hypotheses as these attributes are neither related to nor affected 
by each other. For example, placing an order for a certain volume of concrete is not affected or controlled 
by the choice of a certain PSI grade (as any volume of concrete can be provided in any PSI grade).  
The chapter is subdivided into two sections. The first section is devoted to discussing the results and 
analysis of the category structure (H1 and H2). The nature of adjustments (H3) is subsequently examined.    
5.1  Category Structure  
In this context, occasions of shipment of the activity category “delivering orders” are examined with 
respect to each of the daily schedule attributes (volume, PSI grades, pumps, and site locations). For each 
attribute, the analysis starts with the first hypothesis. Thereafter, qualitative and quantitative analyses are 
devoted to examining the second hypothesis.  
5.1.1  Volume  
Volume is an attribute of the “delivering orders” activity category and specifies the volume of concrete to 
be delivered to a given customer. Although estimating the total volume of concrete required for an entire 
construction project can be done in advance at a satisfactory level, estimating the volume of each order 
delivered at specific time over the course of the project is very difficult. This difficulty, combined with 
the fact that customers are charged for the volume ordered—whether it is used or not—results in some 
tension in the process of placing orders at ready-mix concrete plants. Accordingly, a common practice 
among customers is to order less concrete volume than is actually required and then ask for additional 
concrete on short notice if it is needed. Ordering less concrete than needed has led RMC to establish a 
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policy of limiting customers to one additional truckload per order on short notice. In executing the daily 
schedule, this policy is considered central, yet sometimes it is not strictly followed due to the relative size 
of the order. With large orders, for example, one extra truck accounts for a relatively small percentage of 
the order; therefore, two or more extra trucks might be inevitable according to the dispatchers.  
The policy of limiting customers to one additional truckload is evidence of the variability in volume, 
which suggests that staff members at RMC are aware that an order delivery can have a range of 
possibilities up to a full truckload from the original booking. This knowledge and awareness among staff 
members about possible deviations supports the first hypothesis that individuals tend to conceive plans as 
future activity categories with a range of possibilities.  
5.1.1.1  Analyzing the Qualitative Data   
This section reports anecdotes and quotes to examine the graded structure hypothesis (H2), which 
includes identifying deviations between scheduled and actual delivered orders, the degree to which these 
deviations are typical, and the behaviors associated with each deviation. The focus here is on the 
deviations within particular occasions of shipment as the study was conducted within the context of the 
plan–action relationship, which emphasizes the consistency between scheduled and actual shipments. The 
qualitative analysis applies to each of the daily schedule attributes (i.e., PSI grades, pumps, and site 
locations), which will be discussed later in this chapter.   
The 18.5 hours of recordings that captured daily activities at the dispatcher’s office serve as the 
foundation of this analysis. The procedures for coding and analyzing shipments are as follows. First, 
orders that had deviated from the schedule during the 18.5 hours were identified using RMC’s daily 
schedule reports:  14 orders deviated regarding the volume of concrete, 4 deviated from PSI grade, 8 
deviated regarding concrete pumps, and 1 deviated from site location. Second, using the transcription of 
the 18.5 hours, the researcher traced and coded the details of the deviated orders, noting how typical these 
deviations were (e.g., usual and one-of-a-kind) and their associated behaviors (e.g., welcoming words and 
harsh language used, such as shouting and screaming).  
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Not all of the deviated orders had enough detail to be coded as staff members (e.g., schedulers) dealt 
with some of the deviated orders without consulting the dispatch office where the recording was 
occurring. As a result, the researcher supplemented the analysis with data collected from interviews that 
indicated typical and atypical deviations.  
In the first piece of evidence, an episode suggested that different staff members possess different 
understandings of what constitutes a deviation: 
Researcher: What is going on with [customer]? 
Dispatcher: He booked 95 [m3]. Maybe the customer was not sure how much he would actually 
need; it may be 90 [m3], or 100 [m3], or maybe 105 [m3]. 
Researcher: So, usually one truck, right? 
Dispatcher: No, it’s very usual to take 2 [m3], 3 m3, 5 m3 less or one truck more [i.e., 9 m3]. It’s 
very usual for every customer. So, for example, [the customer] could take up to 105 [m3] more. 
That is a truck extra. 
Researcher: What if he takes 90 [m3]? Is that okay? 
Dispatcher: Yeah, that is very reasonable. I told QC [Quality Control] that the booking is 100 
[m3], so how many bags do I need to order? They said “four hundred ice bags.” I increased it [the 
customer booking6] to 100 [m3].  
Researcher: Do you tell QC how many cubic meters and then they inform you how many bags? 
Dispatcher: Yes, because they control the temperature. 
Researcher: Don’t they put a margin of 10 or 20 bags?   
Dispatcher: No. I easily can supply up to 105 [m3] because I already ordered 100 [m3] and 
accumulated 20 bags extra from last night. 
 
This episode shows that staff members, such as dispatchers, who interact directly with shipping orders 
understand reasonable and usual deviation at RMC. However, other staff members, such as quality 
control technicians, who do not interact directly with shipping orders do not understand deviation. 
According to this episode, a conflict arises when the staff members who do understand deviation 
coordinate their work with staff members who do not understand deviation. In other words, some staff 
                                                   
6 The actual booking was 95 m3. 
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members experience and recognize that deviation is happening, whereas others do not. As a result, those 
who do understand deviation use a padding mechanism by adding extra concrete equivalent to the 
expected deviation. The padding mechanism is shown when a staff member who does not understand 
deviation was informed of a volume that includes 5 m3 extra. The staff member who does not understand 
deviation calculates that the number of ice bags (used to control concrete temperature in the summer) 
based on the volume that includes this padding, not the customer’s original booking.              
A second anecdote provides evidence of a usual deviation:  
Dispatcher: We [RMC] sometimes suffer from being late because of 1 or 2 [m3].  
Researcher: Isn’t there one truck extra? 
Dispatcher: Usually, one truck is 1 to 2 m3 more or 2 to 3 m3 fewer. 
Dispatcher: But for a big slab, a big quantity may be one full truckload or two trucks. 
 
In the previous example, one of the staff members talked about the difficulty that RMC staff members 
experience when customers ask for 1 or 2 m3 extra, which delays the schedule. Although the quote 
indicates that sending a larger quantity of extra concrete is an unpleasant situation for RMC staff 
members, sending a few extra cubic meters and up to one additional truck is common. Large orders are 
the exception, as they might ask for more than one extra truckload.      
A third anecdote shows a more typical deviation:    
Dispatcher: I sent 25 [m3], but only 24 [m3] were necessary to complete the job. 
Researcher: He [customer] paid for the 25 [m3], right?  
Dispatcher: He paid for the 25 [m3]. This always happens. In ready-mix customers are unable to 
give exactly how much concrete they will need. Customers can’t estimate the required volume 
with perfect accuracy. You see there [pointing outside his office to a dump trailer] is [the 
customer’s] excess concrete.  
 
In this episode, two deliveries had excess concrete. In one of these two cases, the 1 m3 excess was sent 
to a subsequent customer, whereas in the other case, the excess concrete was unloaded into the dump 
trailer to be sent to the dumping area because the concrete was not fresh enough to be sent to another 
customer. Again, the episode stressed that deviations are not unusual at RMC. 
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A fourth anecdote illustrates an interesting example from the interviews regarding the helpful behavior 
a dispatcher displayed toward the scheduler. In this example, the dispatcher wanted the head office to 
contact the customer when the last truck of an order was about to be sent to double-check with the 
customer as to whether he or she needed extra concrete. The scheduler considered this very helpful 
behavior:  
Scheduler: Okay, a customer had an initial order of 100 m3. The dispatcher called me 
[scheduler], and I left with 3 m3 to finish his booking. Would you [scheduler] please check if the 
customer needs an extra truck [over the booking of 100 m3]?  
 
The fifth anecdote relates to a customer who ordered a lot of extra concrete—an unusual deviation. Its 
consequences are apparent based on the discourse.  
Dispatcher: This is another **** [curse]. You know that if he [a particular customer] orders 20 
m3, he may order 10 [m3] more [laughing]. If he orders 100 m3, he might needs 50 [m3] more, or 
if 100 m3, he may ask for another 200 [m3]. I supply him very carefully, checking the site. If he 
places an order of 50 m3, I ask [the site inspector] to examine the construction site [to estimate 
how much concrete the customer will actually need versus how much he initially orders]. 
 
In the sixth anecdote, an example of another unusual deviation and its consequences are again 
noticeable.  
Dispatcher: One day, I got angry. I wasn’t able to control myself. [The customer] ordered 40 m3 
and took nearly 100…After the 40 m3, he [the customer in three separate instances] said “Send 
20,” again, “Send 20,” and then, “Send 20.” I told him, “You tell me what you want at one time.” 
He said, “I’m an engineer.” I said, “Whether you’re an engineer or not is not the question. Okay, 
you’re an engineer. Tell me the right quantity so that I can adjust.”  
 
In the preceding example, the dispatcher became angry with a customer who asked for many extra 
truckloads, using harsh language, curse words, and raising his voice. The dispatcher took several actions 
in subsequent dealings with the same customer(s), such as asking the customer to be honest and relying 




These anecdotes and quotes highlight shipments with typical and atypical deviations. Specifically, 
typical deviations (which had a maximum of one additional truck) were easier to cover through a 
willingness to send a few extra cubic meters. These typical occasions were described with phrases such as 
“very usual,” “very reasonable,” “every customer,” “usually,” and “always happens,” which indicates 
these shipments are more likely to happen. On the other hand, atypical deviations (customers who require 
more than one additional truck) were more difficult to cover and associated with mistrust, harsh language, 
and very negative tone often of cursing. Overall, these anecdotes and quotes provide support for the 
second hypothesis that occasions of shipment in the “delivering orders” activity category exhibits a 
graded structure in which some occasions of shipment are more likely to happen (small deviations 
equating to a maximum of one truckload) than others (large deviations equating to more than one 
truckload). 
5.1.1.2  Analysis of the Quantitative Data   
In this section, a quantitative approach is developed and performed to determine if the graded structure, 
found in the previously presented qualitative analysis, is also present. In addition, the purpose here is to 
determine/demonstrate that prior data are not special cases; but that they are typical and that the results 
are generalized to all shipments at RMC. The procedure used for the quantitative analysis is as follows. 
Based on daily schedule reports for 43 days of operation and 1,109 identified orders, undelivered and 
unscheduled orders were excluded, leaving 702 orders to analyze. The researcher then computed the 
deviations in the shipments with respect to each attribute of the daily schedule. For example, the deviation 
for the attribute volume was calculated by computing the difference between scheduled and delivered 
volume for each order. The computed deviations were grouped in two ways: 1) staff members’ opinions 
of the permissible and not permissible deviations obtained in the qualitative analysis and 2) a two-step 




With respect to volume, based on the company’s policy of limiting customers to one additional 
truckload, deviations were grouped into the following: 1) orders within the policy (i.e., 0 to 9 m3) and 2) 
orders that deviated beyond the policy. Table 5.1 indicates that 82% (573 orders) fall in the first group 
while 18% (129 orders) fall in the second group. These data show that orders are most likely to fall within 
the permissible range, whereas it is less likely for orders to fall beyond the permissible range. 
Table  5.1: Groups Created Based on the Policy of Limiting Deliveries to One Additional Truckload 
Groups n % Range (m3) Range (trucks) 
G1p within the permissible range 573 82 (0 to 9) (<= one truck) 
G2p beyond the permissible range        129 18 (> 9 ) (> one truck) 
 
702 100   
 
The two-step cluster technique7 used to find the optimum number of groups was performed on the 
computed deviations (SPSS, 2001). After performing the two-step cluster technique, three groups were 
identified. The Silhouette measure, an index used to compare the width of each group produced with the 
width of the entire dataset, was used to validate the number of groups produced. The result of the 
Silhouette measure is a single number between -1 and 1. If the Silhouette index is close to 1, it is 
considered to be a very good grouping; if the index is close to 0, it means another cluster can be 
preformed; and if the index is close to -1, it is considered to be a misgrouping of the dataset (SPSS, 2001). 
For the three groups of the volume, the index was computed as 0.7, which is considered to be a good 
grouping.  
As shown in Table 5.2, the first group includes 85% of the orders (596), which deviated from the 
scheduled volume by values between 0 and 11 m3. Table 5.2 also shows a relatively large standard 
deviation (SD = 17.2) for G3c, which suggests that G3c includes a wide range of values for the deviations 
and has a very large dispersion.  
                                                   
7 This technique’s procedures consist of two steps. In the first step, many small subgroups are produced based on a sequential 
clustering approach that uses a distance criterion. Here, the data are examined sequentially to determine whether each record is a 
best fit with the existing group(s) or requires a new group. In the second step, the technique finds the optimum number of groups 
automatically and then converts the many small subgroups that were produced in the first step into the automatically generated 
groups (SPSS, 2001). 
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Table  5.2: Groups Created Based on the Cluster Analysis 
Groups n          % Mean (m3) SD (m3)  Range (m3) Range (trucks) 
G1c 596 85 2.3 3.00  0 to 11 approx. <= one truck 
G2c 79 11 21.2 6.80  12 to 38 approx. 2 to 4 trucks 
G3c 27 04 59.5 17.2  >= 39 approx. > 4 trucks 
 702 100      
 
Figure 5.1 indicates that Group 1, created by the cluster analysis, matches 96% of RMC’s policy of 
limiting customers to a maximum of one extra truckload per order (i.e., 0 to 9 m3). Figure 5.1 further 
indicates that the cluster technique differentiates between orders that deviated by two to four trucks in 
Group 2 and orders that deviated by more than four trucks in Group 3. However, Groups 2 and 3 are 
treated in a similar fashion to RMC’s policy because they fall into one group beyond the permissible 
range. Therefore, because RMC’s policy does not differentiate between Groups 2 and 3, it can be said 
that—to a large extent—the groups created by the cluster technique are consistent with the groups created 
based on RMC’s policy. Specifically, in the “delivering orders” activity category, shipments with respect 
to volume are most likely to be delivered within the permissible range and less likely to be beyond the 
permissible range.  
The quantitative analysis is consistent with the qualitative analysis that suggested that some occasions 
are more likely to occur than others. On the whole, the results presented in the qualitative and quantitative 
analyses indicate that, with respect to volume, shipments are most likely to be within the permissible 
range and less likely to be beyond the permissible range. These results demonstrate that volume exhibits 
graded structure, supporting Hypothesis 2. That is individuals tend to conceive of plans as future activity 
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Figure  5.1: Match between the groups created based on the cluster analysis and the groups created based on the policy of 
one additional truckload    
5.1.2  Pounds per Square Inch Grades  
Pounds per square inch (PSI) grades (hereafter, grades) is an attribute of the “delivering orders” activity 
category that refers to the compressive force required to cause the concrete to fail (Lee, 1989). RMC has a 
high standard of safety in which an ordered grade should provide a strength that equals at least the 
ordered grade plus 500 PSI. For example, if a customer orders grade A, the delivered concrete will be at 
least grade A plus a minimum safety factor of 500 PSI. In the general manager’s words: “We design the 
mix to give at least a 500-PSI margin above the target.” Indeed, the safety factor is considered to be 
central in executing the daily schedule.  
The safety factor of adding a minimum of 500 PSI defines the minimum, but not the maximum, limit of 
the PSI added, which introduces variability. This variability suggests a range of possibilities that may 
include any number higher than or equal to 500 PSI additional strength to the ordered grade. Thus, the 
awareness and knowledge that staff members have about possibilities resulting from the inclusion of a 
safety factor in shipments provides evidence to support Hypothesis 1, which states that individuals tend to 
conceive of plans as future activity categories with a range of possibilities.  
5.1.2.1  Analysis of the Qualitative Data   
Shipments are investigated in relation to the difference between originally ordered grades and the actual 
grades delivered to customers. To evaluate this factor, the dataset’s anecdotes and quotes were analyzed 
following the procedures discussed in section 5.1.1.1. 
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The following quote discusses the consequences of pouring concrete at the wrong site:  
Dispatcher: Yeah, I have to be very careful since we are pouring concrete at two different sites in 
the same area. One time when we poured concrete at two sites in the same area, one truck driver 
went to the wrong site. I was lucky that both sites had similar grades. 
[The researcher then asked the dispatcher whether he remembered a case when the delivered 
grade was lower than the original order.]  
Dispatcher: Yeah, about seven years ago. It was costly. We had to remove the concrete and 
replace it. We also paid for the manpower. 
 
From this quote, it can be concluded that the consequences of mistakenly sending concrete to the wrong 
site would depend on the grade. If both sites required identical grades, the mix-up would not be a 
problem. However, if the sites required different grades, this would require replacing (at RMC’s expense) 
the concrete at the site that received the grade lower than originally ordered. Indeed, RMC has 
experienced this situation as noted. 
Sometimes concrete is sent from one site to another site. In these cases, the grade of the concrete has to 
be identical to or higher than the originally ordered grade. The next episode shows the role of grades in 
the process of transferring excess concrete between sites. 
Dispatcher [on the phone with the scheduler]: Hello, Sir. One m3 left from blinding, two 
and a half hours. Can I send it to [customer]? Oh, okay. 
Dispatcher [to plant operator]: One-six-four [truck number] has one m3 inside. Send it to 
[customer number 17]. 
Researcher: Only one m3? 
Dispatcher: The customer doesn’t need it. It’s excess. 
Researcher: Oh, excess. So, you will send it to [another customer]. 
Dispatcher: Yes, another site. 
Researcher: You will add more, right? 
Dispatcher: One m3 in the truck, and I’ll add 8 m3. 
 
In this episode, one m3 of excess concrete from one customer was sent to another customer. Although 
the discussion in the episode did not address the grade of the concrete explicitly, the grade was indirectly 
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indicated by identifying it as blinding concrete. According to the scheduler, different kinds of structures, 
such as blindings, foundations, and slabs, have standard grades. Because blinding concrete is usually of a 
grade that is identical to the target the customer originally ordered, grade was not an issue.  
The next quote is an example of a miscommunication between schedulers in which each thought that 
the other confirmed an order from a customer. Ultimately, the concrete was loaded onto the truck before 
anyone noticed the miscommunication. The quote indicates that the concrete was sent to another 
customer.  
Scheduler: I’m going to send [the already loaded truck] to [customer]. He ordered grade 
2,500, but I’m going to send grade 4,000. He is lucky. It’s a loss, but what can I do? The 
bookings are completed, and no one wants concrete right now.  
 
This case was subject to sales manager approval because the loss was approximately US$270. The 
problem resulted in sending higher-grade concrete than the customer had ordered, which was justified in 
this case because it was the end of the daily operation, the daily schedule was almost finished, and no 
other customers were willing to take concrete at that time.  
Collectively, these quotes and anecdotes illustrate the impact of sending concrete with a different or 
identical grade than the originally ordered grade. Sending concrete from one site to another site is not 
problematic if both sites use an identical concrete grade; however, sending higher-grade concrete than 
originally ordered was less typical and associated with phrases such as “management approval,” “no one 
wants concrete right now,” and “lucky.” Sending a lower concrete grade than originally ordered violates 
RMC’s policy, which means it only occurs as an error. According to the dispatcher, this mistake had 
occurred only once in the last seven years. This evidence suggests that grades in shipped concrete are 
most likely to be identical to or higher than the originally ordered grades and not lower than the originally 
ordered grades. Thus, it can be said that the “delivering orders” activity category exhibits a graded 
structure because some occasions of shipped grade are more likely to occur than others. This evidence 
supports Hypothesis 2, which notes that individuals tend to conceive of plans as future activity categories 
that are structurally graded.  
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5.1.2.2 Analysis of the Quantitative Data  
This section examines the graded structure following the procedures presented in section 5.1.1.2. The 
daily schedule reports show the originally ordered grades and the delivered grades without reporting the 
included safety factor. Accordingly, the researcher investigated alternative data beyond the daily schedule 
reports. Quality control reports of the frequently tested subsets of delivered concrete were very helpful as 
these reports showed the included safety factor. The general manager described the testing process as 
follows: 
Concrete is tested by crushing samples in line with International Standards to measure the 
point at which the concrete fails a stress test under load. We have a calibrated concrete 
crushing machine in our laboratory used to carry out this test. We are producing various 
grades of concrete in accordance with relevant specifications. Usually, our concrete is 
sampled on site at the point of delivery and is cured and tested in our laboratory. 
Individual samples are usually in sets of 3 cylinders. One is crushed at 7 days and the 
remaining two at 28 days. We sell our product to a guaranteed minimum of 28 days’ 
strength. The 7-day result is expected to be between 70% and 80% of the result of the 
average of the two 28-day results. 
 
Based on quality control reports that covered a four-month period from January to April 2011, the 
present study examined 207 samples of an average8 of two crushed cylinders at 28 days from three 
different grades. As shown in Table 5.3, the grades are 3,000 PSI (Grade A) with 13 samples; 3,500 PSI 
(Grade B) with 13 samples; and 4,000 PSI (Grade C) with 181 samples. Regarding the small number of 
samples, the general manager stated: “We cannot sample and test too many mixes other than our control 
mix and those required for special projects.” 
 
 
                                                   
8 The reported tested samples at 28 days are based on the average of two crushed cylinders, not on a single crushed cylinder. This 
practice at RMC is in line with the recommendation of the American Concrete Institute Building Code 318 (ACI 318) (Artuso & 
Wargo, 1998). Although averaging in itself is a variability reduction mechanism, the averaged two crushed cylinders are 
collected, cured, and tested in the same way, using the same machines, which may result in higher homogeneity. 
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Table  5.3: Description and Frequency of the Examined Samples of Grades 
Grade Description (PSI) n % Mean (PSI) SD (PSI) Range (PSI) 
A 3,000  13 06 3,644 64.6 3,528 to 3,717 
B 3,500  13 06 4,062 158.6 3,783 to 4,250 
C 4,000  181 88 4,733 65.3 4,653 to 5,046 
  207 100    
 
The added safety factor per tested sample was extracted for the three grades, A, B, and C. Samples 
were then grouped into 1) meeting the safety factor and 2) not meeting safety factor. As shown in Table 
5.4, 98% (203) of the samples met the safety factor of a minimum of 500 PSI, whereas only 2% (4) of the 
samples did not meet the safety factor. It is worth noting that no sample was recorded below a customer’s 
original order. These data indicate that orders most likely meet the safety factor while it is unlikely for 
orders not to meet the safety factor. 
Table  5.4: Groups Created Based on the Safety Factor  
Groups n % 
G1f (i.e., meeting safety factor of minimum 500 PSI)  203 98 
G2f (i.e., not meeting safety factor of minimum 500 PSI)  4 02 
 207 100 
 
Based on the added safety factor, a two-step cluster analysis technique was performed, which resulted 
in four groups. To validate the quality of the clustering, the Silhouette measure was performed, resulting 
in an index of 0.6. Since it is greater than 0.5, the groups produced are considered to be a good clustering. 
As shown in Table 5.5, G1c, G2c, and G3c of 197 (95%) samples are above the safety factor, whereas 
G4c of 10 (5%) samples tends to represent the readings that were below or close to the safety factor. The 
range includes readings between 283 PSI and 569 PSI (not just < 500 PSI). From a financial perspective, 
G1c is quite impractical due the unnecessary cost since going about 500 PSI additional beyond the safety 






Table  5.5: Groups Created Based on the Cluster Analysis  
Groups n % Mean (PSI) SD (PSI) Range (PSI) 
G1c 15 07 913 63.40 841 to 1046 
G2c 89 43 740 20.20 718 to 792 
G3c 93 45 686 23.60 602 to 717 
G4c 10 05 471 102.2 283 to 569 
Total 207 100  
  
 
As suggested by Figure 5.2, G1c, G2c, and G3c created by the cluster analysis match approximately 
97% of the G1f for meeting the safety factor. This suggests that shipments in G1c, G2c, and G3c are 
treated in a similar manner as shipments in G1f regarding the safety factor since these shipments meet the 
safety factor. Although G4c of the cluster analysis is equivalent to G2f of not meeting the safety factor, 
this description is imperfect because G4c of the clustering includes readings just above the boundary of 
the additional 500 PSI safety factor, such as 521 PSI and 528 PSI. Overall, it can be said that the 
presented analysis of the safety factor and cluster analysis suggests that delivered grades mostly meet the 
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Figure  5.2: Match between the groups created based on the cluster analysis and the groups created based on the safety 
factor    
 
The quantitative analysis is consistent with the qualitative analysis in which some types of shipments 
are more likely to occur than others. In terms of the hypothesis, both qualitative and quantitative analyses 
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indicate that shipments with respect to grades are more likely to be delivered as requested by the customer 
or higher including the safety factor. It is less likely that shipments will fall below the customers’ 
requirements when including the safety factor. These results support Hypothesis 2, which states that 
individuals tend to conceive of plans as future activity categories that exhibit a graded structure in which 
some instances are more likely to occur than others. 
5.1.3  Concrete Pumps  
Concrete pumps are used to discharge concrete from the truck mixers at a construction site. Due to the 
limited number of pumps, schedulers assign pumps in advance to construction sites. In response to the 
researcher’s question about criteria by which different pumps are assigned to sites, the scheduler 
responded, “it isn’t [the expertise of the operators] necessarily. It depends on the pump’s boom height.” 
Boom height is central to the decision to assign pumps to construction sites. The match between the 
pump’s boom height and the site requirement is typically based on two factors: the height of the building 
and the pump setup location and its proximity to the concrete pouring area—namely the closer the pump 
is to the concrete pouring area, the less boom height the construction site requires. Table 5.6 shows details 
of the pumps at RMC. 
Based on the boom height, pumps with identical boom heights can replace one another (e.g., P8 of 32m 
can be replaced by P9 of 32m), and shorter pumps can be replaced by longer ones (e.g., P8 of 32m can be 
replaced by P1 of 42m). Accordingly, boom height introduces variability in replacing pumps. Staff 
members’ knowledge and awareness about boom height in replacing pumps suggest that staff members 
are aware of the range of possible replacements for a given pump. This knowledge and awareness about 
the range of possible replacements for a given pump supports Hypothesis 1, which states that individuals 









Table  5.6 Pumps Fleet at RMC 










* P6 was out of service during the course of the study.  
5.1.3.1  Analysis of the Qualitative Data   
This section reports anecdotes and quotes that were analyzed following the procedures discussed in the 
analysis of the qualitative data of volume (section 5.1.1.1). For different shipments, the focus was on 
replacements between scheduled and actual pumps that went to construction sites.  
The following quote is an exchange about the replacement of two pumps:  
Dispatcher: Yeah, P8 [32m] and P9 [32m] are the same. In the schedule it’s P8, but 
today I’m using P9. 
Researcher: You changed P8 with P9? 
Dispatcher: Yes, sir. 
Researcher: What happened to P8? 
Dispatcher: P8 will go to inspection [Periodical Motor Vehicle Inspection]. 
Researcher: But he [scheduler] wrote here [pointing to the schedule] P8. Did he know 
about the inspection? 
Dispatcher: If he didn’t know, it’s not a problem; I can change it. 
 
In this exchange, the change between P9 and P8 was described as “the same”; both pumps have a boom 
height of 32m. The process of changing was done without consulting the head office and was the decision 
of the dispatcher located in the plant. 
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The next quote is a phone call between the scheduler at the head office and a dispatcher at the plant. A 
sudden breakdown in one of the pumps required a replacement. Although the quote represents only the 
scheduler’s side of the call, the scheduler suggested two alternatives for the sudden breakdown in one of 
the pumps.    
Scheduler [talking to the dispatcher over the phone]: Hello. Did P9 come to the plant 
or not yet? 
Scheduler: Still not yet! P2 went already, right?  
Scheduler: P1 and P7 already went, and they are back. 
Scheduler: Now what? [loud voice] Oh oh oh. Bad news! Bad news. 
Scheduler: Okay, thank you. 
Staff member in the schedulers’ office: What is the bad news? 
Scheduler: P2, P2, remove it from tomorrow’s schedule! 
 
In this exchange, the head office called the plant to obtain an update about the operations. A sudden 
breakdown in P2 affected both the current operations and the next day’s schedule. As shown, P1 and P7 
were finished with their assignments and could be good replacements for P2. It seems that the head office 
was more concerned about the next day’s operation, whereas the decision to choose one of the two 
replacement candidates, P1 or P7, was delegated to the dispatcher located in the plant.        
In a third example, P3 arrived at the customer’s site and poured 12 m3. After that, it broke down due to 
a hydraulic problem. The maintenance staff went to the site to fix P3, but the problem required fixing P3 
at the workshop. It took a very long time to fix the problem, from 6:45 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. The order was 
thus postponed to 12:00 pm the next day. P3 was not a good replacement because of its height (i.e., 47m). 
Thus, the order was postponed.  
These quotes provide examples of the impact of the sudden replacement of pumps. Replacing a pump 
with another pump that has an identical boom height invokes phrases such as “the same” and “it’s not a 
problem,” which suggest that these replacements are typical. In addition, these replacements are 
associated with phrases such as “not consulting the head office.” Replacing a pump with a taller one was 
not considered a problem and did not even deserve much discussion, further indicating the typicality of 
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this kind of replacement. The cases of replacing pumps with identical or higher boom heights were 
deemed to be good replacements. However, in the last event, the replacement of the highest boom 
height’s pump was not possible due to the lack of any other pump that could do the job. This is 
considered atypical because the customer was delayed until the pump was fixed. Acts of delaying the 
customer and postponing the order to the next day are associated with cases of not having a good 
replacement. These shipments are evidence that pumps were most likely to be sent as scheduled or 
replaced with identical or higher boom heights. Yet it is very unlikely that a taller pump can be replaced 
with a shorter pump. Thus, Hypothesis 2, which states that individuals tend to conceive of plans as future 
activity categories that exhibit a graded structure in which some occasions of shipment are more likely to 
occur than others, is supported.   
5.1.3.2  Analysis of the Quantitative Data 
In this section, we again follow the procedures described in section 5.1.1.2. After excluding the orders 
that did not require a pump to discharge concrete, 447 orders were obtained (see Appendix E for 
frequencies of pump assignments).  
Based on the difference in the boom height between scheduled and actual pumps sent to a site, 
shipments can be grouped into 1) within the permissible range, which refers to pumps sent as scheduled 
or pumps replaced with the exact or higher boom heights, and 2) beyond the permissible range, which 
refers to replacement with shorter pumps. Table 5.7 shows that 91% (408) of the orders fall within the 
permissible range, whereas 9% (39) of orders fall beyond the permissible range (for a detailed breakdown 
of the two groups per pump, see Appendix F). These data show that orders are most likely to be within 







Table  5.7: Groups Created Based on the Boom Heights    
Groups n % 
G1h beyond the permissible range (i.e., replacing a pump with a shorter pump) 39 09 




Replacing a pump with a shorter boom height (i.e., beyond the permissible range) may seem illogical 
because it should not be possible for a shorter pump to do the job of a higher pump. Within the context of 
RMC, two explanations emerge regarding these replacements. First, in some cases, when the boom height 
is shorter than the required height, a hose can be attached to the boom to match the site requirement and 
boom height. However, notably, the process of attaching the hose is complex and time consuming. 
Second, it is possible that, when a pump was assigned, its boom height was higher than the minimum 
height required to adequately service the construction site, making it possible to replace it with a shorter 
boom pump. Although assigning a pump with a higher-than-required boom height is a possible 
explanation, the notion of not optimizing the boom height based on the site is the exception due to the 
limited number of tall pumps (e.g., 47m). In the scheduler’s words, “Sometimes I send P3 [the pump with 
the highest boom] to a site at which any pump can do the work because I don’t have any other job for 
P3.”     
Using the same dataset of 447 orders previously identified in this section, each pump is assigned a 
value in meters. The values are computed based on the difference in boom height between the scheduled 
and the actual pumps sent to sites. Given this basis, 314 orders that went as scheduled were given a value 
of zero because the pumps in these cases did not change. In the other 133 cases of pump replacements, 
three possibilities arose. First, a pump was replaced with a pump of the exact boom height, which resulted 
in a value of zero. For example, if P8 of 32m was replaced by P9 of 32m, the result was zero (i.e., 0 = 32-
32), showing the difference in height between the actual pump sent to the site and the scheduled pump. 
Second, a pump replaced with another pump possessing a higher boom height resulted in a positive value. 
For example, if P1 of 42m was replaced by P3 of 47m, the result was +5 (i.e., 5 = 47-42). Finally, 
 
 71 
replacing a pump with a shorter one resulted in a negative value. For example, replacing P1 of 42m with 
P9 of 32m resulted in a value of -10 (i.e., -10 = 32-42). Using these values, a two-step cluster analysis 
technique was performed, which resulted in three groups, as shown in Table 5.8. G1c of 9% represents 
replacements that had negative values or replacements of schedule pumps with a shorter pump. G2c 
accounts for 84%, which represents orders with values of zero. In other words, G2c represents both 
pumps that went as scheduled and pumps replaced with other identical boom height pumps. G3c refers to 
replacements that had positive values in which the scheduled pumps were replaced with higher boom 
pumps. To validate the quality of the grouping, the Silhouette measure was used, which resulted in 0.9—
namely, an excellent grouping. 
Table  5.8 Groups Created Based on Cluster Analysis  
Groups  n   % Mean (m) SD (m) Range (m) 
G1c  39   09 -5.8 2.0 -11 to -4 
G2c  377   84   0.0 0.0 0.0 
G3c  31   07 +6.7 2.7 +4 to +15 
  447 
  100    
 
As shown in Figure 5.3, G1c identified by cluster analysis matches G1c identified by boom height, 
which represents replacements beyond the permissible range. With respect to G2c and G3c identified by 
cluster analysis, from the boom height perspective, these two groups can be combined into a category 
within the permissible range. This is the case because for staff members it does not make a difference 
whether a replacement has an exact or higher boom height than the scheduled pump. Indeed, both exact 
and higher boom heights of the scheduled pump represent a good replacement. Overall, it can be said that 
cluster analysis is consistent with boom height analysis. This result suggests that pumps are most likely to 




















Figure  5.3: Match between the groups created based on the cluster analysis and the groups created based on boom height 
 
On the whole, the results of the quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis suggest that shipments are 
most likely to be fulfilled such that a pump is sent as scheduled or replaced with a pump that has the same 
or a higher boom height, both of which represent the condition of within permissible range. However, it is 
unlikely that a pump is replaced with a shorter pump, thus falling into the condition beyond the 
permissible range. These results support Hypothesis 2—namely, that individuals tend to conceive of plans 
as future activity categories that exhibit a graded structure in which some instances are more likely to 
occur than others.   
5.1.4  Site Locations  
The location of sites, referring to the physical address of the construction sites where concrete is 
scheduled to be delivered, is one of the attributes of the “delivering orders” activity category at RMC. 
Two sources of variability exist in the site locations. The first is the discrepancy between scheduled and 
actual site locations. At RMC, this kind of discrepancy is considered to be an error. The second source of 
variability is the discrepancy between scheduled and actual level of details of the address. More precisely, 
on some occasions the scheduled address and directions are correct, but the details are not sufficient for 
the truck to reach the location, particularly because the towns in which the study was conducted do not 
have a postal code system. Notably, the construction sites of large projects to which RMC delivers 
concrete do not typically require detailed addresses the way that new or infrequent sites require. 
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Regardless of the source of the variability, for all shipments, the staff member (e.g., the dispatcher) must 
have knowledge and be aware of the possibility that the site locations could differ. This knowledge and 
awareness of the range of possibilities support Hypothesis 1 that individuals tend to conceive of plans as 
future activity categories with a range of possibilities.   
5.1.4.1  Analysis of the Qualitative Data   
To investigate the graded structure with respect to site locations (i.e., Hypothesis 2) from different 
shipments, this section studies anecdotes and quotes for evidence of how staff members treat differences 
between actual and scheduled site locations. The procedures used were described in section 5.1.1.1.  
The first piece of evidence is a quote showing the minor, acceptable, and manageable range of errors.  
Dispatcher: Aqrabeyia, Golden Belt, and Bandaria are very close to each other. 
Sometimes [the scheduler] writes “Golden Belt,” thinking that the site is located in the 
Golden Belt, but it’s in Aqrabeyia. If [the scheduler writes one but means the other] he 
writes “Aqrabeyia” or “Golden Belt” area, it’s not a problem. I can change the location. 
 
From this quote, we can see that if the error in the schedule is between two different sites that are “very 
close to each other,” the phrases associated with the error that necessitates the change are “it’s not a 
problem” and “I can change the location.” In this case, it seems that the mistake is minor and does not 
require much communication.       
The second piece of evidence is a discussion among the dispatcher, the site inspector, the researcher, 
and a contractor’s engineer regarding how to fix an error of difference between two towns. The exchange 
is somewhat lengthy due to both the number of people involved in the situation and the difficulty in 
obtaining directions to the site.  
Researcher: Do you need to call someone? 
Dispatcher: Yes, a customer. A new site starts today. It’s Aqrabeyia [according to the 
schedule], but our site inspector checked the site, and it’s not Aqrabeyia. It’s Safwa, or, 
really, it’s the 91 or 71 area [areas in towns other than the assigned site location].  
Researcher: It’s written here [in the schedule] “Aqrabeyia”? 
Dispatcher: Yes. [The scheduler] wrote “Aqrabeyia” by mistake, but it’s not Aqrabeyia. 
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Researcher: The pump already went! 
Dispatcher: The pump went out. I told him to hold, not to go to Aqrabeyia. I already said 
“don’t go,” and now I’m calling the customer. 
Researcher: Is there an engineer at the site?  
Dispatcher: Yes, sir. 
Researcher: Does it [concrete being sent to the wrong location] happen frequently? 
Dispatcher: No, only occasionally. 
 
After a few minutes without a response from the engineer, the dispatch office phone rang. Note that it 
was only possible to record the dispatcher’s side of the call. However, the call was followed by another 
exchange between the researcher and the dispatcher to confirm the researcher’s understanding of the 
situation.  
Dispatcher [answering the phone]: RMC. Yes, good morning, Mr. [contractor engineer]. 
Yes, I called you. You have a booking now, right? 
Dispatcher: Where is this location, Mr. [contractor engineer]? 
Dispatcher: Airport Road,  
Dispatcher: Okay. 91 or 71 traffic signals? 
Dispatcher: Okay. 71 traffic signal. Go straight toward the airport. 
Dispatcher: Two bridges. 
Dispatcher: And then after the two bridges, one main road to the Ministry of Interior 
Housing.  
Dispatcher: Then go left, right-hand side. 
Dispatcher: After the two bridges? [Dispatcher was confused by the directions he had 
just been given by the engineer.] 
Researcher: The location is in [a town different than the one in the schedule]. 
Dispatcher: The Ministry of Interior Housing is very far. 
 
The following call took place soon after the previous call between the dispatcher and the site inspector 
employed by RMC.  
Dispatcher [phoning the site inspector]: Hello, Engineer [site inspector]. Would you call 
[contractor engineer] about Airport Road?  
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Dispatcher: After the 91 signal, you cross two bridges. After crossing two bridges, one 
road goes to the right. This is the Ministry of Interior Housing.  
Dispatcher: Okay, you go right. 
Dispatcher: Yes, the new Airport Road, then one road that goes to the right.  
Dispatcher:  I’ll give you [contractor engineer]’s number. Better to call [contractor 
engineer] and make sure. 
Dispatcher: He [contractor engineer] explained the location, but I couldn’t understand it 
clearly. 
 
In the former exchange, the site is a “new site.” The error in site location, which is scheduled in a 
different town from the actual site, is atypical and was described as a “mistake” that has happened a “few 
times.” Solving the error required several people to communicate: the dispatcher, site inspector, and the 
customer. Several courses of action were taken: “now I’m calling the customer,” “the pump went out. I 
told him to hold,” “I’ll give my site inspector, Mr. [site inspector’s name], your number. He’ll understand 
it better than I,” and sending the pump and one truck together. Notably, it was not possible to 
communicate with the scheduler because the order was sent to be delivered early in the morning, before 
the head office opened. 
These exchanges demonstrate that site locations for shipments carry the possibility of being both 
typical within the permissible range and atypical beyond the permissible range. The typical occasions are 
associated with phrases such as “it’s not a problem” and occur with sites that are “very close to each 
other.” A typical site is linked to a course of action, such as “I can change the location.” Meanwhile, 
atypical occasions that fall beyond the permissible range are described as “mistake[s]” that occur only a 
“few times.” Overall, shipments are more likely to take place within the permissible range of deviations 
and less likely to take place beyond the permissible range of deviations. As a result, the site locations in 
the “delivering orders” activity category exhibit a graded structure, which supports Hypothesis 2. 
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5.1.4.2  Analysis of the Quantitative Data  
The data used in this section to investigate site locations are based on analyzing the daily schedule of 43 
days of operation, which resulted in 702 orders as outlined in section 5.1.1.2. Based on the discussion 
with the dispatcher, whether an error related to site location occurs depends on the level of detail provided 
regarding the site location, with the central aspect of site locations being the distance between the address 
recorded in the daily schedule and the actual address. To assess the site location in these orders, the 
researcher compared the distance between scheduled and actual site locations using Nokia Maps 
(http://maps.nokia.com). If no discrepancy was found, the site location was considered “as scheduled” 
and within the permissible range. If a discrepancy emerged, two conditions were possible: 1) the recorded 
and actual addresses were in neighborhoods close to each other (i.e., the distance was short), which was 
considered within the permissible range of deviations, or 2) the recorded and actual addresses were in 
different neighborhoods (i.e., the distance was substantial), which was considered beyond the permissible 
range of deviations. Table 5.9 shows that 97% (684) of the orders were within the permissible range 
whereas only 3% (18) orders deviated beyond the permissible range.  
Table  5.9: Groups Created Based on the Distance between Scheduled and Actual Site Locations  
Groups n % 
G1d within the permissible range (i.e., neighborhoods close to each other) 684 97 




A two-step cluster analysis technique examined the distance between the previously obtained scheduled 
and actual site locations. Two groups were created, as shown in Table 5.10; the first group (G1d) 
accounted for 97% (680) of the orders that have values of zero because these orders went as scheduled. 
The other group (G2d) of 3% (22) of the orders represented orders that had discrepancies between the 
scheduled and actual site locations. The Silhouette measure indicated the quality of the clusters. In this 
case, the index is equal to 1 and is considered a perfect grouping as the groups are clearly formed by the 
bias in the zero values. 
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Table  5.10: Groups Created Based on the Cluster Analysis 
Groups n      (%) Mean (km) Range (km) SD (km) 
G1c 680   (96.8) 00 0 0.00 
G2c 22.0  (03.2) 8 3.8 to 18.6 3.9 
Total          702   (100)    
 
As shown in Figure 5.4, G1c identified based on the two-step cluster analysis technique (Table 5.10) 
matches G1d identified based on the distance between scheduled and actual site locations (Table 5.9). A 
small difference occurs between the G1c and G1d because G1c only includes orders that had no deviation 
at all (“as scheduled”), whereas G1d includes additional orders with a short distance deviation. Overall, it 
can be said that the results of the cluster analysis are consistent with the dispatcher’s opinion of the 
distance between scheduled and actual site locations. This suggests that site locations are most likely to 
either be as scheduled or deviate with a short distance, both of which are considered “within the 
permissible range.” Meanwhile, it is less likely that an order will have substantial deviation between 
















Figure  5.4: Match between the groups created based on the cluster analysis and the groups created based on the distance 
between scheduled and actual site locations 
 
To summarize, the qualitative and quantitative analyses revealed that shipments with respect to site 
locations are most likely to be delivered as scheduled or within a short distance of the scheduled site 
location, both of which represent the permissible range. Meanwhile, it is very unlikely that an order will 
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have an error or not enough details to reach the location, resulting in a substantial difference between 
scheduled and actual site locations. 
5.2  Nature of Adjustment 
Adjustment refers to the way in which an individual deals with contingencies that might occur during 
occasions of shipments. In other words, if a customer is not ready and the truck mixer is already loaded 
with concrete, what can be done? If concrete is left over, how can the concrete be used? If a customer is 
waiting at the construction site and the pump suddenly breaks down, what happens? This section 
discusses adjustments that occur during occasions of shipment and then explores the link between the 
adjustment that staff members make and the way in which they tend to conceive of their occasions of 
shipment as discussed in section 5.1.  
To collect different adjustments, a protocol was developed based on observing how staff members such 
as schedulers and dispatchers worked around frequent problems. Usually, when the researcher observed 
an adjustment used to solve a frequent problem, the researcher discussed it with the staff members who 
employed that adjustment. The discussion involved having the staff member explain the adjustment, the 
rationale behind the adjustment, and its impact on the occasions of shipments. For this research, reported 
adjustments must be an adjustment employed to solve a frequent problem. The researcher does not claim 
that these are all of the adjustments used at RMC; indeed, the reported adjustments are merely cited as 
illustrative examples.     
A frequent problem at RMC is the last-minute cancellation of orders, which is not uncommon in the 
ready-mix concrete industry. According to Anson et al. (2002), a lack of planning and poor weather 
conditions are two major reasons behind cancellations. They further asserted that “[i]t is likely that 
contractors sometimes place orders speculatively in order to ‘get on the list’ just in case a pour 
preparation goes faster than expected” (p. 241). Over the course of the study (n = 43 days), as shown in 
Table 5.11, 16% (176) of scheduled orders were undelivered due to last-minute cancellations. A repeated 
adjustment associated with last-minute cancellations is added to unscheduled orders to reduce the 
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negative impact of last-minute cancellations on total daily volume production. The 21% (231) of 
unscheduled orders were mostly generated from a list of flexible customers who make bookings a few 
days in advance but are willing to receive the concrete before the booking time, particularly on short 
notice from RMC. In addition, some of the unscheduled orders are placed by RMC’s important customers 
and considered urgent.  
Table  5.11: Frequency of Different Kinds of Orders over the Course of the Study  
Kind of orders n % 
Delivered orders  702 63 
Unscheduled orders 231 21 
Undelivered orders  176 16 
 1,109 100 
 
The characteristics of the unscheduled orders were explored to examine the criteria by which an order 
is selected to be added. The analysis indicated that 82% of the unscheduled orders used direct pouring 
(i.e., pouring without pumps or other special equipment), and the unscheduled orders tended to be small 
in volume, with an average of 12 m3 per order (a standard deviation of 17 m3). According to Anson et al. 
(2002), direct pouring without equipment such as pumps is the fastest way to pour concrete. In addition, 
small-volume orders are easier to accommodate in a running schedule because small-volume orders do 
not require much coordination. 
Based on Lewin's (1936) theory, whenever an individual moving between regions of activity 
encounters a barrier that stops his or her locomotion in a life space, the individual tries to find a detour 
around that barrier to reach his or her goal. This general explanation suggests that, for RMC to reach the 
goal of scheduled volume, cancelled orders are barriers that require a detour such as adding unscheduled 
orders to reach the goal. 
Polishing the daily schedule is another interesting adjustment discovered in response to last-minute 
cancellations. Staff members who have access to the scheduling software usually delete some of the last-
minute cancelled orders. The tracing process was difficult because the original schedules are only kept in 
an archived hardcopy form, whereas the scheduling software shows only the polished schedules without 
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referring to changes in the original schedules. Archived hardcopies of the daily schedule are of virtually 
no use; indeed, staff members rarely, if ever, refer to them. Comparing the daily schedule and the 
polished daily schedule over the course of the study (n = 43 days) revealed that 35% (62 of 176) of the 
last-minute cancelled orders were completely removed from the scheduling software. Figure 5.5 shows 
the frequencies of the 176 last-minute cancelled orders and the 62 deleted orders from the scheduling 
software over a period of 43 days. For example, on day 21, 11 orders of the original bookings were 
cancelled at the last minute. The scheduler deleted 5 of the 11 cancelled orders. Thus, the scheduler 
essentially rewrote the daily order history because in the scheduling database the polished schedule of day 
21 shows that only 6 of the original bookings were cancelled, reducing the actual number of cancelled 



















Cancelled or postponed 
Completely deleted
 
Figure  5.5: Frequencies of the 176 last-minute cancelled orders across the observed 43 days   
 
Another adjustment discovered in response to the last-minute cancellations was adding unscheduled 
customers to the database after they received their orders. In one event, the scheduler instructed the 
dispatcher to add an unscheduled customer to the database. The dispatcher put the scheduler’s request on 
hold until the customer actually received the order. Explaining the choice to not add the unscheduled 
customer to the scheduling database immediately, the dispatcher said, “If I do not supply him [the 
unscheduled customer], nobody will blame me because he was not in the schedule.”  
 
 81 
The tactics of rewriting the schedule history and only adding unscheduled customers after receiving 
their orders ensure that staff members do not report many scheduling pitfalls to management. For 
example, they may be attempting to improve the image of the scheduling activities by reducing the real 
number of cancelled orders. The explanation is plausible as staff members believe that management will 
hold them responsible, blame them, and question their ability to run the daily schedule if they show a high 
number of cancelled orders.  
Another frequent problem at RMC is customers known to waver on their requested volume of concrete, 
which results in ordering many extra trucks. Some kinds of pouring (e.g., slabs) require a continuous 
supply of concrete; if the supply stops before finishing the entire pouring, technical problems such as 
cracks in the concrete could occur. Accordingly, staff members have developed a three-step adjustment 
mechanism. The first step is pressuring such customers by insisting at booking time that the company 
policy allows for only one extra truckload. The second step is to send site inspectors employed by RMC 
to check the accuracy of orders by visiting the construction site and estimating the required volume of 
concrete. The third step is keeping in contact with staff members located at the construction site during 
the concrete pouring time to estimate a need for extra concrete.  
In Lewin’s (1936) terms, at irreality, one can imagine that a customer’s ordered volume is not accurate 
enough. As a result, an imaginary barrier arises that requires a detour. Because the barrier is still 
imagined, staff members may use different contingency behaviors to prevent the imaginary barrier from 
becoming a real one. Furthermore, contingency behaviors provide information about how staff members 
understand the structure of the typical activity category and how the activity category changes structure 
when events are less typical.  
One frequent problem observed is the continuous breakdown of some equipment that negatively 
impacts the smoothness of operations. RMC’s workshop department produced the Fleet Condition Daily 
Report to describe the status of various pieces of equipment. This report includes categories such as 
“working,” “standby,” and “breakdown,” which are used in most ready-mix concrete plants to describe 
the status of fleet equipment such as pumps and trucks. Of the remaining categories in the report, one 
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worth pointing out is “bad condition.” This category is peculiar because it appears in a handwritten format 
and is “added on” after the report is generated from the computer, unlike other categories in the report 
that are in printed format. Moreover, it was striking that the “bad condition” category consistently served 
only one specific pump. It is unusual that an organization would invent a category in a daily report to 
serve one specific piece of equipment. A quote about this unusual category provides an interesting 
explanation. In the dispatcher’s words, “the workshop does not want to say we cannot fix it [the bad 
condition pump], but they know that pump operators are not going to use it because of its condition.” The 
point is that the language in the report was used as an adjustment to help flag one specific pump to 
indicate that it would most likely break down if used and would subsequently negatively impact the 
operation. Thus, it appears that the “bad condition” category was created for two reasons: 1) to save the 
image of the workshop department, because if the pump was listed under the “breakdown” condition, it 
would require fixing it as soon as possible before management questioned it; and 2) to notify pump 
operators not to use that specific pump. (In follow-up contact with RMC two years after the study, the 
researcher learned that the “bad condition” pump was for sale.)    
The adjustments that staff members make when they face problems during occasions of shipment—
including adding orders on the day of the delivery, deleting some of the last-minute cancellations, 
developing steps to deal with customers known to waver on their requested volume of concrete, and using 
language by inventing categories—all reflect the different kinds of adaptations developed at RMC to deal 
with frequent problems. If these adjustments are assumed to be paths (as in Lewin’s [1936] theory), 
investigating the nature of adjustment is needed. The investigation involves the following issues: 1) the 
selection of a specific path, 2) the rationale behind this selection, and 3) whether the path that was 
selected is permissible. In addition, to understand the association between various kinds of adjustments 
made during occasions of shipment and the way staff members tend to conceive of their occasions of 
shipment, there is a need to identify 4) other paths available in the situation according to how the actor 
perceives his or her situation and 5) the rationale behind not selecting alternate paths. The data presented 
can help address the first three issues; however, it is very difficult to identify other possible paths 
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available that are not selected. Due to the complexity of investigating the last two issues within the 
context of this case study and the fact that the researcher possessed no control over the various situations 
studied, the adjustment, and its association with the way in which individuals conceive of plans will be 
examined experimentally in the next chapter.  
5.3  General Discussion  
An in-depth case study was conducted in one organizational situation to examine aspects of the proposed 
theoretical framework related to the plan–action relationship. This section starts with an overview of the 
major findings of the case study, followed by a brief restatement of the main points of the developed case 
study research methodology as it relates to the literature. The section concludes with the limitations of the 
case study.        
5.3.1  Overview of the Case Study Results 
The case study provided support for the theoretical framework. As discussed in sections 5.1.1 through 
5.1.4, the qualitative data demonstrated that staff members have knowledge and awareness about the 
variability of the attributes on shipment occasions (see Table 5.12 for details). These data support the first 
hypothesis, which states that individuals tend to conceive plans as future activity categories with a range 
of possibilities. 
Table  5.12: Variability of the Attributes in the Occasions of Shipment 
No. Attribute Variability 
1 Volume Between 0 and 9 m3 
2 Grades A minimum of 500 PSI added 
3 Pumps Identical or longer boom heights 
4 Site locations Short distance (within the same neighborhood) 
 
In addition, qualitatively (see sections 5.1.1.1, 5.1.2.1, 5.1.3.1, and 5.1.4.1) and quantitatively (see 
sections 5.1.1.2, 5.1.2.2, 5.1.3.2, and 5.1.4.2), the results indicate that individuals tend to conceive of 
plans as future activity categories that exhibit  graded structure in which some occasions of shipment are 
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more likely to happen than others (Hypothesis 2). The qualitative data include quotes and anecdotes in 
which some shipment occasions were described through verbal discourse such as very typical, usual, and 
reasonable whereas others were described as one of a kind, very unusual, or atypical. The quantitative 
data include corporate records from daily schedules over a period of three months; these records were 
grouped based on the central aspects of the examined attributes (e.g., one extra truckload policy, safety 
factors, and boom height) and the two-step cluster analysis. These two approaches to grouping corporate 
records were used for cross-validation purposes. Based on the data presented in sections 5.1.1.2, 5.1.2.2, 
5.1.3.2, and 5.1.4.2, it appears that the groups created based on the central aspect are consistent with those 
created using the two-step cluster analysis.  
5.3.2  Overview of the Case Study Methodology  
As discussed in section 4.2.2.1, when examining graded structure in categorization studies, typicality 
ratings (a survey instrument) are generally used as the paradigm. However, typicality ratings did not fit 
the current study due to the relatively small number of potential participants. Thus, instead, a qualitative 
approach was developed and applied to the case study; this approach was informed by former 
categorization studies demonstrating the association between different behavior measurements in 
psychological research and the degree of typicality. In addition, the developed approach was informed by 
categorization researchers (e.g., Lakoff, 1987), who have argued that the speech of ordinary people 
indicates that some category members are typical while others are not.  
In the quantitative analysis, two approaches were used to group the data (for details, see section 
5.1.1.2). The first approach involved grouping the data based on the central aspects of the examined 
attributes; the second approach was based on the two-step clustering technique. Of particular importance 
was the central aspect concept, which refers to policies, standards, or staff members’ personal views that 
define permissible and not permissible deviations (see Table 5.13 for details). These policies, standards, 
and staff members’ personal views essentially refer to the important aspects that staff members have to 
carefully implement when meeting a schedule. The central aspect concept is in line with what 
 
 85 
categorization literature calls ideal dimension (also called relevant dimension). Meanwhile, the ideal 
dimension refers to the characteristic that is important within a category to fulfill the goal of the category 
(Barsalou, 1981, 1985). For example, in the category “things to take from one’s home during a fire,” the 
ideal dimension that is important to use is “being valuable” (Barsalou, 1985). 
Table  5.13: Central Aspects of the Examined Attributes 
No.  Attribute Central Aspect 
1  Volume The policy of limiting one extra truck  
2  Grades The safety factor of a minimum of 500 PSI  
3  Pumps The permissible range is replacing a pump with equal or higher pump  
4  Site locations The permissible range of deviation is error within the same neighborhood  
 
However, the central aspect used in the current research differs from the ideal dimension in several 
significant ways. First, some researchers (e.g., Barsalou, 1985) employ their own opinions to derive the 
ideal dimension, which Kim and Murphy (2011) described as problematic. In the current study, central 
aspects are derived from policies, standards, and staff members’ personal views, which is inline with 
other researchers who have derived the ideals dimension of a category (central aspects) based on their 
subjects. For example, for the “fish” category, fishermen identify desirability as the ideal dimension 
(Burnett, Medin, Ross & Blok, 2005) while for the “birds” category, the Itzaj Maya—a tribe from 
Guatemala—identify beauty and the taste of the meat as the ideal dimensions (Atran, 1999). Second, in 
contrast to most previous studies that have defined the ideal dimension abstractly (e.g., efficiency and 
likeness) and relative to people, thereby making the interpretation of such data difficult (Kim & Murphy, 
2011), the current study relies on RMC staff members, who use specific means such as numeric values to 
identify the central aspect (e.g., minimum 500 PSI).  
5.3.3  Limitations of the Case Study 
First and most notably, it was not possible to examine the association between the adjustments individuals 
make when they face contingencies and the individuals’ conception of the future activity as graded 
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structure due to the lack of relevant data as discussed in section 5.2. Thus, the laboratory experiment is 
designed to address this issue (see Chapter 6).      
Second, categorization studies tend to employ data at the individual level of perception. However, the 
current thesis uses data at the plant/organizational level (e.g., corporate records and recordings from 
dispatch office). Although it can be argued that individuals’ (i.e., staff members’) concepts of occasions 
of shipment correlate with plant/organizational data, this argument is not empirically examined—a 
shortcoming addressed in Chapter 6—as the laboratory experiment is based on perceptual data. 
Third, the qualitative data analyzed (sections 5.1.1.1, 5.1.2.1, 5.1.3.1, and 5.1.4.1) were relatively 
small. For example, a small number of shipment occasions were coded because not all orders that shipped 
during the 18.5 hours of recordings had sufficient details for coding. Although the collected data were 
sufficient to capture patterns in daily schedule execution, they were too small to warrant generalizations. 
Chapter 6 discusses a laboratory experiment conducted to examine the framework of the thesis in a 
completely different setting to enhance the validity and the generalizability of the theoretical framework 
of this thesis. 
Fourth, this study examined four attributes of the daily schedule: volume, grades, pumps, and site 
locations. The researcher does not claim that the presented attributes are the only ones worth examining; 
rather, the choice was informed by the availability of the associated corporate records, as discussed in 
section 4.1.  
Fifth, the assumption that RMC staff members were following a daily schedule was not validated. 
Although a few instances were observed that could be considered as an indicator that certain staff 
members were not following a daily schedule at RMC (see Appendix G for details about these instances), 
it can be argued that these instances are ad hoc and informal, meaning that they are far from showing a 
common pattern of behavior. In the laboratory experiment (see Chapter 6), this assumption is validated. 
Sixth, it can be argued that conducting a single case study is not appropriate for testing a theoretical 
framework (Duimering, 1997). By using different kinds of data (qualitative and quantitative) and 
analyzing these data in various ways to demonstrate the consistency between the pattern in the daily 
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schedule execution and the hypotheses derived, the theoretical framework provides supportive evidence 
for this research framework. The laboratory experiment in Chapter 6 tests certain hypotheses 
quantitatively and enhances the theoretical framework of the thesis.  
Finally, the limited number of interviews is a weakness as most of the blue-collar workers were not 
fluent in either of the languages the researcher speaks, resulting in communication and interpretation 
barriers and thereby limiting the number of potential interviews. However, in order to overcome the 
limited number of interviews, other sources of data such as corporate records and audio and video 





Laboratory Experiment  
To test the research hypotheses quantitatively, a laboratory experiment was conducted. The experiment 
includes two tasks in one session, which was devised based on the French card game la Belote (hereafter, 
Belote). The first task examines the hypothesis that individuals tend to conceive plans as future activity 
categories with a range of possibilities (H1). The experiment also examines the hypothesis that 
individuals tend to conceive plans as future activity categories which exhibit a graded structure (H2). The 
second task is designed to explore how an individual, while performing a planned activity and facing 
contingencies, adjusts to variations (H3). Within the context of this experiment, plans are operationalized 
as the strategies of the card game Belote.  
This chapter discusses the major experimental tasks employed in the previous planning studies and 
issues with these experimental tasks. The chapter describes the two tasks of the experiment which were 
conducted in the same study. The description of each task is followed by results and discussion. Finally, a 
general discussion and limitations of the experiment are presented and discussed.  
6.1  Previous Experimental Tasks 
This section describes and evaluates the major experimental tasks used in previous literature within the 
psychological theories of planning and situated action perspective of plans—the two major approaches 
used to examine the plan–action relationship. This review is designed to help develop appropriate 
experimental tasks for the current research. In psychological studies of planning, the Tower9 and the 
errand-running tasks are the most often discussed in the literature (Mayhew, 2009; Scholnick, Friedman, 
& Wallner-Allen, 1997). The Tower task, originally designed by Simon (1975), requires participants to 
create their own plans, based on rules provided by the experimenter, to place five disks of decreasing size 
onto three pegs of equal height. Although studies that used the Tower task have some variations (e.g., the 
                                                   
9 It is also called Towers of Hanoi (Patsenko & Altmann, 2010).  
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number and height of the pegs), the basic notion remains the same (Mayhew, 2009). In the errand-running 
task, originally developed by Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth (1979), participants were examined in a 
laboratory setting. The participants were provided with a grocery list and a layout of a town that showed 
different stores. Participants were asked to create plans and navigate through the layout to acquire the 
items on the list within a specific time period. In some versions of the task, the shopping was actually 
done at malls and grocery stores (Mayhew, 2009). For detailed descriptions of the Tower task and the 
errand-running task and their variants, see Scholnick et al. (1997) and Mayhew (2009). 
In the situated action perspective of plans, studies tend to be conducted in natural settings; however, a 
few existing studies have been conducted in experimental settings. Two particular studies manipulated 
specific aspects of the plan–action relationship. The first is Suchman’s (1987) photocopy machine 
experiment, which was discussed thoroughly in the literature review. Of importance here is the fact that in 
the photocopy machine experiment, only first-time users were employed in a very structured situation 
with predefined steps that participants were required to follow in order to accomplish the task. The second 
study, conducted by Ng (2002), asked participants to make and use plans to retrieve information from a 
database. Although participants were required to create their own plans, the plans were limited to a range 
of 50 to 100 words. To differentiate participants based on their experience, the study employed first-time 
(“novice”) and second-time (“expert”) users.  
6.2  Issues with the Reviewed Experimental Tasks 
The aforementioned experimental tasks are evaluated in this section to determine whether they are 
appropriate for this study. The evaluation includes the structure of the experimental situation, the 
participants’ level of experience, and the participants’ plans. Furthermore, because the experimental tasks 
have been conducted in natural and laboratory settings, both types of settings are assessed. It is worth 
noting that “situation” is a holistic concept that refers to both the person and the environment, as 
discussed in the theory chapter (see section 3.1)   
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6.2.1  Structure of the Situation 
As presented in the theory chapter, the dynamic properties of the situation encompass the entire process 
of adjustments, which includes barriers, detours, and paths. A barrier—whether psychological or 
physical—that an individual faces when he/she seeks to satisfy goals may require the individual to adjust 
by finding paths to overcome it. This is also called a detour.  
The reviewed studies did not systematically investigate the dynamic properties of the situation and its 
effects. Specifically, the photocopy machine task in Suchman’s (1987) study and the Tower task in 
Simon’s (1975) study are both very structured situations that feature a specific sequence of steps (i.e., “a 
path,” to use Lewin’s (1936) term) to follow in order to accomplish the task. Although the researchers 
might know the path that satisfies the experiment’s goal, the participants are not familiar with the task, 
which results in problem-solving or maze-like situations. Thus, the photocopy machine and the Tower 
task require more than planning; for example, they require problem solving as well. Other studies, such as 
those with errand-running tasks, include multiple paths that can be followed to accomplish the task. This 
may result in disagreement among the participants regarding the existence of some paths. Accordingly, 
the researcher cannot establish a situation in which participants necessarily perceive the situation 
similarly, thereby creating a concern with the study. Therefore, the devised task in the present study must 
deliberately define different structural properties of the situation, such as barriers, detours, and paths. In 
addition, the researcher must ensure that the participants and the researcher share and perceive the 
structural properties similarly.      
6.2.2  Participants’ Level of Experience 
To manipulate participants’ level of experience, most previous studies have assumed no prior experience 
(Scholnick et al., 1997). Accordingly, the participants’ level of experience is said to be similar because all 
the participants can be considered novices. However, a few studies have investigated familiar activities 
that are part of participants’ everyday lives, such as grocery shopping. When using tasks derived from an 
everyday life activity such as grocery shopping, the participants’ experience levels can be assumed to be 
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similar because participants are familiar with the activity. Generally speaking, presenting tasks that are 
either new to participants or are very familiar are two approaches that can be used to ensure that 
participants share a similar level of experience regarding the task. In the present study, the choice was 
made to devise a task based on a very familiar activity because devising a task based on a new activity 
may lead to a situation that requires more than planning, such as problem-solving skills.    
6.2.3  Participants’ Plans  
Although the studies discussed in this chapter tended to ask participants to create their own plans (e.g., 
Ng, 2002), these plans were controlled to a certain level of detail (e.g., number of words or time limit to 
develop the plans). In contrast, allowing participants to create their own plans in their entirety may 
ultimately make comparisons between plans impossible. In Suchman’s (1987) study, participants were 
given a plan (step-like instructions) to follow. As discussed in the structure of this situation, participants 
were classified as “novice,” which resulted in more than simply following the plan (i.e., problem solving).     
In the present study, to compare plans precisely, participants should be given plans that are familiar to 
them. One possible way to overcome this challenge is to devise a task that has commonly shared plans 
built into the activity. For example, professional chess players may have commonly shared strategies or 
plans (e.g., opening moves and endgame). These plans are not part of the rules of playing chess, yet are 
commonly known to professional players.       
6.2.4  The Settings of the Reviewed Experimental Tasks 
The reviewed studies employed two different settings. The first setting was scenario-based, in which 
participants performed the task in the laboratory (e.g., grocery shopping using a layout). In a scenario-
based setting, participants are provided with background information about the situation and actors. 
Background information may be presented in various formats, such as textual stories and video scenes 
that first introduce and elucidate the situation and then ask participants what they would do in such a 
situation. The second setting is the natural setting, in which the participants perform the task in a real-life 
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situation as the activity unfolds (e.g., shopping at a grocery store). Both settings are possible candidates 
for the present study.  
6.3  The Characteristics of the Required Task and Setting  
Based on the above discussion of the reviewed experimental tasks, three possible variables can be 
manipulated to test the research model: 1) the structure of the situation, 2) the participants’ level of 
experience, and 3) the participants’ plans. These three variables can be examined by varying one while 
controlling for the others. Because the focus of the current study is to investigate the effect of the dynamic 
properties of a situation, the choice was made to vary the structure of the situation and control for the 
participants’ experience levels and plans.  
Several conclusions can be drawn with regard to the task and setting required to investigate the plan–
action relationship. The developed task requires:  
1) Plans: 
i. Plans must be built into the task. In other words, plans are neither developed by the 
participants to satisfy the researcher’s request, nor dictated by the researcher to the 
participants.  
ii. Plans are common and shared among participants as well as between the participants and 
the researcher. 
2) Structure of the task: 
i. The researcher must have control over the task structure, which is more easily achieved in 
the laboratory than in the natural setting.  
ii. The researcher and the participants must perceive the structure of the task and the courses 
of action taken to adjust in a similar way.  
iii. The researcher can differentiate between courses of action taken to adjust that fall within 
the initial plan and those that fall beyond the plan.  
3) The participants should share a similar level of experience.  
4) The task has a recognizable cognitive unit or “unitization,” which refers to how individuals 
typically perceive and draw boundaries between different parts of the task. For example, items to 
be bought in the shopping task can be divided into aisles, which are recognizable units that divide 
the activity into subparts.  
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6.4  Card Game  
To satisfy the characteristics of the required task and setting, the French card game Belote is utilized. 
Belote is a popular game in France, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Western and Central Africa 
(Levy, 1999; Seban, 2011). Although the card game has some variations in different parts of the world, 
the basic game uses 32 cards of one standard 52-card deck, excluding all cards with denominations 
between 2 and 6. In other words, it uses the 7, 8, 9, 10, Jack, Queen, King, and Ace of each of the four 
suits (♣, ♥, ♦, ♠). As shown in Table 6.1, each card has a scoring value that is used to count awarded 
points per team. The game is played with two teams of two players each, with the first and third player 
forming one team and the second and fourth player forming the other. Play proceeds counter-clockwise. 
A round consists of four played cards (i.e., one card per player). The player who plays the card that 
matches the suit of the first card played and has the highest scoring value wins the round and begins the 
next round (Seban, 2011). 
Table  6.1: Scoring Values of Non-trump Suit 
Card (♣, ♥, ♦, ♠) Scoring value 







The game can be played in two ways—namely, either with or without a trump suit. In the non-trump 
version, players must follow the suit played by the first player unless they do not have any cards of that 
suit, in which case they can play any card. In the trump version, one dominant suit always wins over the 
other suits. The current experiments are developed based on the non-trump version since its rules and 
strategies are simpler than those of the trump version. Additional details of the game rules are beyond the 




The Belote card game fits the task and setting requirements of the experiment. With respect to 
planning, the card game has plans or strategies (e.g., opening strategies) that are not part of the rules of 
the game but are conventions generally understood by all competent players. In other words, these 
strategies are not introduced by the researcher or created by the players to satisfy the researcher’s request; 
rather, they are built into the game itself. As a result, these strategies are known and common among 
competent players.  
With respect to the structure of the task, a scenario can be created in which a single participant is 
provided with all required information about his/her teammate and opponents, after which the participant 
is asked to play under different conditions. In addition, the game provides an ideal situation wherein the 
researcher and the participants share knowledge about the structure of the situation. This shared 
knowledge includes cards per hand and cards that can be played according to the rules of the game. In 
addition, given certain conditions (e.g., opening strategy), competent players can predict the most 
probable cards. They can also determine which cards satisfy a given condition (i.e., fall within the 
strategy) and which do not. The details of the strategies are discussed shortly in the design of the first 
experimental task.  
With respect to the cognitive unit, players distinguish four hierarchal levels of activity in game play. 
The lowest level is a move, which refers to single move (i.e., one played card) for a single player. The 
next higher level is a round, which consists of four moves (i.e., one single move per player). Next, the 
level of a play consists of eight rounds. Upon completing a play, points are awarded to each team. The 
highest level is the game, which concludes when one team reaches 152 points to win the game. It usually 
takes a number of plays to complete a game.  
In the developed task, the plan is operationalized as strategies of the Belote card game and the activity 
is operationalized as a single card move. Accordingly, in this study, the unit of analysis used is the 
relation between strategy and a single card move. The devised task requires the participants, on an 
individual basis, to perform the activity of playing a single card under different strategies. More 
specifically, a single participant is invited to the laboratory, where he or she is presented with information 
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required to complete a round. The task requires the participant to play a card that fits the given 
information. The choice of the relation between strategy and the single card move as the unit is used 
because it occurs at the individual player’s level rather than at group level (i.e., team level). The 
individual level better fits the theoretical framework of the present study as Lewin’s field theory (1936) 
and Rosch’s categorization theory (1978) are developed at the individual level.     
In order to test the research hypotheses quantitatively, two experimental tasks were designed and 
conducted at the University of Waterloo between February and April of 2011. Task one was designed to 
test the structure of the future activity categories (H1 and H2). Task two was designed to examine the 
association between individual’s knowledge of typical adjustment and the individual’s actual adjustment 
under various experimental conditions (H3).  
In the following sections, the discussion begins with the method, followed by results and discussion for 




6.5 Task one 
The purpose of task one was to examine the structure of future activities (H1 and H2). H1 states that 
individuals tend to conceive of future activities as categories with a range of possible attributes. H2 states 
that categories of future activities tend to exhibit a graded structure in which members of the future 
activity categories range from highly typical to typical to atypical.  
6.5.1  Method       
Participants. Thirty males from Arabian Gulf States (also called Arab states of the Persian Gulf) who live 
in the Waterloo Region participated in the experiment (task one and task two). The participants were 
Belote card game players who were recruited through a snowball sampling method (i.e., the researcher 
contacted a few players, who then suggested other potential participants; Babbie, 1992). Upon completing 
the experiment, participants received a $20 gift card for their participation.  
Materials. In task one, various strategies from the card game Belote served as the stimuli. The lack of 
formal documentation describing such strategies posed a challenge for the study. In order to identify 
strategies, the researcher conducted a handful of informal interviews with competent players, observed 
several games, and videotaped a full game played by players invited to the laboratory. A number of 
strategies were observed; the four most common were selected: 1) “play your strength,” 2) “support your 
partner’s play,” 3) “don’t play below the ace,” and 4) “don’t leave your 10 alone.” Table 6.2 provides a 
brief definition for each of these strategies.   
Table  6.2: Strategies Used in Task One and Their Definitions  
No. Strategies Definition 
1 Play your strength First player opens the round with his/her strength (i.e., three or more cards of the same suit).  
2 Support your partner’s 
play 
First player’s partner plays a high-value card to support his/her teammate’s opening play.  
3 Don’t play below the 
ace 
If a player has an ace and other cards of the same suit, he/she plays either the ace of that suit or 
any card of a different suit.  
4 Don’t leave your 10 
alone 




After selecting the strategies, hands were assigned to each strategy. Each hand was drawn randomly 
from the full set of 32 cards, then assigned to one of the strategies. The researcher ensured that the hands 
matched the selected strategies, replacing hands if necessary (e.g., if a given hand did not have three or 
more cards of the same suit for the “play your strength” strategy). Of the permissible hands, 5 different 
hands were chosen for each strategy, for a total of 20 hands (see Table 6.3 for the full set of hands used in 
the task).  
Table  6.3: Full Set of Hands Used in the Task 
 Card1 Card2 Card3 Card4 Card5 Card6 Card7 Card8 
Strategy 1: Play your strength 
Hand1 K ♥ Q ♦ 9 ♣ 9 ♠ J ♠ 8 ♥ A ♠ J ♥ 
Hand2 J ♥ A ♥ 8 ♦ 7 ♦ 8 ♠ 9 ♠ 10 ♠ K ♠ 
Hand3 J ♥ A ♦ 9 ♥ 8 ♦ Q ♥ Q ♣ 7 ♠ 10 ♠ 
Hand4 8 ♣ 9 ♥ 10 ♥ 10 ♠ K ♠ 7 ♦ 10 ♦ A ♦ 
Hand5 8 ♦ A ♦ J ♠ Q ♥ K ♥ 10 ♥ A ♥ J ♣ 
 
Strategy 2: Support your partner’s play 
Hand1 8 ♥ J ♣ 8 ♠ 9 ♣ 10 ♠ 10 ♥ K ♣ 10 ♣ 
Hand2 7 ♦ 9 ♣ 9 ♥ 10 ♥ 8 ♠ K ♣ 8 ♦ J ♣ 
Hand3 8 ♦ 9 ♦ 10 ♣ K ♣ J ♣ 7 ♥ J ♥ K ♥ 
Hand4 9 ♣ 10 ♥ J ♣ K ♠ A ♥ Q ♠ K ♦ 9 ♥ 
Hand5 J ♠ A ♦ 10 ♣ A ♣ Q ♠ 7 ♦ Q ♣ Q ♦ 
 
Strategy 3: Don’t play below the ace 
Hand1 J ♥ A ♠ J ♦ 8 ♣ 7 ♦ 10 ♥ A ♦ Q ♥ 
Hand2 K ♠ 7 ♥ J ♠ 9 ♥ 7 ♠ Q ♥ A ♥ A ♠ 
Hand3 J ♦ J ♣ 10 ♦ A ♦ A ♥ 9 ♦ 9 ♠ J ♥ 
Hand4 7 ♣ 8 ♦ K ♠ A ♥ J ♣ 7 ♥ A ♦ Q ♦ 
Hand5 9 ♦ Q ♠ 8 ♥ K ♦ 8 ♣ A ♥ 9 ♣ A ♣ 
 
Strategy 4: Don’t leave your 10 alone 
Hand1 A ♣ 10 ♣ 8 ♣ 10 ♠ 10 ♦ 9 ♥ J ♣ 10 ♥ 
Hand2 10 ♦ Q ♠ J ♠ 9 ♥ 10 ♠ K ♣ A ♦ K ♥ 
Hand3 Q ♥ J ♠ 10 ♦ 9 ♥ J ♣ 7 ♥ 10 ♠ 10 ♥ 
Hand4 8 ♦ J ♣ A ♣ Q♥ 7 ♣ Q ♦ 10 ♥ 7 ♠ 




Although Belote is played with four players (see section 6.4), in task one only one participant performs 
the task at a time. Indeed, participants were in a scenario-based situation where the researcher provided all 
required information, such as the moves of other players (played cards). In task one, participants were in 
the first player position (i.e., their moves were not preceded by any other move), so each participant was 
required to know only his own hand when applying strategy 1 (“play your strength”), strategy 3 (“don’t 
play below the ace”), and strategy 4 (“don’t leave your 10 alone”; see Table 6.3). Unlike the other three 
strategies, strategy 2 (“support your partner’s play”) required additional information about the previously 
played cards as it requires the participant to be placed in the third player position. For this particular 
strategy, the researcher selected the first and second players’ cards based on his knowledge of the game 
(see Table 6.4).  
Table  6.4: First and Second Players’ Cards for Strategy 2  
  First player  Second player 
Hand1 K ♥ J ♥ 
Hand2  A ♥ J ♥ 
Hand3 A ♣ Q ♣ 
Hand4 J ♠ 9 ♠ 
Hand5 J ♦ K ♦ 
         
Procedures. The study was conducted in a laboratory setting with one participant at a time. Task one 
lasted for 45 minutes on average. All sessions were videotaped, with permission from the participants. 
Upon starting the experiment, participants received a data collection instrument, including a cover page 
that showed the general instructions of the experiment. Participants were allowed time to read the 
instructions, and the researcher was available to help or answer questions, as necessary. The general 















Figure  6.1: General instructions of the experiment 
 
The general instructions were followed by general competency questions (Figure 6.2); participants 
were asked about their years of experience in playing the game, their age, their self-reported competency 
in the game on a scale of 1 (beginner) to 3 (very competent), and the frequency with which they had 
played the game the last six months. Participants were given time to read these questions on the data 
collection instrument; the researcher was available for help. The researcher did not ask the participants to 






Figure  6.2: General competency questions 
 
These questions were followed by the instructions for task one (see Figure 6.3). Participants were given 





Thanks for participating in this study. This experiment is part of a study on how individuals use strategies. While 
working on each of the two tasks, you will be asked to complete a short questionnaire. All answers should be 
based on your personal experience. Please try to think aloud while you are performing the task.  
 
For the two tasks, you will play the non-trump suit version of Belote (i.e., SUN condition). In other words, there 
is no dominant suit for this version of the game. You will be given a hand (i.e., eight cards) in which the first 
player may play any card, but you have to follow his/her suit. If following the suit of the first player’s card (i.e., 
the dominant suit) is not possible according to the rules of the game, then you can play any card as the rules of 
the game permit. There is no single correct way of playing this game; I am seeking the way you regularly play in 
similar situations. Upon completing the two tasks of the study you will receive a gift card.  
 
Remember: Please try to think aloud while you are performing the task. 
 
Thanks again for your time and participation.  
Good luck! 
1) How many years have you been playing Belote? 
2) What is your age? 
3) How would you describe you competence with the Belote? 
Beginner   Average player   Very competent  











Figure  6.3: Instructions for task one 
 
After presenting the instructions for task one, participants were asked more specific questions to ensure 
their competency with respect to the particular strategies used in the task. In the data collection 
instrument, participants were asked if they were familiar with each of the four strategies (“play your 
strength,” “support your partner’s play,” “don’t play below the ace,” and “don’t leave your 10 alone”). If 
they answered yes, they were asked to describe the strategies and give concrete examples, which they 
could draw from the full set of 32 cards. If participants answered no, indicating their unfamiliarity with a 
strategy, the researcher provided a description of the strategy similar to the definitions provided in Table 
6.2. Again, the researcher used the videotaped recordings of participants’ responses in the analysis instead 
of asking them to write down their answers. Figure 6.4 provides an example of one of the four strategies.  
 




Figure  6.4: Example of the strategies familiarity questions  
 
In the data collection instrument, each strategy was followed by five different hands (see Table 6.3 for 
all hands used as well as their corresponding strategies). For each hand, participants were asked to rate the 
probability of playing each card when applying the corresponding strategy, based on a 7-point scale (with 
1 being least probable and 7 being most probable). Appendix H provides an example of the rating 
In the first task, you will be presented with four different Belote strategies. 
1. You will explain and give an example of each of these strategies.  
2. You will apply each strategy to five different hands.  
3. For each hand, you will be asked to rate the typicality of applying the given strategy to this hand on a 
scale of 1 (highly atypical) to 5 (highly typical). 
Note: Based on the rules of the game, you may indicate that playing a certain card would be an inappropriate 
move.   
Remember:  
 There is no single correct way of playing this game; I am asking about the way you regularly play in 
similar situations. 
 Please try to think aloud while you are performing the task. Also, try to explain what you are doing and 
why. 
1) Are you familiar with the “play your strength” strategy?  
2) Explain the “play your strength” strategy. 
3) Give a concrete example of the “play your strength” strategy (using the deck on the table).  
4) You are the first player so, define then apply “play your strength” strategy on each one of the 
following hands:   
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questions. Two versions of the data collection instrument were developed. Strategies in each version were 
randomly ordered. 
Measures. Task one was designed to examine the structure of the future activity categories (H1 and H2). 
The first hypothesis, which states that individuals tend to conceive of plans as future activity categories 
with a range of possibilities, was tested by showing that players have knowledge and awareness about the 
range of possible hands that fit the strategy.  
In this experiment the range of possible hands was shown by identifying aspects of each strategy that 
are central to participants in applying each strategy. More specifically, a qualitative analysis of the 
participants’ descriptions of each strategy was performed to identify and categorize the aspects central for 
applying each strategy. The coding procedures started with transcribing the strategies’ descriptions. Next, 
the researcher identified each strategy’s central processes by focusing on the actions stated in the 
participants’ descriptions, as suggested by Charmaz (2006), which indicate aspects of applying the 
strategies. After identifying the aspect(s) mentioned by each participant, the frequency with which these 
aspects occurred across participants was computed. Any aspect mentioned by 50% or more of the 
participants was deemed to be a central aspect of the corresponding strategy (see Appendix I for an 
example of the coding). 
The second hypothesis states that individuals tend to conceive of plans as future activity categories that 
exhibit a graded structure. According to Barsalou (1983), a graded structure is demonstrated by high 
agreement among participants in rating members of a category. In the context of this experimental task, if 
the participants significantly agreed in their ratings of the cards of the hands presented, then a graded 
structure would be present. Two extreme possibilities could violate the graded structure: if participants 
agreed to giving all cards of a hand the same rating on the 7-point scale (e.g., all 8 cards of a hand rated as 
7 on the 7-point scale) and if participants agreed to giving a card an equal rating across all points of the 
scale (e.g., first card rated three times on each point of the 7-point scale; Barsalou, 1983; Rosch, 1973). 
However, neither of these cases occurred in the course of the study.  
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To date, various approaches have been developed and introduced to measure such agreement in rating. 
The first approach involves using the chi-square statistic to test for significant differences between the 
actual and expected distributions of the ratings. The assumption inherent in this approach is that a 
significant difference between the actual and expected distributions represents agreement (non-
randomness) in the ratings (Rosch, 1973).  
The second approach involves using two statistics: Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (W), a 
nonparametric test, and the interclass correlation coefficient (ICC), which is a parametric test (Barsalou, 
1983). Both statistics are essentially used to measure the average agreement between each participant and 
every other participant. The coefficient of concordance (W) and interclass correlation coefficient (ICC) 
range from zero (no agreement) to one (perfect agreement; Cohen et al. 2003; Siegel, 1956). In the second 
approach the effects of the two extreme possibilities that could violate the graded structure were avoided 
by not allowing participants to assign more than one item at any given rank (i.e., forced rank; Barsalou, 
1983). This approach assumes that if both statistics are significantly high, then the category possesses a 
graded structure. 
The third approach was presented by Graesser and his collaborators in a series of studies (e.g., Graesser 
et al., 1979; Graesser & Nakamura, 1982; Smith & Graesser, 1981). A threshold measure based on the 
mean of items across participants was used to determine the agreement in ratings. The scale ranged from 
1 to 6, with the threshold at 4.4 in some studies (e.g., Graesser et al., 1979) and 4.5 in others (e.g., 
Graesser & Nakamura, 1982). Accordingly, if an item’s mean is above the threshold, then it is typical; 
otherwise, it is atypical. This approach did not investigate the two previously discussed extreme 
possibilities that could violate graded structure. Overall, in this approach the assumption is that high-rated 
items are typical items whereas lower-rated items on the typicality scale are unessential or unrelated to the 
category (Smith & Graesser, 1981).  
Although all three approaches measure agreement, differences exist among these approaches. The chi-
square statistic approach and Graesser’s approach both measure agreement at the item level, which 
requires testing each item of a category on an individual basis. On the other hand, the coefficient of 
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concordance and interclass correlation coefficient measure agreement at the category level, which takes 
into account all of the items in the category.  
In task one, the coefficient of concordance and interclass correlation coefficient are used. This 
approach was selected because the graded structure is examined in a particular set of future activities (i.e., 
strategies), so in task one the goal of using a measure of agreement is to show that each one of these 
strategies is structurally graded. If the coefficient of concordance and interclass correlation coefficient are 
significantly high, they are interpreted to mean that participants agree that some cards are more likely 
than others to be played first under a given strategy.  
Because using the coefficient of concordance requires a ranking scale, it was necessary to transform the 
rating scale used in the task into a ranking scale; a card rated as most probable (i.e., 7 on the 7-point scale) 
is transformed into rank one and so on. In addition, at an early stage of the task development in this study, 
competent players asserted that in some cases they do not have a preference about playing some cards 
over others (i.e., two or more cards are equally preferable in certain cases). Consequently, participants 
were allowed to tie ranks (i.e., place more than one item at any given rank); thus, a correction factor was 
introduced.10 
6.5.2  Results 
Task one was designed to assess participants’ competency with respect to the card game Belote in general 
as well as specific Belote strategies. Three items were used to assess general competency: 1) number of 
years since participants started playing Belote (M=10.7 years, SD=5.4), 2) frequency with which 
participants played per month (M=3.8 per month, SD=4.7), and 3) participants’ self-reported competency 
                                                   
10 Siegel (1956) asserts:  
The effect of tied ranks is to depress the value of W [coefficient of concordance] as found by formula (9.15). 
If the proportion of the ties is small, the effect is negligible, and thus, formula (9.15) may still be used. If the 
proportion of the ties is large, a correction may be introduced which will increase slightly the value of W 
[coefficient of concordance] over what it would have been if uncorrected (p. 234). 
Since Siegel (1956) did not provide a measurement of small and large ties, this study computes the size of the ties by averaging 
the number of ties per hand across participants. This study further assumes that, if the average number of ties for any given hand 
is less than or equal to 30% of the maximum possible number of ties (i.e., 8 cards resulted in at most 4 ties as each 2 cards are 
considered one tie), then no correction factor was used. 
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on a 3-point scale (M=2.5, SD=0.6; see Table 6.5). These data suggest that the participants possessed a 
high level of experience.  
Table  6.5: Descriptive Frequency of the General Competency Questions 
No. Question Mean SD Range 
1 Experience (Years) 10.7 5.4 1 to 24 
2 Frequency of Play (Per month) 3.8 4.7 0 to 20 
3 Self-reported Competency (3-point scale, 1 beginner to 3 competent) 2.5 0.6 1 to 3 
 
Table 6.6 indicates participants’ detailed knowledge of every strategy and its application. In no cases 
was a participant able to describe a strategy without also being able to provide a concrete example. 
Appendix J presents examples of each strategy provided by participants. Only 10 examples are shown per 
strategy as these examples are intended to be illustrative rather than show all combinations of cards the 
participants provided.     
Table  6.6: Frequency of Participants’ Familiarity with the Four Strategies  
No. Strategy n % 
1 Play your strength 30 100 
2 Support your partner’s play 28 93 
3 Don’t play below the Ace 23 77 
4 Don’t leave your 10 alone 25 83 
Mean  26.5 88 
 
In order to examine the first hypothesis, which states that individuals tend to conceive of plans as future 
activity categories with a range of possibilities, two kinds of data were analyzed. The one is the fact that 
participants were able to generate different combinations of hands to fit each strategy, as shown in 
Appendix J. Different hands provided by participants demonstrate variability in the strategies by showing 
a range of possibilities.  
The second kind of data is participants’ knowledge and awareness of the important aspects that must be 
carefully implemented when applying each strategy. These aspects, as shown in Table 6.7, indicate the 
sources of variability in the strategies. In other words, each aspect defines a range of possible cards that fit 
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the strategy. For example, strategy 1 includes the aspect of high-value cards, which refers to any 
combination of the five cards that have a scoring value (jack, queen, king, 10, and ace). The range of 
possibilities is any combination of these cards from the same suit. Also, the aspect “three or more cards of 
the same suit” may refer to three, four, five, six, seven, or even eight cards of the same suit, thereby 
encompassing a wide range of possible combinations. In strategy 2, the aspect “higher value card than the 
previously played cards” could range from a single possible card up to six possible cards of the same suit. 
The single possible card situation occurs when the 10 has been played previously, in which case the only 
higher scoring card is the ace. The situation involving six possible cards occurs when the 7 and 8 have 
already been played, in which case all other cards are higher (9, jack, queen, king, 10, ace). In strategies 3 
and 4, the phrases “other cards” and “another card” refer to the wide range of the seven cards of the same 
suit. It can be said that, in the four presented strategies, central aspects define the range of possible hands.  
Table  6.7: Central Aspects of Different Strategies  
No. Strategy Central Aspects n % 
1) High-value cards 28 93 
1 Play your strength 
2) Three or more cards of the same suit 22 73 
1) Higher value card than the previously played cards 20 71 
2 Support your partner’s play 
2) Similar suit should be played first in the next round 28 100 
3 Don’t play below the ace 1) Ace and other cards of the same suit 23 100 
4 Don’t leave your 10 alone 1) 10 and another card of the same suit 25 100 
 
Ultimately, the data about the concrete examples (Appendix J) and aspects of strategies (Table 6.7) 
provided by participants, which shows the participants’ knowledge and awareness of the range of possible 
hands that fit the strategies, support the first hypothesis—namely, that individuals tend to conceive plans 
as future activity categories with a range of possibilities.  
To examine the second hypothesis, as discussed in the Measures section, the agreement among 
participants is computed using two measures: 1) Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (W) and 2) the 
interclass correlation coefficient (ICC). The averages for both tests across different hands are W = .55 and  
ICC = .54, which shows a relatively high agreement between participants, all hands being significant (p < 
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0.001; for details see Table 6.8). Therefore, the relatively high agreement among participants when rating 
the eight cards of each hand indicates that, under a given strategy, participants agreed that some cards are 
more likely to be played than others. As a result, the second hypothesis, which states that individuals tend 
to conceive of plans as future activity categories which exhibit a graded structure, is supported.  
Table  6.8: Results Comparison between Coefficient of Concordance and Interclass Correlation Coefficient 
 Coefficient of concordance Interclass correlation coefficient 
 W P-value ICC P-value 
Strategy 1     
Hand1 0.24 p < 0.001 0.20 p < 0.001 
Hand2 0.66 p < 0.001 0.33 p < 0.001 
Hand3 0.12 p < 0.001 0.14 p < 0.001 
Hand4 0.47 p < 0.001 0.57 p < 0.001 
Hand5 0.51 p < 0.001 0.54 p < 0.001 
Strategy 2     
Hand1 0.85 p < 0.001 0.89 p < 0.001 
Hand2 0.73 p < 0.001 0.79 p < 0.001 
Hand3 0.99 p < 0.001 0.81 p < 0.001 
Hand4 0.84 p < 0.001 0.78 p < 0.001 
Hand5 0.99 p < 0.001 0.87 p < 0.001 
Strategy 3     
Hand1 0.20 p < 0.001 0.27 p < 0.001 
Hand2 0.66 p < 0.001 0.77 p < 0.001 
Hand3 0.68 p < 0.001 0.83 p < 0.001 
Hand4 0.41 p < 0.001 0.50 p < 0.001 
Hand5 0.31 p < 0.001 0.33 p < 0.001 
Strategy 4     
Hand1 0.69 p < 0.001 0.82 p < 0.001 
Hand2 0.24 p < 0.001 0.29 p < 0.001 
Hand3 0.45 p < 0.001 0.47 p < 0.001 
Hand4 0.10 p < 0.001 0.14 p < 0.001 
Hand5 0.82 p < 0.001 0.42 p < 0.001 
Mean 0.55  0.54  
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6.5.3  Discussion  
The first task examined two questions: How do individuals conceive of future activities? What is the 
structure of these future activities? Based on the theoretical model, it was suggested that individuals tend 
to conceive of future activities as categories with a range of possibilities and that these categories are 
structurally graded. 
In this task, participants were asked to describe and give concrete examples of four common strategies 
used in the Belote card game. Participants were then asked to rate the probability of playing each card of a 
given hand when using a certain strategy on a 7-point scale. Participants were given 5 different hands per 
strategy, resulting in 20 different hands. The strategies and hands were manipulated; all participants were 
given the same strategies and hands. These strategies were randomly ordered in two different sets.   
No previously developed measures existed for the first hypothesis, which states that that individuals 
tend to conceive of plans as future activity categories with a range of possibilities. Within the context of 
the experiment, the range of possibilities is represented by the range of possible hands that fit a given 
strategy, which is measured based on a qualitative analysis of the descriptions provided by participants. 
Since one might question the accuracy of this qualitative analysis, the procedures by which descriptions 
were analyzed are provided along with concrete examples of the steps involved in the analysis (see 
Measures, section 6.5.1). In dealing with concepts such as strategies, a qualitative analysis such as that 
used in the study seems unavoidable. The range of possibilities shown, based on both the qualitative 
analysis of the descriptions and the concrete examples, provided support for the first hypothesis. 
With respect to the second hypothesis, the coefficient of concordance (W) and interclass correlation 
coefficient (ICC) can provide evidence of graded structure if a high level of agreement exists among 
participants. Accordingly, graded structure refers to agreement among participants on those items of a 
category that are more likely than others to occur.   
The results show a relatively high level of agreement among participants (W = .55, ICC = .54), all of 
the hands being significant at (p < 0.001). In addition, the results did not show either of the two 
conditions that could violate graded structure. These results provide support for the second hypothesis, 
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which states that individuals tend to conceive of plans as future activity categories that exhibit a graded 
structure. This finding is consistent with other research findings that suggest that taxonomies, goal-
derived categories, and scripts are structurally graded (Barsalou, 1983; Graesser et al., 1979; Rosch, 
1973).  
One point that requires clarification in the results is the low agreement that yielded a high level of 
significance. More specifically, while the agreement on the third hand in strategy 1 (W = .12, ICC = .14) 
and the fourth hand in strategy 4 (W = .10, ICC = .14) is relatively low, the significance is high at p < 
0.001, which seems odd. Statistically, Siegel and Castellan Jr. (1988) asserted that the chi-square 
distribution is used when n > 7 and m > 20, which is perfectly applicable to this experiment, where the 
number of cards (n) is 8 and the number of participants (m) is 30. However, since m (30) in the chi-square 
coefficient = m*(n-1)*W is large, the chi-square coefficient becomes even larger after multiplying m by n 
and W. It seems that the low agreement with the high level of significance is a limitation in the results due 
to using the chi-square coefficient to compute the significance level. 
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6.6 Task Two 
The purpose of task two was to examine the nature of the adjustment. In the experiment, adjustment refers 
to the process participants follow when—while executing a strategy—they encounter a barrier (i.e., 
situational contingencies) that requires a detour or an alternative path. This research argues that a 
participant’s knowledge and awareness related to applying a strategy as a structurally graded category 
(H2) are associated with the adjustment that the participant makes to achieve his goal when prevented. 
The general case can be formalized as follows: An association exists between an individual’s knowledge 
of a typical adjustment relevant to the activity and his actual adjustment in the activity.  
6.6.1  Method       
Participants. The 30 male persons who participated in task one also participated in task two during the 
same session of task one.  
Materials. In task two, the two strategies of the card game Belote are the stimuli. These strategies are 1) 
“support your partner’s play” and 2) “signaling” (see Table 6.9 for details). These two strategies were 
selected because they share a similar underlying structure in which the participant’s decision to play a 
card depends on the previously played cards. For these two strategies, participants were placed in the third 
player position, in which the player needs information about the previously played cards in order to 
choose which card to play. The previously played cards provide the opportunity to manipulate the 
dynamic properties of the situations; in other words, cards played are the contingences that may create a 
barrier requiring the participant to adjust play by taking a new path that does not fall within the strategy.   
After selecting the strategies, the researcher assigned one hand per strategy (see Appendix K for the 
assigned hands), then developed three conditions per strategy. While the participants kept the same hand, 
the researcher changed the cards played by the first and second players. The changes in the previously 





Table  6.9: Strategies Used in Task Two and Their Definitions  
No. Strategies Definition 
1 Support your 
partner’s play 
First player’s partner (i.e., third player) plays a high-value card to support his/her teammate’s opening 
play. Within the context of “support your partner’s play,” the definition of high-value card depends on 
the previously played cards. In order to describe the card as a high-value card, the first player’s partner 
has to play a card that has a higher scoring value than the other played cards.    
2 Signaling This strategy can be applied only when a player does not have a card of the same suit as the card played 
by the first player. In this case, according to the rules of the game, the player can play any card; however, 
a played card of a suit different than the first suit played in the round cannot win the round. Signaling 
refers to when the first player’s partner needs to send a signal to notify the first player of the suit that 
should be played first in the next round. The first player’s partner signals by playing a high-value card of 
the opposite color. Specifically, the convention is that playing a diamond means that first player’s partner 
desires a club and vice versa. Similarly, playing a heart means that the first player’s partner desires a 
spade and vice versa. Thus, the first-played card to open the next round should be based on the desired 
card.  
 
An example will illustrate the process. In task two, for the strategy “support your partner’s play,” the 
first player played 8♦. Without knowing the second played card, the participants had three cards in their 
hands (K♦, J♦ and 7♦) that matched the played suit. The scoring value of these cards is 4 points for K♦, 2 
points for J♦, and zero points for 7♦. Since 8♦ is worth zero points, the K♦ and J♦ have a higher scoring 
value, which in turn suggests that these two cards (K♦ and J♦) fall within the strategy of support for your 
partner’s play. However, as 7♦ is worth zero points and the lowest card in the deck, 7♦ falls beyond the 
strategy. 
Another example can be drawn based on “signaling.” In task two, the first player played Q♥. Without 
knowing the second card played, the participant did not have any card that matched the played suit. Thus, 
according to the rules of the card game, the participants can play any card. However, based on “signaling” 
strategy, participants were notifying their teammates of clubs that should be played first in the next round 
as participants had four clubs (i.e., A♣, 10♣, J♣ and 7♣). As a result, participants played K♦ to follow the 
convention that states playing a high-value diamond card to get a club as the first card in the next round. 
Thus, playing the K♦ (4 points) falls within the strategy while playing other cards such as 7♠, 9♣, and 9♦ 
falls beyond the strategy.  
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Procedures. Participants were given time to read the instructions for task two (see Figure 6.5), and the 
researcher was available for help.  
 
Figure  6.5: Instructions for task two 
 
In the data collection instrument, participants were presented with one strategy at a time. Participants 
were given time to read the instructions, and the researcher was available for help. Although participants 
were in the third player position (i.e., they would be expected to play their cards after the second player), 
they were asked which card they were going to play immediately after they were shown the first player’s 
card. The reason for this was that the researcher wanted to encourage participants to give a description of 
their plan, including potential contingent moves that depend on the unknown move of the second player. 
The researcher did not ask participants to write down their answers, but rather used their videotaped 
responses in the analysis. The instructions are shown in Figure 6.6. 
 
Figure  6.6: Questions probing the decision-tree related to different possible moves   
Strategy 1: Case 1: 
Your hand:     
 
You are the third player, and you should follow the “support your partner’s play” strategy unless you think it is inappropriate 
to do so. Please justify your move regardless of whether you follow the strategy or not.     
The first player (your partner) played: 
 
What you are going to play? Why? 
1. In the second task, you will be given hands and then asked to play following a given Belote strategy.  
2. You should follow the strategy given by the experimenter unless you think it is not appropriate for the current 
round.  
3. Whether the given strategy is appropriate or not, you need to justify your move.  
4. After each hand, you will be asked to rate each card from 1 (least probable move) to 7 (most probable move) based 
on the given strategy.  
Note: Based on the rules of the game, you may indicate that a card would be an inappropriate move.   
Remember:  
 There is no single way of playing this game; I am seeking the way you regularly play in similar situations. 
 Please try to think aloud while you are performing the task. Also, try to explain what you are doing and why. 
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The second player played: 
 
Your turn: Rate these cards on a scale of 1 (least probable) to 7 (most probable), indicating how likely it is that you would 
select each card as your first move to “support your partner’s play.” 
 
Next, after being shown the second player’s card, participants were asked to rate on a 7-point scale 
(with 1 being least probable and 7 being most probable) how likely it was that they would select each card 
as their first move to apply the corresponding strategy (see Figure 6.7).   
Figure  6.7: The rating question   
 
Measures. In order to investigate the association between individuals’ knowledge of typical adjustment 
relevant to the activity and their actual adjustment in the activity (H3), data were collected for both 
participants’ knowledge about typical adjustment and their actual adjustments. Participants’ knowledge 
was extracted when participants were asked to follow a strategy and identify the possible outcomes. The 
actual adjustment was computed based on counting actual played cards.  
Questions were used to stimulate participants’ knowledge of the possible outcomes when following a 
strategy. For example, participants were in the third position (after the first and second players), yet they 
were asked to indicate which card they intended to play under the current strategy (e.g., support your 
partner’s play) immediately after seeing the first player’s card. It is important to distinguish between 
participants’ knowledge about the possible outcomes and the strategies (e.g., support your partner’s play) 
provided by the experimenter. Participants’ knowledge about the possible outcomes focuses on how the 
strategies (provided by the experimenter) apply in a particular situation. More specifically, their 
knowledge about the possible outcomes draws on their past experiences in such a situation, which may 
include typical adjustments that are not part of the strategy. In the previous example, when the 
participants were asked to indicate what they intended to play immediately after seeing the first player’s 
card, their responses could include typical adjustments that fell beyond the current strategy (e.g., support 
your partner’s play).          
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The participants’ description was transcribed and then coded. In the coding stage, the focus was on the 
indicators of branching responses, such as if and in the case that. The following is a quote that illustrates 
the coding.      
Okay, before seeing the second player’s card, I would play the king or maybe the jack in 
the case that the second player’s card is lower than a jack. If [the second player’s card is] 
higher than a king, like a 10 or an ace, I’ll play the 7, no doubt. (Participant 21) 
 
This participant started with cards that could be played to satisfy the strategy. The participant further 
added that if the second played card had a scoring value higher than his cards, then he would not follow 
the strategy but would play the 7. Indeed, playing the 7 is part of the participant’s knowledge about the 
possible outcomes that fall beyond the strategy. The use of phrases that indicate branching, such as in the 
case that and if-then-else, suggest that the participant has a knowledge about two branches that depend on 
the second played card; depending on this card, the participant could play a card that falls either within or 
beyond the strategy.   
Thus, participants’ responses can fall into one of three possible outcomes: their knowledge about 
playing a card falls only within the strategy, their knowledge about playing a card falls only beyond the 
strategy, or their knowledge about playing either within or beyond the strategy, depending on the second 
played card. The goal of identifying participants’ knowledge in a given situation is to show the extent to 
which participants are aware of the possible outcomes.  
A chi-square one-sample test was used to examine if a statistically significant difference exists between 
the expected and the actual outcomes. An equal probability is expected for the three outcomes. Based on 
chance, one third of participants would indicate the knowledge of playing a card that falls only within the 
strategy. Another one third would indicate the knowledge of playing a card that falls only beyond the 
strategy. The remaining one third would indicate knowledge about playing either within or beyond the 
strategy, depending on the second played card.    
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With respect to actual adjustment, the actual played cards were counted. For a given strategy after 
seeing the first played card, participants’ cards were categorized into two categories: those that fall within 
or beyond the strategy (Appendix M shows the cards actually played and their corresponding categories). 
In the context of the Belote card game, a played card is classified as either within or beyond any given 
strategy (i.e., within and beyond are mutually exclusive categories). As a result, the played cards per 
condition either fall within or beyond the strategy. The significance of the difference between the 
expected and the actual was examined using a chi-square one-sample test. The expected probability of 
each category was estimated based on the number of cards that fall within or beyond a strategy relative to 
the total number of legal cards that can be played (see Table 6.10).       
Table  6.10: Probability of Each Category and Corresponding Strategies  
No. Strategies Cards fall within the strategy  Cards fall beyond the strategy 
1 Support your partner’s play 2/3 1/3 
2 Signaling 5/8 3/8 
 
6.6.2  Results 
The purpose of task two is to test the third hypothesis, which states that an association exists between an 
individual’s knowledge of typical adjustment relevant to the activity category and his/her actual 
adjustment in the activity category. A two-step measure was used to examine the third hypothesis, as 
outlined in section 6.6.1. In the following sections, the results of participants’ knowledge about typical 
adjustment and their actual adjustments are reported separately. 
6.6.2.1  Participants’ Knowledge about Typical Adjustment 
Following the coding procedures discussed in Measures (section 6.6.1), the percentages of participants 
who fall in each of the three possible outcomes are shown for each strategy (see Figure 6.8). In the 
“support your partner’s play” strategy, 28 participants knew the strategy and described their knowledge 
about the possible outcomes. As shown in the first chart of Figure 6.8, 92.8% of those participants had 
knowledge about playing cards that fall either within or beyond the strategy. In the “signaling” strategy, 
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23 participants knew the strategy and were able to provide possible outcomes. The second chart in Figure 
6.8 shows that 82.6% of those participants had knowledge about the cards that can fall either within or 




















Figure  6.8: Percentages of participants possessing knowledge of possible outcomes for the two examined strategies 
 
The majority of participants possessed knowledge about playing cards that fall either beyond or within 
the strategy, as shown Figure 6.8. In this experiment, the knowledge about playing cards that fall beyond 
the strategy is considered a knowledge about expected adjustment given that when participants played 
beyond the strategy, they could not follow the strategy. Participants who indicated their unfamiliarity with 
















































The chi-square was computed for the two strategies (“support your partner’s play” and “signaling”) and 
was significant for both strategies at p < 0.001 (1-tailed), as indicated in Table 6.11. This result suggests 
that a real difference exists among the three outcomes. In particular, a large portion of participants 
demonstrated knowledge and awareness about typical barriers that may require adjustment.      
Table  6.11: Chi-square for Participants’ Knowledge for the Possible Outcomes in the Two Strategies 
No. Strategy Chi-square d.f. N P-value (1-tailed) 
1 Support your partner’s play 44.806 2 28 p < 0.001 
2 Signaling 26.214 2 23 p < 0.001 
 
6.6.2.2  Actual Adjustment of the Participants in the Activity  
In order to examine the association between participants’ knowledge of typical adjustment and their 
actual adjustment in the card game, the frequency of the played cards was counted. These played cards 
were then categorized into cards that fall within the strategy and cards that fall beyond the strategy. Next, 
the played cards (represented by black bars) were converted into percentages and plotted with expected 
probability of each of the two categories (represented by gray bars) (for details about how the probability 
was calculated, see Measures, section 6.6.1). This process was done separately for the two strategies (i.e., 
“support your partner’s play” and “signaling”).   
With respect to strategy 1 “support your partner’s play,” it is clear from the charts in Figure 6.9 that the 
majority of the participants (represented by black bars) in each condition played their cards either within 
or beyond the strategy. In conditions 1 and 2, most participants were within the strategy while in 
condition 3 participants adjusted by playing card that fell beyond the strategy. The shift from being within 
the strategy to being beyond the strategy was due to previously played cards (i.e., situational 
contingences). In condition 3, the previously played cards created a barrier that encouraged participants to 




     
    



















Figure  6.9: Percentages of actual and estimated frequency of cards played using the “support your partner’s play” 
strategy 
 
Furthermore, since two cards satisfy the strategy, it is possible to analyze the data at the card level 
rather than grouping cards into the category of within the strategy. In fact, some differences were 

































































observed in condition 1, as 19 participants chose the king while only 6 choose the jack. In condition 2, all 
participants (n=28) chose the king. Thus, the majority of participants in both conditions seemed to prefer 
the king regardless of previously played cards.       
It should be noted that, according to Figure 6.9, the number of participants varies because participants 
not familiar with the presented strategy were excluded, as they were not able to comment on whether the 
card they played was within or beyond the strategy. In addition, as participants were given the option of 
selecting more than one card, in a few cases participants chose more than one card as a tie for their first 
choice. Accordingly, if one of these cards was within and the other was beyond the strategy, these 
participants were excluded as the categories of within and beyond are mutually exclusive. 
With respect to strategy 2 “signaling,” across different conditions and based on previously played 
cards, participants shifted between cards that fell within and beyond the strategy as shown in Figure 6.10. 
The shift beyond the strategy considered adjustment due to played cards (situational contingences). Charts 
2 and 3 in Figure 6.10 clearly demonstrate that all participants played beyond the strategy as the situation 
did not support following the strategy of “signaling.”  
However, unexpectedly participants had three different interpretations of “signaling.” Specifically, the 
design of the task required that participants notify their partners that a club should be played first in the 
next round because the hand provided for the “signaling” strategy includes the four of clubs. Participants 
notified their partners in condition 1 by playing the king of diamonds, queen of spades, or jack of clubs. 
Some participants argued that, to notify the partner of the need for a club, the participants needed to play 
a diamond. Others argued that playing a spade indicated the need for a club. The last group argued that 
notifying their partner that they needed club required playing a club. In the categories of within and 
beyond the strategy, these three interpretations do not affect the analysis because, in condition 1, 
regardless of which card participants chose (i.e., king of diamonds, queen of spades, or jack of clubs), all 
these cards fell within the strategy. However, these interpretations make the analysis at the card level 
























       
        Figure  6.10: Percentages of actual and estimated frequency of cards played using the “signaling” strategy  
 
The chi-square was also computed for each condition in the two strategies (“support your partner’s 


































































and estimated probability was significant at p < 0.001 (1-tailed). The other two conditions (Support your 
partner’s play-condition2, and Signaling-condition1) were significant at p < 0.01 (1-tailed) 
Table  6.12: Chi-square for Each Condition in the Two Strategies  
No. Strategy Chi-square d.f. N P-value (1-tailed) 
1 Support your partner’s play     
 Condition 1 10.17 1 26 p < 0.001  
 Condition 2 6.45 1 28 p < 0.014  
 Condition 3 56.00 1 28 p < 0.001  
2 Signaling     
 Condition 1 05.87 1 23 p < 0.015 
 Condition 2 38.33 1 23 p < 0.001 
 Condition 3 38.33 1 23 p < 0.001 
 
6.6.3  Discussion 
Task two examines the nature of the adjustment. Based on the theoretical model, it is hypothesized that an 
association exists between an individual’s knowledge of typical adjustment relevant to the activity and 
his/her actual adjustment in the activity. 
In this task, participants were presented with two strategies and asked about their knowledge of 
possible outcomes, which might include typical adjustments in the situation that the strategy does not 
apply. Participants were then asked to play under different conditions, where their decision of what to 
play was based on the provided strategy and the other played cards.  
The researcher was able to manipulate the structure by changing the previously played cards. The 
manipulation was proven to be successful, as the choice of the frequency of the cards that fell either 
within or beyond the strategies reported was high. 
A two-step measure was used to examine the association between individual’s knowledge of typical 
adjustment and the actual adjustment. In the first step, the participants’ knowledge about the possible 
outcomes that could fall within or beyond the strategies was coded. In the second step, the observed 
frequencies of played cards were examined against the estimated probability under different conditions. 
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In step one, the extraction of participants’ knowledge was based on the descriptions provided by 
participants. The qualitative nature of the data and the interpretation involved in the process of coding 
may lead one to question the accuracy of the results. However, the focus on branching responses (if-then-
else) in the qualitative analysis reduces the complexity of the coding. In fact, given the participants’ high 
level of competency (see section 6.5.2), it is not surprising that the signal in the data is strong, as a 
majority of the participants (charts in Figure 6.8) indicated the possible outcomes that would fall within 
and beyond the strategy. Furthermore, using chi-square to test the difference between the expected and 
the actual outcomes indicated a significant difference (p > .001-one tailed) between the three possible 
outcomes for the two strategies. 
In step two, each of the two created categories (within and beyond strategies) may include a number of 
cards. Thus, it can be argued that assigning a specific card in the category of within the strategy or the 
category of beyond the strategy involves subjective judgment. However, the cards of the participants were 
defined in advance based on the first played card as to whether a card was within or beyond the strategy, 
which reduced the effects of the subjective judgment.  
In the second strategy of “signaling,” the unexpected different interpretations of the strategy created a 
number of challenges in the analysis as it was not possible to analyze the data in the second strategy based 
on cards as each card that can be played is assigned an equal probability. As a result, to overcome this 
problem the researcher grouped cards that could be considered within the strategy together into the 
category “within the strategy” and those that coded not were labeled as “beyond the strategy.”  
Overall, based on the chi-square test, a significant difference emerged in the obtained knowledge of the 
possible outcomes, including typical adjustment of playing cards beyond the strategy at 1-tailed. In 
addition, based on the chi-square, the difference between the expected and the actual outcomes of the 
cards played within and beyond the strategy is significant at 1-tailed. Combining the results of the 
significant chi-square test for the obtained knowledge and the actual adjustment in one-tail provides 
support for H3. Thus, an association exists between an individual’s knowledge of typical adjustment 
relevant to the activity and his/her actual adjustment in the activity. Indeed, observed adjustment was 
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influenced by participants’ knowledge about possible outcomes, including adjustments beyond the 
strategy. 
6.7  General Discussion  
An experiment comprising two tasks was carried out to examine the proposed theoretical framework. 
Three hypotheses outlining the plan–action relationship were formulated and tested quantitatively. This 
section provides an overview of the major findings of the experiment, followed by the experimental 
method that was developed, as both the major findings and the experimental method relate to the 
literature. The general discussion concludes with the limitations of the conducted experiment.        
6.7.1  The Experiment Results 
The major findings of the experiment are divided into two main categories. The first one is the knowledge 
participants have about strategies as graded structure future activity categories (H1 and H2). The second 
one involves the nature of adjustment (H3). 
6.7.1.1 Knowledge about Strategies as Graded Structure Categories 
The first task, which involved defining four Belote strategies, providing concrete examples of each, and 
applying the four presented strategies, supported the first hypothesis. As discussed in section 6.5.2, the 
analysis of the central aspects of the four presented Belote strategies suggested that participants had 
knowledge and awareness about the variability in the presented strategies (see Table 6.12 for details). 
Participants were able to specify aspects of strategies that are important in implementing these strategies. 
In addition, participants were able to generate many different concrete examples to fit the presented 
strategies. These data provide support for the first hypothesis that individuals tend to conceive of plans as 




Table  6.13: Variability of the Central Aspects in Applying Four Belote Strategies          
No. Strategy Central Aspects Variability 
1) High-value cards Jack, queen, king, 10, and ace 
1 Play your strength 
2) Three or more cards of the same suit 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8 cards (same suit) 
1) Higher value card than the previously played cards Can be up to 6 different cards 
2 Support your partner’s play 
2) Similar suit should be played first in the next round Can be up to 5 different cards 
3 Don’t play below the ace 1) Ace and other cards of the same suit Can be up to 6 different cards 
4 Don’t leave your 10 alone 1) 10 and another card of the same suit Any card other than ace (same suit)   
 
It is important to note that, although the central aspects indicated the participants’ knowledge and 
awareness of different card combinations that might fit the strategies, this research argues that participants 
formed strategies based on what they considered most likely to happen (i.e., most typical). This research 
makes this argument because, when participants were asked to give concrete examples of strategies, their 
examples tended to reflect typical and expected situations.  
The difference between how participants conceived of strategies and how they formed strategies was 
evident in strategy 1, when participants described “play your strength” in terms of the aspect of “high-
value cards”—a description that includes all five cards with a scoring value. The description of this aspect 
indicates the participants’ knowledge and awareness about the wide range of possible cards that can fit the 
aspect. However, in strategy 1, the examples provided by participants tended not to show an extremely 
good example by combining all five high-value cards together. Participants tended to choose two to four 
of the five scoring value cards to illustrate the aspect of high-value cards. Similarly, three or more of the 
same suit could mean (unusually) six, seven, or even eight cards of the same suit, yet participants tended 
to provide combinations of only three to four cards of the same suit as examples, as shown in Appendix J. 
Based on this result, it can thus be suggested that strategy involves what is typical, while conceiving of a 
future activity that involves the knowledge and awareness of the wide range of possibilities.  
Section 6.5.3 argued that participants possess knowledge that encompasses a wide range of possibilities 
that fit strategies. These possibilities were described in terms of central aspects important for 
implementing strategies (see Table 6.12). These aspects are similar to the concept of ideal dimension in 
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the categorization literature (e.g., Barsalou, 1981, 1985). Although the ideal dimension is typically 
defined by the researcher (Kim & Murphy, 2011), in this study the central aspects were defined by the 
participants (i.e., not the researcher).    
The central aspects stated at a broad level ignore a number of details. For example, when identifying 
high-value cards, participants did not refer to a specific card (e.g., ace or king) or a specific suit (e.g., 
heart or diamond); rather, they used the broader terms “high value” and “cards.” Thus, the question 
becomes by what process participants were able to distinguish relevant and irrelevant elements to form 
their descriptions of the strategies. A possible answer behind this process is the concept of chunking, 
which refers to a cluster containing items highly associated with each other and less associated with items 
contained in other clusters. Chunks can be formed based on goals (also called goal-oriented chunking; 
Gobet et al., 2001). In the same line of thought, Dreyfus (1992) argued that individuals divide their 
situations into relevant and irrelevant elements based on goals. Indeed, goals are like filters that enable 
individuals to perceptually divide situations in larger chunks and omit many irrelevant details (e.g., 
“heart,” “diamond,” “spade,” and “club”).  
With respect to the second hypothesis, the results in section 6.5.2 indicate that variability in the 
examined hands is structurally graded, meaning that some cards are more likely to be played than others. 
The analysis was based on the agreement between participants on ranking cards using two statistical 
tests—namely, the coefficient of concordance and the interclass correlation coefficient.  
6.7.1.2  Nature of adjustment  
In the second task, participants’ knowledge regarding the range of possible cards was identified based on 
their discussion of the possible cards that could be played under each condition (see section 6.6.2.1 for 
details). Participants were asked to follow two strategies under different conditions (see section 6.6.2.2. 
for details). Using a chi-square test, the results indicate a significant difference at 1-tailed between the 
expected and the actual outcomes identified based on participants’ knowledge. In addition, using a chi-
square test, a significant difference at 1-tailed was found between the expected and the actual groups 
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(within the strategy and adjustments beyond the strategy). These two results of significance at 1-tailed 
provide support for the third hypothesis—namely, that an association exists between an individual’s 
knowledge of typical adjustment relevant to the activity and his/her actual adjustment in the activity. 
However, these results should be interpreted with caution for several reasons: 1) the chi-square test is 
used in an indirect way, 2) grouping the cards into two categories of within and beyond the strategy might 
not be the best way to analyze the data, and 3) unexpected results of different interpretations were 
involved in the second strategy.     
The argument that strategies are built based on what is expected to happen (i.e., what is typical) equally 
applies to the concept of adjustment. In this experiment, adjustment refers to the path a participant might 
take beyond the strategy if faced with a barrier to following the strategy. Although an individual certainly 
cannot imagine every possible barrier and its alternative path (adjustment), typical barriers can be 
reasonably expected. The fact that typical barriers exist is evident, specifically in terms of this 
experiment, because in the forethought (see section 6.6.2.1 for details), the majority of participants 
reasonably expected to adjust beyond the strategy if needed. However, it can be argued that the expected 
adjustment is due to the participants’ level of expertise. More specifically, participants in this experiment 
are highly skillful players for whom predicting a different possibility is not a complex activity. This is 
probably true for most experts in different fields. Therefore, the argument that typical barriers exist needs 
to be interpreted with caution as not all barriers are totally new, although a particular individual may 
encounter a barrier for the first time or some barriers may be completely new (i.e., never having occurred 
to anyone in a given situation). 
6.7.2  The Experiment Methodology 
The experiment comprised two tasks and was conducted in one session. As the two tasks were derived 
from the card game of Belote, all 30 participants were experts in the game. The use of a qualitative 
measurement in the experiment was unavoidable because some aspects of the plan–action relationship 
require qualitative analysis such as the forethought of future possibilities. In fact, the use of both task-
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based on domain-specific activity (i.e., the card game Belote) and qualitative measurement is in contrast 
to other studies that investigate the plan–action relationship (Ng, 2002) and categories’ internal structure 
(e.g., Barsalou, 1983; Rosch, 1973).         
Based on the categorization literature (e.g., Barsalou, 1983), participants were not expected to need to 
use ties (i.e., place more than one card in the same rank). While conducting a handful of interviews to 
explore the card game, the researcher began to expect that participants needed to use ties. This was 
evident as participants in the experiment were frequently tied. This finding is in line with Kendall’s 
(1945) argument that, in the real world ties, constitute the rule rather than the exception. Thus, based on 
the findings of this study, it is suggested that previous studies’ use of ties is a questionable practice. A 
future study on the effect of ties on categories’ internal structure is therefore recommended.  
6.7.3  Limitations of the Experiment  
Finally, a number of important limitations need to be considered. First, the sample size is relatively small 
(n = 30 participants). This is due to the limited number of potential participants who were competent 
players of Belote. In addition, each participant was tested individually for about an hour to complete both 
tasks of the experiment. The small population and time-consuming experiment made it difficult to find 
willing and available participants. However, the sample size in this experiment (n = 30 participants) is 
still larger than other experiments on graded structure, such as Barsalou (1983), who reported only 24 
participants.  
Second, limited stimuli (i.e., the strategies of the Belote card game) were studied. Limited stimuli were 
used in order to increase the analyzability while reducing the complexity involved in the experiment. 
Because this choice might affect the generalizability of the results, the researcher conducted both an in-
depth case study and a laboratory experiment to enhance the generalizability of the findings.    
Third, the experimental manipulation of the structure was designed at two levels. At the first level, the 
structure was manipulated, wherein played cards were classified as either within or beyond a given 
strategy. At the second level, the structure was manipulated at a fine-grain level, wherein cards that fell 
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within the strategy were manipulated under different conditions. Although the first level of manipulation 
proved to be successful (see section 6.6.2.2), the current study was unable to analyze data of the 
differences between paths that fell within the strategy because in the first strategy, the majority of 
participants chose to play the king of diamonds in the two cases, which can be interpreted as being able to 
recognize the difference between the two cards while manipulation did not work. In addition, difficulty 
with the “signaling” strategy, which has multiple interpretations, made it harder to draw conclusions 
about the changes between paths (cards) with the strategy. It seems that the selected strategies, in 
particular “signaling,” did not fit perfectly the fine-grain level of different paths within a strategy. 
Finally, in the “signaling” strategy, participants had more than one interpretation of the strategy in 
condition 1. These different interpretations do not affect the basic idea of the “signaling” strategy, in 
which participants have to play a high-value card to be within the strategy. At the analysis level, grouping 
cards that fall within the strategy reduce the effect of the data analysis. However, these interpretations are 
a source of unnecessary variability that made the analysis at the card level impossible. Thus, it seems that 
other strategies that do not have multiple interpretations should be used in the future. 
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Chapter 7                                                                                             
Conclusions, Implications, and Future Research   
Two major pieces of work have been presented in this dissertation. First, a theoretical framework was 
proposed to explain the phenomenon of the plan–action relationship. Second, an empirical investigation 
was conducted using two methods: an in-depth case study at an organizational setting and a laboratory 
experiment. This chapter briefly outlines the theoretical framework and summarizes the findings of the 
dissertation. This overview will be followed by a discussion of the degree to which other alternative 
theories could account for the dissertation findings. The theoretical, methodological, and practical 
contributions of the study will then be presented. Finally, the chapter concludes with potential future 
work.     
7.1  Overview of the Theoretical Framework  
In this dissertation, drawing on research on cognition and categorization theories, the plan–action 
relationship is conceptualized in terms of activity categories. Individuals tend to conceive (have 
knowledge and awareness) of a plan11 and its attributes as a future activity category with a range of 
possibilities that are structurally graded. Although this dissertation argues that individuals have 
knowledge of a plan and its attributes as an activity category with a range of possibilities that includes 
those beyond the typical, plans and their attributes are formed based on what most is likely expected to 
happen (typical).  
Furthermore, as the individual is moving toward the goal, plans are divided into sub-plans. However, if 
a barrier (i.e., a situational contingency) is presented that prevents the individual from the goal, an 
adjustment is required to overcome the barrier. In this dissertation, an alternative path or detour that an 
individual takes toward the goal is called adjustment. This dissertation argues that an association exists 
between an individual’s knowledge of typical adjustment relevant to the plan and his/her actual 
                                                   
11 As discussed in section 3.3, plans, strategies, and schedules are treated similarly as all three are intended activities 
that have not yet been performed. 
 
 129 
adjustment during the execution of the plan because, for the most part, adjustments are not constantly new 
but can be reasonably expected based on an amalgamation of past experience. However, this dissertation 
does not argue that an individual can expect or have knowledge of every imaginable contingency.      
7.2  Overview of the Case Study and the Experiment in Relation to the Theoretical 
Framework   
Combining the case study and the experiment, the empirical findings support the theoretical framework in 
a variety of ways. The findings can be divided into two main areas: category structure and nature of 
adjustment.  
With respect to the category structure, both the case study and the experiment demonstrated that 
individuals have knowledge and awareness of the schedules and strategies as structurally graded. More 
specifically, in the case study (sections 5.1.1 through 5.1.4), central aspects of the attributes of a daily 
schedule indicated that staff members have knowledge and awareness about the variability on shipment 
occasions. Similarly, in the experiment in section 6.5.2, central aspects of the presented Belote strategies 
suggested that participants have knowledge and awareness about the variability in the presented 
strategies. In addition, in the experiment, participants were able to generate many different concrete 
examples that fit the presented strategies. Overall, these data provide support for the first hypothesis, 
which states that individuals tend to conceive of plans as future activity categories with a range of 
possibilities. 
This dissertation further suggests that plans and their attributes are formed based on what is most likely 
expected to happen (typical). It should be noted that the argument of typicality of plan does not contradict 
the argument that individuals have knowledge and awareness of plans as a range of possible attributes that 
include those beyond the typical because—if individuals are asked about what could happen—they may 
provide a wide range of possibilities. Thus, individuals are aware of the broader knowledge of the 
situation in which the plans take place. For example, the plan for “taking my wife from Waterloo to 
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Toronto Pearson International Airport next Saturday” is formed based on typical conditions related to 
traffic and weather conditions rather than every possible traffic and weather condition.         
In the second hypothesis, this dissertation argued that the internal structure of the knowledge of plans 
tends to be structurally graded. In the case study, both qualitatively (see sections 5.1.1.1, 5.1.2.1, 5.1.3.1, 
and 5.1.4.1) and quantitatively (see sections 5.1.1.2, 5.1.2.2, 5.1.3.2, and 5.1.4.2), the results indicate that 
variability in knowledge about schedule is structurally graded in which some occasions of shipment are 
more likely to occur than others. Similarly, in the experiment (section 6.5.2), the coefficient of 
concordance and the interclass correlation coefficient tests demonstrated relatively high agreement 
between participants (W = .55, ICC = .54) at the p < 0.001 level of significance, suggesting that—in a 
given strategy—participants agreed that some cards are more likely to be played than others. In sum, 
these results provide evidence that the knowledge about future activities tends to exhibit a graded 
structure in which some members of the category of future activities are more likely to occur than others.  
With respect to the nature of adjustment, in this dissertation adjustment refers to the way in which an 
individual deals with barriers that prevent him/her from reaching the goal during plan execution. In the 
case study (see section 5.2 for details), a number of typical barriers and their typical adjustments were 
documented. However, due to the nature of the case study, it was not possible to test the third hypothesis 
rigorously—namely, that an association exists between an individual’s knowledge of typical adjustment 
relevant to the activity and his/her actual adjustment in the activity. In the experiment, it was evident (as 
discussed in section 6.7.1.2) that typical barriers can be reasonably expected and typical adjustments can 
be used to overcome these barriers. Furthermore, in the experiment, participants’ knowledge regarding the 
range of possible cards (see section 6.6.2.1 for details) and the actual played cards (see section 6.6.2.2. for 
details) supported the third hypothesis. An extreme interpretation of these results may suggest that an 
individual may be able to predict every imaginable barrier; however, this interpretation is not intended as 
there are undoubtedly barriers that a particular individual may encounter for the first time. 
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7.3  Contributions  
The findings from this dissertation make several contributions to the current literature. Theoretically, this 
study developed a novel theoretical approach to examine the plan–action relationship that differs from 
prevailing views. The abstractness of plan and the concreteness of action in the psychological theory of 
planning are connected by the decomposition of plans into sub-plans until the level of action (e.g., Miller 
et al., 1960). The situated action perspective (e.g., Suchman, 1987) shifted the emphasis to the action at 
the single level of moment-to-moment. Although the situated action perspective did not provide a 
theoretical explanation of the plan–action relationship (Suchman, 2003), based on the analysis of action at 
the moment-to-moment level, the situated action perspective criticized the idea that plans can be 
decomposed to the level of action. By contrast, it has been argued in this dissertation that the experience 
of the actors, as those actors perceive their situations, is the bridge between the abstractness of plans and 
concreteness of actions. Indeed, it is not the detailed plans at the level of action nor the action at the 
moment-to-moment level, but rather the actor’s experience that links plan and action.  
The theoretical framework presented in this dissertation further differs from psychological theory of 
planning by providing additional details about plan formation and adjustments. Plan formation and 
adjustments are based on the typical outcomes (i.e., what is most likely to happen) rather than individuals’ 
knowledge about the wide range of possibilities that could happen.     
The theoretical framework in this dissertation combined categorization theories about typifications of 
human experience and field theory of the action in the here and now, which no one had previously 
connected. From the categorization perspective, this dissertation provides a starting point to investigate 
the internal structure and variability in activity categories because, in categorization literature, little work 
has been done to investigate activities (Hemeren, 2008; Zacks & Tversky, 2001). From the field theory 
perspective, this dissertation shows another fruitful avenue for analyzing human experience by applying 
the field theoretical analysis. The application of field theory provides for a better understanding of human 
experience and presents a theory of situated action that has been overlooked in the literature.  
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Methodologically, this dissertation makes several noteworthy contributions. The case study attempted 
to combine observational method with theories of categorization in response to the call in the literature to 
observe categorization in a natural setting (e.g., Murphy, 2005). Furthermore, this dissertation developed 
qualitative and quantitative approaches to analyze the case study data, which could serve as a basis for 
future studies aimed at investigating categorization in natural settings.  
With respect to the Belote card game, the experiment attempted to examine aspects of the plan–action 
relationship that could not be examined in the case study as well as quantitatively test certain hypotheses. 
The development of the tasks based on the Belote card game provided an avenue to study the dynamic 
properties of the situation in relation to planning, as discussed in section 6.3. Finally, combining both the 
field study and lab study contributed to the generalizability of the results. 
Based on the current work, practical recommendations can be made about information systems design. 
What difference does this study make to information systems design? Earlier work on information 
systems design focused on computerizing office procedures, assuming that office work involves the 
execution of predefined procedures (Ehn, 1989; Suchman, 1982; 1983). However, other approaches (e.g., 
work-oriented approach) have argued that this assumption is not valid. Rather, they assert that 
information systems design has to be developed based on observational studies (e.g., videotape analysis) 
of the situated action (Suchman et al., 1999). For example, Robinson (1991) stated that “[t]he emphasis 
within the worldwide CSCW [Computer Supported Cooperative Work] community [is] on understanding 
the specifics of practical, situated action” (p. vii). This dissertation has argued that approaches of 
designing information systems based on situated action fail to provide the process by which the situated 
action on moment-to-moment bases is abstracted to a workable system. Advice such as observing people 
and making prototypes in the workplace do not indicate how to move from the details of everyday 
activities to the abstract of the information systems.  
Based on this dissertation’s theoretical framework and findings, it is suggested that a system can be 
better developed by viewing the knowledge of office workers about procedures as activity categories with 
a range of possibilities that are structurally graded. Thus, to develop a system, this dissertation suggests 
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implementing office procedures based on what is typical or most likely to happen rather than what is 
ideal. For example, in the case study, ideally customers should not ask for additional concrete beyond the 
originally ordered volume; however, it was found that typically there is a one-truckload deviation. 
Accordingly, the information should support the permissible range of the one-truckload deviation. 
Furthermore, this dissertation suggests that information systems should account for typical problems (i.e., 
barriers) and their typical adjustments. For example, the case study demonstrated that order cancellation is 
a typical problem (sections 4.3 and 5.2) that has several existing solutions (i.e., adjustments) to reduce the 
negative impact or order cancellations for plant operation. Consequently, this dissertation suggests a 
better design for information systems to support adjustments that are typically made to overcome frequent 
problems.     
7.4  Directions for Future Research 
The present study can be seen as a starting point for a variety of potential future research directions. One 
potential direction is that several conceptual limitations require further examination. First, the connection 
between individuals’ knowledge and typical barriers and adjustments requires further investigation. More 
specifically, it seems that a model explaining the mental process by which individuals retain the typical 
barrier and typical adjustment in memory is lacking.  
Second, the concept of behavioural opportunities and their implications was not analyzed in this 
dissertation. This question is in part conceptual as, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, it is not 
entirely clear how the concept of opportunity is treated in field theory. It can be argued that opportunity 
and barrier are organized perceptually in the figure-ground, meaning that the barrier contributes to what 
one sees as opportunity, yet remains in the background. This implies that both the opportunity (figure) 
and the barrier (background) cannot both be seen at once. Although the background is often forgotten, it 
does modify, affect, and contribute to the way the figure is seen. It seems within the context of the plan–
action relationship, opportunity and barrier offer directions for future research to clarify the relationship 
between both opportunity and barrier from the field theory perspective. 
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In addition, it is assumed in this dissertation that plans are formed based on what is most likely to 
happen (typical). However, this assumption is not empirically examined in this dissertation. Therefore, 
future work should test this assumption. 
Another potential direction is exploring the process by which plans transform from an abstract level to 
a more specific level and vice versa. Within the organizational context, this transformation can be 
investigated in two directions. The first direction involves investigating the transformation processes at 
different time junctures within a single organizational role (e.g., planner). The second direction involves 
investigating the transformation processes at different time junctures among various organizational roles 
(e.g., truck driver, salesperson, and store manager). 
Methodologically, several avenues are available for future research. One possible direction is to 
improve the design of the experiment to capture the paths within a strategy. The improved design should 
focus on selecting more representative hands, using other strategies, and developing steps that detect and 
analyze the fine-grain level of different paths. In addition, future studies could use the experimental set-up 
of the Belote card game to investigate the interaction among the strategies, the structure of the 
environment, and behaviors of individuals acting upon the strategies simultaneously. In this context, 
strategies and the structure of the environment can be captured by examining the level of fit among them 
(typicality rating). Participants’ behavior can be represented by the degree to which they agreed on 
ranking the cards of each hand (coefficient of concordance).  
In order to pursue an empirical investigation of the interaction among strategies, structure of the 
environment, and behavior, several issues should be conducted. Unlike the current study, the size of the 
data points should be quite large, using more than five hands per strategy. In addition, whereas this study 
used hands that were randomly drawn, the hands might cover a wider spectrum of typicality ratings, 
ranging from highly typical to typical to atypical for the corresponding strategy. Ideally, both variables—
the typicality ratings and card rankings used to compute the coefficient of concordance—should be 
provided by different participants to control for possible bias. Finally, strategies used in the experiment 
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should define a similar number of legal choices (i.e., cards) as some strategies define a much smaller 
number of legal choices (i.e., cards) than others. 
Further research is also needed to better understand the effects of ties on the shape of the internal 
structure of categories. This research empirically found that it was not uncommon for participants to 
assign ties to members of a category (i.e., to assign the same rank to more than one member), which calls 
into question previous study results (e.g., Barsalou, 1983) that did not allow for ties (i.e., no more than 
one member at any given rank). Accordingly, further investigation and experimentation on the effect of 
ties on the internal structure of a category is recommended.  
Practically, one of the potential directions is to enhance the modeling of scheduling at ready-mix 
concrete facilities. Few studies (e.g., Tommelein & Li, 1999) have described the reality of scheduling at 
ready-mix concrete facilities. Despite previous efforts to use sophisticated mathematical techniques, such 
as the genetic algorithm (e.g., Naso, Surico, Turchiano, & Kaymak, 2006), to model ready-mix 
scheduling, these models made unwarranted assumptions, such as assuming that demand is determined in 
advance (Schmid, 2007). However, as discussed in sections 4.3 and 5.2, the last-minute cancellation of 
orders is not uncommon within the ready-mix concrete industry. Furthermore, ordering additional 
concrete on short notice seems to be a common practice. Accordingly, it is recommended that further 
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Background Questions: 
1) What is your official position or job title? 
2) How long have you been in this position? 
3) How long have you been with the company? 
Job Overview: 
4) Could you describe the primary activities you do with respect to the planning and scheduling process 
(your main job responsibilities or broad classes of job activity)? 
Activity Category: 
5) For the following major activities of the plan (activity categories), 
a) What is involved?  
b) What is involved in the sub-activities? 
c) What is involved in the sub-sub-activities?  
Task Networks:  
6) In the course of working on the planning and scheduling process, you no doubt interact with a number 
of others, either within or outside the company. 
a) For this major activity of the plan (activity category), I would like to know who you interact 
with in the course of doing your job. (Use the diagram)  
b) Using the diagram, could you please identify other people (or groups, departments, etc.) and 
artefacts with which you interact most frequently as you do your job.  
c) Can you rank order the interaction links that you have indicated, from most to least important, 
as they relate to your job in the planning process? 




For this major activity of the plan, I would like to ask about the kinds of interactions you have with each 
of the other people (or groups, departments, etc.) and artefacts. Naturally, these interactions may 
sometimes proceed normally, not so well, or very well as you do your job. You will have an opportunity 
to comment on the three kinds. 
 7) For each link identified: 
a) For the planning process with respect to this major activity, could you give some specific 
examples of the kinds of things they do that take place under normal circumstances?  
b) For the planning process that relate to this major activity, could you give some specific 
examples of the kinds of things they do when the plan does not proceed well?  
c) For the planning process that relate to this major activity, could you give some specific 
examples of the kinds of things they do when the plan goes very well? 
8) In the course of working on the planning process, what are the artefacts and planning software you use 
(e.g., white board and phones)? 
a) Could you give some specific examples of the way in which the planning software is 
performing normally as you do your job?  
b) Could you give some specific examples of the way in which the planning software is not 
performing well as you do your job?  
c) Could you give some specific examples of the way in which the planning software is 
performing very well as you do your job? 
9) For all links including the software (questions will be asked in relation to each identified behaviour or 
example): 
a) Relative frequency and Impact: (not so well) 
   - How frequently does this “not so well” behaviour take place?  
- What is the percentage of time out of 10 times?  
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   -What do you do when that happens? 
    -E.g. – extra tasks or extra network interactions?  
            – Who do you need to talk with? 
   -How would that impact on the time required to complete the task? 
-Overall, for all behaviours identified as “not so well”, how frequently did these 
behaviours take place? What percentage of the time out of 10 times?  
     b) Relative frequency and Impact: (very well) 
   - How frequent does this “very well” behaviour take place? 
    - What is the percentage of time out of 10 times?  
-How does that help you? 
-E.g. – fewer tasks or fewer network interactions?   
   -How does that impact the time required to complete the task? 
-Overall, for all of the behaviours identified as “very well”, how frequently do 
these behaviours take place? What is the percentage of time out of 10 times?  
 
 142 
Diagram of interactions 
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Data Collection Process  
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The data collection process began witha staff member being asked how to perform a job task or subtask as 
shown in the figure below. Then, the researcher observed the staff member’s performance of the job task 
or subtask several times. During each observation, the researcher engaged in conversation with the staff 
member performing the task or subtask to collect information about problems that may have occurred 
during performance of the task. Whenever a problem was identified and explicitly commented on by the 
staff member, the researcher asked the staff member to judge the problem’s typicality and impact. The 
staff member was asked to judge first the typicality and impact of problems with the subtask and then the 
typicality and impact of the task it relates to. The overall judgment takes place at the end of each 
observation. For example, during the observation of the subtask of ‘unloading truck,’ which is part of the 
larger task of ‘delivering order,’ the truck might get a flat tire. If the truck driver indicates that the ‘flat 
tire’ is a problem, the researcher asks the truck driver how typical a flat tire is, and how extensive its 
impact on performance of the subtask of ‘unloading truck.’ Then, after fixing the flat tire, the researcher 
asks the truck driver how typical a flat tire is, and how extensive its impact is in relation to the task of 
‘delivering order.’       






Figure C.1: Example of Tasks, Subtasks and Sub-sucbtasks 
Task: ‘delivering orders’ 
Subtask: ‘unloading truck’ 
Sub-subtask: ‘fixing the flat tire’ 
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Appendix D                                                                                              
Data Collection Template 
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The data collection template (see the table below) was developed to record problems that occurred during 
the daily schedule execution (e.g. ‘flat tire’). 
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 Date        
Order  Disturbance/problem How it is handled People involved Impact problem General activity How the problem fits the problem 
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Appendix E                                                                                        




Fleet number n (orders) % 
P1 (42m) 57 13 
P2 (36m) 74 17  
P3 (47m) 88 20 
P4 (42m) 82 18 
P5 (42m) 14 03 
P7 (42m) 55 12 
P8 (32m) 50 11 
P9 (32m) 27 06 
Total  447 100 
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Appendix F                                                                          




within the permissible range beyond the permissible range 
As scheduled exact or higher shorter 
Fleet number n (orders) % n (orders) % n (orders) % 
P1 (42m) 39 8.7 16 3.6 2 0.4 
P2 (36m) 53 11.9 17 3.8 4 0.9 
P3 (47m) 62 13.9 0 0.0 26 5.8 
P4 (42m) 59 13.2 20 4.5 3 0.7 
P5 (42m) 10 2.2 3 0.7 1 0.2 
P7 (42m) 41 9.2 11 2.5 3 0.7 
P8 (32m) 27 6.0 23 5.1 0 0.0 
P9 (32m) 23 5.1 4 0.9 0 0.0 
  Total 314 70.3 94 21 39 8.7 
 
There are two observations worth noting in the previous table. The first observation is that the table 
indicates that P8 and P9 have no replacements within the category of “not so good” since P8 and P9 are 
the shortest pumps (32m), so all pumps are considered “good replacements” for P8 and P9. The second 
observation is that table # shows that most of the “not so good” replacements (26 out of 39) took place for 
P3. This is because P3 has the highest boom height. Thus, for P3, the category of “good replacements” 
does not exist. In other words, when staff members at RMC face a problem with P3 and must replace P3, 
they really do not have any options, since P3 is 47m and no other pump has an exact or taller height. 
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Appendix G                                                                       





1) It was brought to the researcher’s attention that one of the truck drivers seemed to be 
unmotivated. In the dispatcher words, “if there is no push, he wouldn’t take loads.” The 
researcher observed a day when this truck driver did not take loads as frequent as other truck 
drivers. Even though this truck driver was not as productive as other truck drivers, the whole 
operation went smoothly since he accounted only for 5% (1 out of 20) of the drivers.  
2) In another instance, the plant operator was late, which delayed the operation. Based on the 
researcher’s observation, it seems that the overall production at the end of the day was not 
affected by the late start. 
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Appendix H                                                                                                
An Example of the Rating Questions  
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Rate these cards in which you consider each card as your first move to “play your strength”:  (i.e. 7 is the most probable choice as being your 
first move, 1 is the least probable choice as being your first move and so on).                                                                                                        
You can place a card or more as inappropriate move based on the rules of the game by writing (*) in front of the card.  
















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Least Probable  
 
Sometimes Most Probable 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Least Probable  
 
Sometimes Most Probable 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Least Probable  
 
Sometimes Most Probable 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Least Probable  
 
Sometimes Most Probable 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Least Probable  Sometimes Most Probable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Least Probable  Sometimes Most Probable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Least Probable  Sometimes Most Probable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Least Probable  Sometimes Most Probable 
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Appendix I                                                                                                   
Central Aspects of Strategies: An Example of the Coding 
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The following quotes, in which two participants defined “support your partner’s play,” are offered as an 
example of the coding process.  
Par10: “If my partner is opening the round and I have something like a queen, king, or 10 of the 
played suit, then I can support my partner’s play.” 
Par18: “If my partner is playing a card, I’ll try to support his play. I’ll play a higher value card of 
the same suit. Then, if I win the round I’ll return the favor to my partner by playing a suit similar 
to the suit my partner played in the previous round.”   
From these examples, it can be observed that there are actions and processes such as ‘opening,’ ‘I 
have,’ ‘I can support,’ ‘playing,’ ‘I’ll play,’ and ‘return the favor.’ Overall, three important aspects that 
apply to the “support your partner’s play” strategy emerged, as follows: 
1. It is important to have high value cards of the played suit (Par10 and Par18). Although the 
participant in Par18 only referred to high value cards in general, the participant in Par10 gave 
specific examples of such cards (queen, king, or 10.) 
2. The strategy applies when the player’s partner opens the round (Par10). 
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1. Examples of the strategy 1: “Play your strength”  
No. Card1 Card2 Card3 Card4 
1 10 ♣ K ♣ J ♣ Q ♣ 
2 8 ♣ 10 ♣ K ♣ ------ 
3 A ♦ 10 ♦ Q ♦ ------ 
4 A ♦ 10 ♦ 7 ♦ 8 ♦ 
5 A ♠ 10 ♠ K ♠ Q ♠ 
6 A ♦ 10 ♦ Q ♦ ------ 
7 9 ♥ 10 ♥ K ♥ Q ♥ 
8 K ♦ Q ♦ J ♦ ------ 
9 K ♣ J ♣ 7 ♣ 8 ♣ 






2. Examples of strategy 2: “Support your partner’s play”  
No. Teammate* Participant** 
1 Q ♠ 10 ♠ 
2 9 ♣ A ♣ 
3 7 ♦ A ♦ 
4 10 ♥ A ♥ 
5 7 ♠ 10 ♠ 
6 K ♦ A ♦ 
7 10 ♥ A ♥ 
8 K ♦ A ♦ 
9 8 ♥ A ♥ 
10 K ♠ A ♠ 
 
* Teammate plays his or her card first 







3. Examples of the third strategy: “Don’t play below the Ace” 
No. Card1 Card2 Card3 
1 K ♥ 10 ♥ A ♥ 
2 A ♥ 10 ♥ Q ♥ 
3 7 ♦ Q ♦ A ♦ 
4 K ♥ 7 ♥ A ♥ 
5 A ♠ K ♠ 10 ♠ 
6 K ♠ A ♠ 7 ♠ 
7 A ♥ Q ♥ 8 ♥ 
8 A ♦ K ♦ ---- 
9 A ♣ 10 ♣ K ♣ 





4. Examples of the fourth strategy: “Don’t leave your 10 alone” 
No. Card1 Card2 
1 7 ♥ 10 ♥ 
2 9 ♣ 10 ♣ 
3 10 ♥ 9 ♥ 
4 10 ♠ 8 ♠ 
5 10 ♠ J ♠ 
6 10 ♥ K ♥ 
7 10 ♦ 8 ♦ 
8 K ♥ 10 ♥ 
9 10 ♣ 9 ♣ 
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No. Strategy  Card1 Card2 Card3 Card4 Card5 Card6 Card7 Card8 
1 Support your partner’s play j ♦ A ♥ 7 ♦ Q ♣ 9 ♥ 8 ♣ K ♣ k ♦ 
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Strategy 1   First player                         Second player 
Support your partner’s play   
Condition 1 8 ♦ 9 ♦ 
Condition 2 8 ♦ Q ♦ 
Condition 3               8 ♦ A ♦ 
Strategy 2   
Signalling   
Condition 1 A ♥   K ♥ 
Condition 2 Q ♥        K ♥ 
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Strategy 1: Support your partner’s play 
Strategy 
Within the strategy Beyond the strategy 
Support your 
partner’s play 
k ♦ J ♦ 7 ♦ 
 
 
Strategy 2: Signalling * 
Strategy 
Within the strategy Beyond the strategy 
Signalling 
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Strategy 1: Support your partner’s play 
Strategy Within the Strategy Beyond the Strategy 
Frequency Frequency Support your 
partner’s play 
k ♦ J ♦ 7 ♦ 
Condition 1 19 6 1 
Condition 2 25 0 3 
Condition 3 0 0 28 
 
 
Strategy 2: Signalling* 
Strategy Within the Strategy Beyond the Strategy 
Frequency Frequency 
Signalling* 
k ♦ Q ♠ J ♣ 10 ♣ A ♣ 7 ♠ 9 ♣ 9 ♦ 
Condition 1 11 7 2 0 0 1 2 0 
Condition 2 0 0 0 0 0 12 1 12 
Condition 3 0 0 0 0 0 12 1 12 
 
* According to the design, the third player should notify the first player (teammate) that a club should be 
played first in the next round. However, it was found in the results that there were three interpretations of 
the strategy: 1. Some participants played k ♦. 2. Other participants played Q ♠.3. Few participants played 
J ♣. Participants played these three cards to notify the first player (teammate) that a club should be played 
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